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several authors. E.g., D. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC
AGAINST THE SYSTEM 15 (1983) [hereinafter D. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION] ("[Law students] learn a list of
balanced, formulaic, Pro/con policy arguments that lawyers use in arguing that a given rule should apply to a
situation . . . ."); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 521-35 (1960); Boyle,
Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 1003 (1985); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685. 1713 (1976) [hereinafter Kennedy, Form and Substance] (“My assertion is
that the arguments lawyers use are relatively few in number and highly stereotyped, although they are applied in an
infinite diversity of factual situations."); J. Boyle, Legal Mystification and Legal Argument (unpublished
mimeographed materials); D. Kennedy, Torts (unpublished mimeographed materials) [hereinafter D. Kennedy,
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I. INTRODUCTION
Chemistry teaches us that gemstones form single crystals. What makes these crystals
interesting scientifically is their structure: the molecules in a single crystalline substance arrange
themselves in an ordered and regular pattern which is repeated throughout the solid.1 Moreover, the
tiny molecular patterns taken together create the identical pattern on a larger scale, and this process
continues at each succeeding level of size, so that the structure of the- solid is the same regardless
of the level examined.2 Finally, when a single crystal is cut into pieces (as, when a diamond cutter
splits a diamond), each piece retains the same structure (and levels of structure) as the original.3
The thesis of this Article is that legal thought and legal argument have a crystalline structure.
I mean by this not that legal doctrines have a self-replicating structure, but rather that legal
arguments that people make in defense of legal doctrines share a common structure. This common
structure is replicated throughout diverse areas of legal doctrine and at successive levels of doctrinal
complexity.4
Torts].
5 The fact that all legal argument cannot be grouped into one of the categories described in this Article does
not diminish the importance of understanding and mastering the large array of legal arguments which can be so
classified.
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If one attempts to view legal thinking as a coherent system of moral directives it becomes
hopelessly complicated and confusing; however, if it is viewed dialectically as a continuing series
of struggles between various sets of opposed ideas, its structure becomes relatively simple, and
crystal clear. The play on words is deliberate. The structure of legal thought is "crystalline" both in
its self-replicating nature and in its order and transparency. Thus, in the seemingly vast and
confusing variety of legal rules and principles, I claim there is an underlying unity of great simplicity.
The existence of this structure is significant for several reasons. First, it has pedagogical
importance. The analysis of structures of argument demonstrates that legal discourse is not as
complex as it first appears-that in fact there are standard forms of argumentation which reappear in
diverse doctrinal contexts. The most skilled students and practitioners grasp this instinctively. For
the beginning law student, for the lawyer interested in sharpening his rhetorical skills, or for the
merely curious, the explicit articulation of these principles may be of assistance in learning how to
develop and respond to legal arguments. My admittedly brief experience has confirmed that teaching
students to recognize and use the recurring structures of argument can assist them in the process of
making arguments in widely varying doctrinal situations.5
The significance of this analysis is not, however, limited to a new technique of legal
instruction. In essence, the study of the typology of legal argument is the study of legal thought itself.
The discovery of recurring structures of legal argument raises important questions about the way
that people reason when they engage in legal argument. Moreover, because the forms of legal
argument I shall consider in this article are also forms of moral argument, these recurring structures
raise issues in moral philosophy and epistemology as well.
A. Rules and Rule Choices
In order to see the crystalline structure of law, we must change radically the way we look at
legal thought and doctrine. Legal doctrine as we normally understand it consists of a series of rules,
policies, principles, standards, and tests. An example of a tort doctrine is "the test of negligence is
what a reasonable person in defendant's situation would have done," or "the defendant takes the
plaintiff as she finds her." We usually think of legal doctrine as the stitching together of all the
various tests, rules, policies, principles, and standards into a more or less coherent whole. I would
like to put that picture of legal doctrine as a quilt of rules aside in favor of a new one. Instead of
looking at doctrine as a series of rules, I propose to look at it as a series of rule choices.
The notion of a rule choice is straightforward. Consider the familiar principle of tort law
described above: "the test of negligence is what a reasonable person in defendant's situation would
have done." This is an objective standard for negligence and for legal fault. Our law has chosen this
test, and to say that it has chosen it implies that it was chosen over some alternative. What was that
6 O. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1963).
7 Id. at 85-86.
8 Id. at 86-103.
9 D. Kennedy, Torts, supra note 4, at 11-21. See generally, C. LEVI-STRAUSS, THE RAW AND THE COOKED
(1969); 1 & 2 C. LEVI-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1963,1976); T.K. SEUNG, STRUCTURALISM AND
HERMENEUTICS (1982). Levi-Strauss does not use this particular kind of diagram, but the types of relations in which
he is interested  maybe classified as "dyadic." Id. at 104-12 (comparing Hegelian triadic logic with Levi-Straussian
dyadic or binary logic).
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alternative? There are actually an infinite number, but one obvious alternative is a subjective test of
negligence. This was how Holmes saw the issue posed in The Common Law;6
Supposing it now to be conceded that the general notion upon which liability to an action is founded
is fault or blameworthiness in some sense, the question arises, whether it is so in the sense of personal
moral shortcoming . . . . Suppose that a defendant were allowed to testify that, before acting, he
considered carefully what would be the conduct of a prudent man under the circumstances, and,
having formed the best judgment he could, acted accordingly. If the story was believed, it would be
conclusive against the defendant's negligence judged by a moral standard which would take his
personal characteristics into account. But supposing any such evidence to have got before the jury,
it is very clear that the court would say, Gentlemen, the question is not whether the defendant thought
his conduct was that of a prudent man, but whether you think it was.7
Note carefully what Holmes has done. First he assumes that fault is the basis of tort liability.
Then he asks, shall we have a subjective or an objective standard of negligence? Holmes goes on to
argue for an objective standard,8 but what is important for our purposes here is the doctrinal choice
he poses. This choice can be illustrated by a simple diagram:
This diagram I call a "dyad," after Professor Duncan Kennedy, who in turn borrowed the
word from various Structuralist thinkers.9 It may seem at first rather a great deal of fuss to draw a
diagram in order to make a relatively simple point, but the dyads will become surprisingly useful in
explaining a number of more complicated ideas which follow.
For brevity's sake, I will call a rule choice which can be treated this way as a dyadic rule
choice. Obviously these are not confined to tort law:
10 E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
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These examples are designed to demonstrate that many, if not most, of the issues brought
before courts and legislatures may be understood in terms of dyadic rule choices that could be
similarly diagrammed. This broad claim, however, requires several important refinements:
(1) There is no one "necessary " or "correct " alternative to a given rule of law to form a
dyadic rule choice, although there are rules that cannot serve as alternatives.
In the example given above, Holmes saw the issue of the proper standard of care as between
objective or subjective standards of negligence-he had already assumed that a fault standard of some
sort would be chosen. But imagine a court or decision maker faced with a case in which it must
decide whether to use the preexisting negligence (objective) standard in products liability cases or
adopt strict liability instead.10 This could be diagramed as:
The reader can no doubt think of countless other standards of care to which an objective
standard might be opposed: Custom of the Industry, Objective Standard but Taking Insanity into
Account, No Duty to Exercise Care. The fact that no court would be likely to accept a given
alternative (because it is considered a substantively bad rule) does not mean that an alternative
cannot be articulated.
The analysis which follows does not assume that rules have a single, natural "opposite."
Indeed, it explicitly assumes the contrary-that the arguments used to support a rule derive from the
11 This is a fundamental idea in structuralist and post-structuralist thought---that the relation between (here
to opposition between) ideas, things, or cultural phenomena gives them meaning. STRUCTURALISM AND SINCE 10 (J.
Sturrock ed. 1979) ("Structuralism . . . studies relations between mutually conditioned elements of a system and not
between self-contained essences . . . . [Without difference there can be no meaning."). Thus, what it means to take a
position in favor of a certain rule can only be understood in the context of the rule to which it is opposed.
12The caveat that we are considering only "normal contexts" is quite important to the discussion. In a
dyadic rule choice, we are concerned not with relations of contradiction but of opposition between rules. A
contradiction involves a relationship between two elements which are logically opposed, like "A" and "Not A." An
opposition is a function of three elements: the two opposed objects and the relation or means by which they are
opposed. See T.K. SEUNG, supra note 9, at 8-14. In order for us to feel the sense of opposition between rules, there
must be a relational context which establishes that opposition between them. Seung gives the example of "odd"
versus "even." The opposition between these concepts exists only in the domain of integers; our concept of
numbering provides the relation which produces the opposition. Contrast this with a supposed opposition between
"goal" and "goal." We do not see these concepts as opposed because we see no obvious contextual relation between
them that would produce an opposition. Id. at 11-12. This is not to say that with sufficient ingenuity wecould
notconjure upsuch a context, but rather that a context which created opposition between these two concepts would
have no independent significance for us. In the case of rule choices, our understanding of how rules operate in
specific contexts provides the relation of opposition between them. Such an opposition exists between an objective
and a subjective standard of negligence, but not between an objective standard and a rule against punitive damages
in libel actions.
13Levi-Strauss's structuralism, however, does involve oppositions between objects or concepts like sea and
sky, heaven and earth, father and son, etc. E.g., C. LEVI-STRAUSS, THE RAW AND THE COOKED (1969). The cultural
phenomena I am concerned with here, however, are rules and arguments used to support them.
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context of what rule is offered as its alternative; it is the relation (or opposition) between things that
gives them meaning.11
However, there are some "oppositions" that do not qualify as true dyadic rule choices:
This is the jurisprudential equivalent of comparing apples and oranges. In normal contexts,
the punitive damages rule does not appear to us as an alternative to an objective standard of
negligence.12 In addition, dyadic rule choices are choices between rules, and not the substantive
merits of people, institutions, or other things.13
(2) Even where a rule is seen as the result of a choice between many alternatives, it can be
treated as a series of dyadic rule choices.
14 The above diagram should not be confused with the actual decision procedure a decisionmaker might
employ in choosing between a number of alternatives. It is merely a method of translating multiple choices into a
series of choices of two. Here is an equally possible recasting:
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In the example above, we saw that Holmes had simply assumed that the standard of liability
in tort was fault-based. There are many possible standards of due care, however, some of which are
noted below:
Holmes has simply considered the middle two standards of care. In so doing, however, he
has made the prior assumption (actually a choice) that the law will impose some sort of duty of care,
and he has dismissed strict liability out of hand. This recharacterization of Holmes's rule choice leads
to the following diagram:
The diagram recasts the choice of four possible rules as a series of three dyadic rule choices.14
15 A statute which bans the playing of loud music in public parks between the hours of 11  p.m. and 8 a.m.
might be seen as having no obvious opposite with which it might be contrasted. Legislators who debate complicated
laws, however, are as likely to state their opposition to particular portions of a bill as they are to oppose the entire
bill itself. One legislator might object to the ban of music but not other loud activities, while a second might object
to the restriction to public parks and would extend the ban to all publicly owned property. Each of these legislators
might offer an amendment which could be analyzed in terms of a dyadic rule choice. A third legislator might ask
that the curfew begin at 10 p.m. instead of 11 p.m. As long as there is a different rule which could make a difference
to someone. and which can be argued for in opposition to the alternative, there is the possibility of a dyadic rule
choice.
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965).
17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A comment c (1965).
18 E.g., Daniels v. Evans, 107 N.H. 407, 409, 224 A.2d 63, 66 (1966).
19 E.g., Adams v. Lopez, 75 N.M. 503, 507, 407 P.2d 50, 52 (1965).
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It follows from point (2) that rules or statutes containing many elements or requirements may
in theory be broken down into dyadic rule choices, however cumbersome that might be in practice.15
(3) A discrete body of legal doctrine can be viewed as a series of dyadic rule choices of ever
increasing specificity.
In the tort law example we began with, we noted that the choice between objective and
subjective standards could be seen as preceded by prior choices of rules: We chose duty over no
duty, then a duty of negligence over strict liability, and then an objective standard of negligence over
a subjective standard. Of course, there is no reason to stop at that particular level of doctrine. We
might consider whether under an objective standard of negligence, there is an exception for children,
or a different standard for insane persons, or for those who are blind, or intoxicated, and so forth.
This leads us to further rule choices, each of which leads to additional branches of doctrinal
development. Assume, for example, that we follow one of these branches of doctrinal development
and create an exception for children (which is now the majority rule).16 We might consider if there
is an exception to that exception when the child engages in an ad ult activity (this too, is the case
now generally).17 We might then go on to ask if operating a motorcycle is an adult activity within
the meaning of that rule,18 and if so, whether operating a motorscooter is also an adult activity.19 Put
together, we have a descending series of rule choices of increasing factual complexity and
specificity:
20Thus under the objective/subjective rule choice there are not only the issues of special rules for children,
but also for the blind, the insane, the elderly, etc. Although there are myriad of possible sub-rule choices which
present themselves at each level, it is possible to follow a particular "chain" of dyads in a particular doctrinal area
and study the forms of argument used at each level (for example, with respect to the rules regarding children).
Another example would be the successive development of rules regarding the cause of action for negligent infliction
9
For ease of expression, when I speak of a series of rule choices I shall refer to the choices
following a given choice as involving "subdoctrines" or "subrules" and the rule choices preceding
it as involving "supradoctrines" or "suprarules." (Thus, I will speak of the Adult Activity Rule as a
subdoctrine of the Objective Standard of Negligence Rule, and the choice of Negligence over Strict
Liability as a supradoctrine of the Adult Activity Rule.)
Two points of clarification are in order. First, it is important to recognize that when one says
that legal rules can be arranged in successive dyadic rule choices of increasing factual complexity
and specificity, these terms are necessarily subjective evaluations; not everyone would agree that rule
choice A is more factually complex and specific than rule choice B. Moreover, from point (2) above,
it follows that there is no necessary way of getting to the "last" rule choice and no necessary starting
point-I have simply produced a series of choices in an order that seemed logically coherent starting
with the opposition between duty and no duty, which seemed the most "abstract." The reader may
construct a different series of dyadic rule choices; the order in which the choices are made does not
affect the analysis.
Second, I do not claim that it is possible to put all of the rule choices implicated in a given
doctrinal area in a single dyadic chain or set of chains. There may be an infinite number of
subdoctrinal choices which could follow "beneath" any given rule choice.20
of emotional distress. See infra text accompanying notes 88-110.
21 See infra text at notes 28-31 for a definition of these terms.
22 See infra text at notes 73-74 for a definition of these terms.
23 As I mention infra, there are many other types of oppositions of ideas in legal discourse which create
crystalline structures of argument. In a future article, I hope to discuss some of these other oppositions in more
detail. However, it is more important at this point to develop the idea of a crystalline structure without undue
complication. I consider the two sets of oppositions I have chosen to discuss as the most significant and pervasive in
legal argument.
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Our ability to recast legal doctrines into successive dyadic rule choices is important because
it exposes the common structures of legal thought. Every dyadic choice between two opposed rules
mirrors a larger choice between a pair (or between several pairs) of fundamentally opposed legal
ideas. These pairs of opposed ideas, in turn, represent basic structures in our moral and legal thought.
Furthermore, each side of an opposition of ideas is associated with standard forms of legal
and moral argument. These arguments justify the rule on one side of the dyad and militate against
the opposite rule. For this reason, vast portions of legal doctrine (as expressed in dyadic rule choices)
recapitulate the dialectic between the pairs of opposed ideas. This opposition is replicated at each
level of doctrinal complexity (that is, in subdoctrinal rule choices and supradoctrinal rule choices),
and throughout diverse areas of legal doctrine. The replication of argument forms gives legal thought
its crystalline structure.
*   *   *   
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: In the second section of the article, I
identify and describe what I consider to be the most important pair of opposed ideas in legal and
moral thought. This pair of opposed ideas which consists of two competing visions of human
responsibility in society. I refer to these ideas as individualism and communalism.21
In the third section of the article I classify and describe many of the most common forms of
legal argument and demonstrate how they recapitulate the opposition between individualism and
communalism.
In the fourth section of the article, I explain in greater detail how crystalline structures
operate, and demonstrate the effects these structures have on legal thought and the development of
legal doctrine. I also introduce a second set of opposed legal ideas, the opposition between Formal
and Substantive Realizability,22 and show how this opposition interacts with the opposition between
individualism and communalism.23 Finally, I discuss the importance of the analysis to legal and
moral philosophy.
24Throughout this article, "defendant" and "plain tiff" are employed as terms of art. I use these terms
because it is easier to visualize the competing forms of argument in the adversarial context of a lawsuit. A more
accurate set of terms would be -the responsibility bearer" and the victim or "responsibility beneficiary."
In many situations legal rules do not give rise to private lawsuits between plaintiffs and defendants: (1)
Government officials may debate the adoption of regulations which give no private cause of action, but nevertheless
affect rights and responsibilities. (2) When the legislature debates any statutory rule which alters the responsibilities
and duties of parties in society, there are not as yet plaintiffs and defendants. (3) In criminal cases. there is never a
private plaintiff, although there may be a victim.
Nevertheless, the forms of arguments set forth in this article would still apply to rule choices in these
situations. even if the rules would never give rise to a private lawsuit. Thus, when I speak of "defendants" in this
article, I mean persons who may be assessed additional responsibility, duties or punishment as a consequence of a
particular rule choice. whether or not there is ever any subsequent legal proceeding in which they are named as a
party. By "plaintiffs" I mean those persons who would be the beneficiaries of the additional responsibility, duty, or
punishment, again. regardless of whether there are any subsequent legal proceedings.
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II INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMUNALISM
A. The Basic Distinction
Consider Figure 8 once again. It presents a series of doctrinal and subdoctrinal rule choices,
which I will now lay out side by side:
The orientation of the rules is the same as was used in the branching diagram in Figure 9. The
placement of the rules on the left hand and right hand sides of each dyad was not accidental. It was
done to group similar choices together.
All of the rules on the left hand side of the dyads impose upon the defendant a higher degree
of responsibility than those on the right. This convention was also followed in Figures 1, 2 and 3.
The comparative degree of responsibility imposed upon a defendant24 is significant for
several reasons. First, when the defendant is held to a higher standard of responsibility, more is
expected of her by others in the community, and she is more subject to their requirements and
expectations. Second, she is more likely to have the state's coercive power used against her, either
in the form of penal sanctions, an award of damages, or injunctive relief. Third, even if she never
chooses to cross the line established by the higher standard of responsibility, so that she never
25This familiar opposition has been noted by many writers, most of them relying on Kennedy's description
in Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 4. See, e.g., Dalton, Deconstructing Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L..J.
997, 1006 (1985) (opposition between self and other): Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence
from Bentham to Hohfeld, WIS. L. REV. 975, 980 (1982) (opposition between individualism and collectivism). As
this literature demonstrates, the opposition can be characterized in a wide variety of ways. I do not claim that my
employment of these terms is completely consistent with the meaning of any of the authors above. Kennedy's term
for communalism is "altruism," which I do not use for reasons discussed infra, text beginning at note 31.
26 In adopting this left-right convention, it is essential that the reader not confuse the distinction between
individualism and communalism with that between liberalism and conservatism. Both liberals and conservatives
take relatively communalist positions on some issues and relatively individualist positions on others. In general,
American liberals tend to be individualistic with respect to the rights of criminal defendants and the rights of free
speech and sexual autonomy, while conservatives tend to be more communalist on these issues. On the other hand,
in the area of economic regulation, liberals tend to be more communalistic and conservatives more individualistic.
See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.  
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actually incurs remedial or punitive measures by the community, the very presence of the larger
responsibility inhibits her freedom of choice and action.
Because each rule on the left hand side creates greater responsibilities and duties than the rule
on the right, the arguments for and against each rule will be similar. The arguments for the stricter
rules on the left side will emphasize that heightened responsibility is necessary to protect innocent
victims or those who might otherwise be injured by the defendants' activities. The arguments for the
opposite rules on the right side will emphasize that the stricter rules run the risk of imposing liability
when there is no moral blameworthiness, or that these rules unduly restrict the freedom of action and
rights of self-determination of the defendants.
The debate about the proper scope of individual responsibility to others appears throughout
the whole of the law. It is the reverse side of the problem of the proper scope of individual freedom
in society. The debate is recapitulated in rule choices at ever), doctrinal level. There are two polar
positions or directions of emphasis one can take in this debate. What I shall term the individualist
position seeks to de-emphasize or minimize the responsibilities and duties of individuals to others
in society. The communalist position seeks to emphasize and extend the responsibilities and duties
individuals owe to others .25
In each of the previous examples, the left side of the dyad corresponds to the relatively
communalist rule, which expands individual responsibility, while the right side of the dyad
corresponds to the relatively individualist rule, which limits individual responsibility. This
convention will be observed throughout the article.26
The individualist and communalist positions are more than a way of dividing up and
categorizing rule choices. They represent two very different views about the individual's relationship
to others and to society as a whole. They are polar philosophical positions. They contradict each
other, yet are simultaneously present in our moral consciousness. The tension between them
27 In his critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-
Land, 36 STAN. L. REV. 413 (1984), Professor Louis Schwartz describes Kennedy's project as identifying
individualism with Liberalism and altruism (communalism) as an anti-Liberal “CLS Alternative." Id. at 418. That
identification is just as incorrect, I think, as the identification of individualism with political conservatism. See
supra note 26. Liberalism (the social theory, not the American political position opposed to conservatism) is
composed of both individualist and communalist elements. There is a constant pull in our thought at every level of
legal discourse between individualist and communalist forms of argument. This opposition occurs within Liberal
society and is inextricably woven into the fabric of Liberal social thought I do not claim that Liberalism is the cause
of the opposition, so that if we could transcend our Liberal institutions the tension would magically disappear. See
infra text accompanying notes 144-49. I do claim that the opposition itself is manifested in Liberal thought, so that
neither side is characteristically “Liberal" or "Anti- Liberal." If the principle of freedom of contract in common law
doctrine is comparatively individualistic, the common law principle of compensation for harm without a showing of
fault is relatively communalistic.
28There are dyadic rule choices which do not recapitulate the tension between individualism and
communalism, but instead mirror other sets of opposed legal ideas. These oppositions create their own structures, as
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 67-68.
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reappears at every step of our moral and legal decision making27 and manifests itself in almost every
legal rule choice we encounter.28
The next step in our exploration of the crystalline structure of legal doctrine, therefore, must
be an explanation and description of these opposed social visions.
B. The Nature of the Opposition Between Individualism and Communalism
The problem of moral choice is, at its deepest level, a question of what duties we owe to
others in society, or to society as a whole. Indeed, moral choice only becomes coherent in a social
context; a solipsist need have no scruples. Two polar positions contend over the relationship of self
to others. One position is responsibility denying-it argues that duty and responsibility exist only so
far as they are voluntarily created, embraced, and imposed upon the individual by the individual
herself. The other is responsibility affirming-it holds that duty and responsibility exist insofar as they
are created, embraced, and imposed upon members of the community by the community itself.
In its purest form, individualism argues that no moral imperative is binding except a freely
chosen moral imperative. No sanction, expectation, or command of others can have any moral claim
on an individual unless the individual has acknowledged and consented to its moral force. Thus, for
the individualist, the only valid legislation is self-legislation, the only true duties are self-imposed
duties, and the only enforceable restrictions are those the self has placed upon itself.
The individualist conception of duty determines the individualist conception of freedom, for
freedom and duty are two sides of the same coin. Freedom in individualist terms is the unrestricted
exercise of individual will; it is liberty from the constraints, expectations, and duties imposed by and
owed to others. The self is free insofar as it chooses by itself for itself, and insofar as it is not held
to be responsible for the effects of its choices on others.
29We normally think of freedom as freedom to do something, in the sense of an absence of governmental
coercion as to our choices, but freedom can also be freedom from something, in the sense of being free from worry
about where one's next meal is coming from, feeling free to leave one's front door unlocked when one goes to the
grocery store, etc. This second sense of "freedom” relies on security and social cohesion it is usually a more
communalist conception of freedom, while the first is more often than not an individualist conception. When
Franklin Roosevelt spoke of the "four freedoms," two of them were individualist in conception (freedom of speech
and freedom of worship) and two of them were communalist in conception (freedom from want and freedom from
fear). Message to Congress (Jan. 6, 1941 ).
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An example may help to clarify this point. Freedom of speech may be seen, in comparison
with community imposed censorship, as a relatively individualist position. To say that the individual
has complete freedom of speech is to say that no matter what harm her speech causes to others in
society, or to society as a whole (in terms of hurt feelings, political unrest, violent reaction, damaged
reputation, etc.), the individual will not be held accountable for her choice to express herself. Thus,
the more liberty of speech she enjoys, the less responsible she is for the effects of her speech on
others. The individualist direction, therefore, is the direction of greater freedom and correspondingly
smaller duty and responsibility for the consequences of one's actions.
The polar position opposite individualism is communalism. For the communalist, moral
imperatives are binding because they reflect the will of the community, and not the individual.
Members of a community owe allegiance to its mores, ideals, and goals. All members of the
community have duties and responsibilities to all other members. These duties and obligations are
not the result of voluntary choice but preexist the self. If for the individualist duty was inseparable
from self-legislation, for the communalist, duty is inseparable from communal participation. Self-
realization only is possible through embracing the shared values and goals of the community.
The fact that preexisting mores of the community are imposed upon the self does not negate
the self’s freedom, for the self is part of the community that creates these duties. Under the
communalist vision, one is truly free only when one can share in the benefits of participation in the
community and enjoy the protection and security which membership in the community offers.29
Because the members of the community are responsible to each other, they are responsible
for the consequences that their actions have upon each other. Members must weigh these
consequences in making personal choices. They must choose not only for themselves, but for others,
and for the community as a whole, and they will be held responsible for their choices if others are
hurt or injured.
As an example, consider a system of criminal law. The very existence of such a system is a
relatively communalist position. Under a system of criminal law, individuals who violate community
standards are held responsible to the community for the consequences of their actions. Individuals
who transgress the commands of the community will be required to submit themselves to its
judgment and suffer penal sanctions imposed upon them by the community. In contrast to the
philosophy of individualism, the fact that an individual's act was freely chosen, and was true to a
30 To the extent that principles of justification, excuse, and diminished capacity are present in a system of
criminal law, the responsibilities and duties of individuals to each other are limited. These principles are therefore
relatively individualist.
31Duncan Kennedy has called the position opposite individualism "altruism." His conception stresses
sharing, mutual protection, and sensitivity to the needs of others. Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 4, at
1717-22. These attitudes also form part of what I call the communalist position. However, the idea of communalism
is broader than notions of altruism. Consider four separate cases: (1) a convicted murderer is sentenced to life
imprisonment; (2) a car manufacturer is held strictly liable for distribution of a defective product; (3) a promisor is
held liable for breach of a promise made without consideration but which induced reasonable reliance: and (4) a
contracting party is held liable for failure to perform her contract in good faith.
In the first two cases, we do not think that society is asking the criminal or the manufacturer to act
altruistically toward their respective victims; rather society is asking them to accept responsibility for the
consequences of their actions. The fourth case and perhaps the third as well may sound more like the defendants are
being "forced" to act altruistically, see id. at 1719, but consider how strange that expression sounds.
In fact, all four cases involve the imposition of societal duties on individuals to make them conform with
societally determined standards of responsibility to others. This forces individuals to consider how their acts will
affect others, and curtails their freedom of action to that extent.
This is not to deny that altruistic values are an important part of the communalist ideal. For example, by
imposing strict liability in the second case, the manufacturer may be forced to spread risk and to pass the costs of
non-negligent accidents on to consumers, who will then share the burden together. Certainly this sounds more or
less altruistic. Altruism, however, is only one aspect of this social vision; the central idea is responsibility for the
effects of one's behavior on others in the community, judged according to communally imposed norms---hence the
term communalist.
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personal system of values, will not excuse her from responsibility.30 The communalist direction,
therefore, is the direction of greater responsibility for (and correspondingly lesser excuse for) the
consequences of one's actions.31
C. Individualism and Communalism as Orientations
It is misleading to think of individualism and communalism as coherent positions with
definable agendas like political party platforms or religious dogmas. For example, my students are
often given to say, "individualists believe in freedom of speech, and subjective standards in tort and
criminal law; communalists believe in censorship and objective standards in tort and criminal law."
It is more correct to say that in a rule choice between an objective standard and a subjective standard,
the objective standard is the relatively more communalist rule choice. Objective standards are not
communalist per se; Figure 3 above demonstrates that in a rule choice between an objective standard
of negligence and strict liability, an objective standard is the relatively more individualist position.
To put the point another way, consider a continuum of increasing duty:
32 This antinomy is another manifestation of what Professor Kennedy refers to as the "Fundamental
Contradiction." Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 209, 211-13 (1979)
("[T]he goal of individual freedom is at the same time dependent on and incompatible with the communal coercive
action that is necessary to achieve it . . . . [R]elations with others are both necessary to and incompatible with our
freedom . . . . ").
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A, B, C, and D are possible rules. Even if B is very far to the left on the spectrum, it is still
an individualist position in comparison with rule A, and even if C is very far to the right on the
spectrum, it is still a communalist position in comparison with rule D. In a totalitarian regime in
which all speech is proscribed except speech about baseball, that position is still more individualist
than a complete ban on expressive activity.
Thus, because individualism and communalism cannot be identified with specific rules but
only with relative positions in rule choices, I will speak of them as "directions" or "orientations." The
continuum is therefore the natural analogy.
There is a further reason why individualism and communalism cannot be seen as well-
defined sets of positions like the platforms of political parties. These orientations, taken as far as
possible in their respective directions, become intellectually incoherent. As one travels further and
further in the communalist direction, one assesses more and more responsibility on every member
of the community. Finally, everyone is liable to everyone else for everything. In such a state no one
has any particular responsibility because everyone has responsibility. Collective guilt is noguilt at
all; collective duty is no duty at all. The fruits of security provided by increased protection are
devoured by the absolute liability of each individual for every act or failure to act.
Similarly, as one moves further and further in the individualist direction, persons in society
become increasingly free to act in any way they desire without accountability or responsibility.
Ultimately, anyone can do anything anyone likes toanyone else with impunity. In such a nasty and
brutish state, freedom is indeed short-lived, for there is no protection of activity from persons who
may use any means to prevent that activity. Freedom of speech is no freedom if there is also freedom
of assassination. The fruits of freedom provided by increasing license are destroyed by the lack of
a minimal level of security necessary to facilitate individual choice.
The paradox that results is that the communalist ideal of community participation requires
freedom of action for its fullest enjoyment. The individualist ideal of fulfillment of individual
autonomy requires communally established security in order to protect freedom of action. Just as
freedom and duty are two sides of the same coin, which cannot exist without each other, so
individualism and communalism are mutually dependent visions of society; the total denial of one
vision results in the destruction of the other.32
III. THE RECURRING STRUCTURES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT
Lawyers, judges, legislators, and commentators make legal arguments every day. These
arguments are employed quite unselfconsciously in order to explain and to win others over to their
point of view. Yet it is remarkable to what degree the diverse body of legal doctrine produced by
33As explained below, these are classified as individualist Social Utility arguments.
34 In the descriptions that follow, I use Duncan Kennedy's terminology, with some modifications. See
generally, Boyle, Anatomy of a Torts Class, supra note 4; Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in
Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L.
REV. 563 (1982); Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 4; J. Boyle, Legal Mystification and Legal Argument,
supra note 4; D. Kennedy, Torts, supra note 4.
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these legal thinkers reiterates the same basic ideas. This similarity is not accidental-it reflects the
underlying structures of our legal and moral thought.
As an example of a recurring form of legal argument, consider the following series of policy
arguments; in each case the argument is designed to prove that the imposition of a more stringent
duty will hinder the very social goals it was designed to achieve:
(1) "Imposing an implied warranty of habitability won't help the poor at all-landlords will just
raise the rent or go out of business and the poor will be thrown out into the street."
(2) "Outlawing abortions won't save human lives. Abortions will continue because the rich
can afford them and the poor will be left to the mercy of unlicensed butchers at enormous risk to
their health and safety."
(3) "Affirmative action programs actually hurt minorities in the longrun by subjecting them
to stigmas by their fellow students or employees and to a greater chance of failure when they are
brought into demanding situations without proper preparation."
(4) "Gun control doesn't prevent crimes or save lives-it just guarantees that criminals will
have guns and innocent citizens will be helpless to protect themselves."
(5) "Truth in Lending laws drive up interest rates and the price of consumer goods and make
it harder for the poor and the middle class to afford loans or to purchase things they really need."
The reader can doubtless think of many other similar arguments. All are individualist in
character; they militate against the imposition of extra responsibility by arguing that the proposed
rule will create undesirable consequences.33
The opposed social visions of individualism and communalism animate a large number of
standard legal arguments. The goal of this section is to identify some of the most common forms of
legal argument and demonstrate how they recapitulate the dialectic of individualism and
communalism.34
The vast majority of legal arguments fall into one of seven categories:
(1) Arguments of Moral Responsibility and Desert;
(2) Arguments of Moral, Legal, or Political Right;
(3) Arguments of Social Policy and Social Utility;
(4) Arguments of Formal and Substantive Realizability;
(5) Arguments of Institutional Competence and Authority;
(6) Arguments of Equality; and
35 This list does not exhaust the different forms of arguments that have been or will ever be made. For
example, in the nineteenth century, courts occasionally made what I would call "conceptualist" or "definitional"
arguments: that a certain legal conclusion necessarily followed from the definition of a particular legal concept, like
intent, jurisdiction, sovereignty, power, and so on. I do not consider these forms of argument in this article.
36 For those skeptical about the pervasiveness of these recurring structures, a more systematic and detailed
account of the various types of individualist and communalist argument forms is presented in the Appendix on The
Typology of Legal Argument. The Appendix lists not only the different forms of legal arguments but also gives
numerous examples from judicial opinions and the writings of legal commentators.
37 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891).
38 Id. at 530, 50 N.W. at 404; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 16(l) (1965).
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(7) Arguments of Precedent and Stare Decisis.35
The first three types of arguments fall along the individualistcommunalist axis. That is to say,
there are individualist and communalist versions of each argument; for every individualist argument
there is a communalist rejoinder, and vice-versa. The last four types of arguments represent separate
axes of opposition in our legal and moral consciousness. Of these four, only arguments of Formal
and Substantive Realizability will receive extended discussion in this article.
What follows next is a relatively simple description of the first three groups, designed to give
the reader the general sense of the recurring types of arguments.36
A. Arguments of Moral Responsibility and Desert
Arguments about fault, intention, causation, act, and injury are perhaps the most basic in the
law. They are most prominent in tort and criminal law. To introduce these arguments, consider the
well-known case of Vosburg v. Putney, 37 where a twelve year old boy kicked another child on the
shin, leading to an infection of the plaintiffs leg and the eventual loss of its use. Vosburg announces
the now familiar "egg-shell skull" rule, namely, that once an intentional tort is committed, the
"wrong-doer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act, whether they could or
could not have been foreseen by him.”38
Consider what arguments defense counsel might have made to convince the judge that
damages should be limited to foreseeable injury, which would have allowed the recovery of only
nominal damages. One argument that springs immediately to mind is based upon a lack of moral
responsibility by the defendant:
It is unfair that my client should have to pay for all of this damage. He did nothing wrong---he only
gave his schoolmate a playful kick on the shin. He did not know of the preexisting condition of the
plaintiff. The injury was not foreseeable and it is not his fault that this unfortunate but completely
uncontemplated result occurred.
The plaintiffs attorney would no doubt respond with equal vehemence:
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It may be true that the defendant did not know of my client's preexisting condition and is completely
innocent of any malicious intent. But my client is without the use of a leg through no fault of his own
and deserves compensation. Since the defendant caused the injury he should pay for it.
The attorney for the defendant has made a quintessential individualist argument---No
Liability Without Fault (which I will abbreviate as NLWF). The plaintiffs attorney made the classic
communalist rejoinder---As Between Two Innocents, Let the Person Who Caused the Damage Pay
(ASB21). We may represent the debate schematically:
These two arguments are constant companions in the law of tort. The individualist argument
is that responsibility should not be imposed without "fault." Here there is no fault because there is
neither foreseeability nor bad intent. The communalist rejoinder is that the defendant must accept
responsibility because the defendant's act caused injury to the victim, who deserves compensation.
At this point it may be objected that ASB21 is properly an individualist argument. After all,
it is based upon the fact that the defendant has voluntarily acted and therefore assumed a duty. Thus,
an argument for compensation might seem quite consistent with individualism. This objection is
based on the incorrect assumption that individualism and communalism are coherent political
positions rather than orientations. In context, the ASB21 argument is more responsibility-affirming
than the NLWF argument. Thus, while the communalist ASB21 argument accepts the individualist
notion that voluntary action of some sort is a prerequisite to liability, it denies that any more (i.e.,
fault) is required. Thus it is a relatively communalist argument. Similarly, the relatively individualist
NLWFargument acceptsthe communalist conception that duty may be imposed in some
circumstances (i.e., if there is fault), but denies that this essential element is present.
All individualist and communalist argumentsof Moral Responsibility and Desert share this
contextual nature. The communalist arguments urge the imposition of liability because of the
presence of some element X (whether fault, causation, intention, or injury), while the individualist
responses argue for no liability because of the absence of some element Y. Thus, in tort law, the
individualist argument of Moral Responsibility and Desert might take the following various forms:
The defendant is not responsible (should not have to pay) because:
(a) defendant did not cause any harm;
(b) it is not certain that defendant caused any harm;
(c) it is not certain how much harm the defendant caused;
(d) defendant did not intend to cause any harm;
(e) defendant did not intend to cause a particular kind of harm;
(f) defendant did not intend to cause a particular degree of harm;
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(g) it was unforeseeable that defendant would cause the harm;
(h) the kind of harm defendant caused was unforeseeable;
(i) the degree of harm defendant caused was unforeseeable;
(j) defendant did not act;
(k) defendant did not act voluntarily;
(l) defendant took normal, natural, or customary precautions before acting;
(m) defendant has made what are (or what he believed in good faith to be)
proper precautions before acting;
(n) plaintiff has suffered no harm;
(o) it is uncertain whether plaintiff hits suffered any harm;
(p) it is uncertain to "hat degree the harm plaintiff has suffered is attributable
to defendant's acts;
(q) plaintiff was at fault; and
(r) plaintiff caused his own harm.
This list can be extended with sufficient imagination, but by now the reader should grasp the
general idea. Conversely, the forms that the communalist argument of Moral Responsibility and
Desert might take in the law of torts are:
The defendant is responsible (should have to pay) because:
(a) defendant caused harm to plaintiff;
(b) due to the nature of defendant's act it is uncertain that defendant did not
cause harm to plaintiff;
(c) due to the nature of defendant's act it is uncertain how much harm
defendant caused plaintiff;
(d) defendant intended to cause some harm to plaintiff;
(e) the harm to plaintiff was foreseeable;
(f) defendant acted;
(g) defendant did not take proper precautions; and
(h) it is not certain that defendant took proper precautions.
In criminal law, the arguments are very similar, except that the individualist arguments
include ideas that criminal liability should not be imposed upon the defendant unless the defendant
acted with free will, with fair warning of the criminal nature of his conduct, or with criminal intent
(mens rea). Conversely, the communalist arguments are based upon the fact or the imputation or
assumption that the defendant acted with the requisite degree of free will, fair warning, or criminal
intent.
In my tort and criminal law classes, I classify arguments of Moral Responsibility and Desert
as falling into a small number of general argument forms. The individualist arguments are:
Individualist Tort Law Arguments
(1) No Liability Without Fault (including foreseeability) (NLWF);
(2) No Liability Without Causation (NLWC);
(3) No Liability Without an Act (NLWA);
(4) No Liability Without Harm (NLWH);
(5) As Between Two Guilty Persons, Let the Loss Lie Where It Falls (ASB2G).
Individualist Criminal Law Arguments
39The ASB2G argument includes all forms of arguments in which the plaintiff’s own fault or actions are
claimed to be the (partial) cause of her own misfortune. These arguments are responsibility-affirming, yet they are
individualist, for the responsibility they affirm is that of the plaintiff, not the defendant. The idea of "Rugged
Individualism" encompasses the notion that victims are responsible for themselves and that neither other parties nor
the state are responsible for what befalls them.
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(6) No Liability Without Free Choice (NLWFC); 
(7) No Liability Without Fair Warning (NLWFW);
(8) No Liability Without Criminal Intent (NLWCI).
The ASB2G argument is normally used in situations involving the plaintiff's contributory
fault or assumption of risk.39  Each of the individualist argument forms has a communalist
counterpart:
Communalist Tort Law Arguments
(1) Defendant's Fault Requires Liability (F  L);
(2) As Between Two Innocents, Let the Person Who Caused the Harm Pay the 
     Damage (ASB21);
(3)Act at Your Peril (AAYP);
(4)Plaintiff’s Harm Requires Liability (H  L);
(5)An Innocent Plaintiff Should Not Forfeit Recovery (NFWF(Plaintiff)).
Communalist Criminal Law Arguments
(6) Free Choice Existed (FCE);
(7) Fair Warning Existed (FWE); 
(8) Criminal Intent Requires Liability (C.I. L).
Specific examples of each of these forms of argument may be found in the Appendix.
40 3 H.&C. 774, (Ex. 1865).
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Combining tort and criminal arguments, we derive the following dyad:
Two caveats must be made here. First, the "No Liability Without Fault" argument form
includes arguments such as "Defendant was at fault to some degree but not to the degree that he
should have to pay for all the damage." This is the argument used in Vosburg v. Putney, and is
essentially an argument that liability should be proportionate to fault. Similarly, communalist
argument forms such as "Fault Requires Liability" and "An Innocent Plaintiff Should Not Forfeit
Recovery," include arguments of the form "The plaintiff was at fault to some degree, but the
defendant should not escape liability for his degree of fault." This is the sort of communalist
argument which might be used in opposition to the relatively individualist defense of contributory
negligence. It, too, is an argument for proportionate fault, albeit in the opposite direction.
Second, it is important to understand that the argument forms presented above are not ideal
types with an independent reality. Rather, they are merely heuristic devices for gathering together
policy arguments which share certain features. Classifying them enables us to see how the same basic
forms of thought are repeatedly utilized in policy arguments concerning notions of fault, act,
causation, and the like.
Whenever a dyadic rule choice is presented in tort and criminal law that splits along
individualist-communalist lines, the parties will make individualist and communalist arguments of
Moral Responsibility and Desert described in the lists above. Given any such argument, there is a
natural rejoinder among the arguments on the opposite side of the dyad.
As a first example, consider the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, 40an early English precursor of
modern strict liability doctrine. The opinion of Baron Martin in the intermediate court makes the
following argument of Moral Responsibility and Desert against strict liability:
41 Id. 
42 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
43 Id.




To hold the defendants liable would therefore make them insurers against the consequence
of a lawful act upon their own land when they had no reason to believe or suspect that any damage
was likely to ensue.41
This argument is No Liability Without Fault (NLWF), an individualist argument.
In the House of Lords, Lord Carins responded that "that which the Defendants were doing
they were doing at their own peril 42 (Act At Your Peril (AAYP)), while Lord Cranworth observed:
[W]hen one  person, in managing his own affairs, causes, however innocently, damage to
another, it is obviously only just that he should be the party to suffer. [As Between Two Innocents
(ASB21)]43
This debate can be diagramed as follows:
Note the similarity to the diagram of the arguments in Vosburg v. Putney. Using the dyads
allows us to map the structure of the argument forms, and we can see that the debate over the
eggshell skull rule has a similar structure to the debate over strict liability versus negligence.
A second example, this time from criminal law, is Regina v. Prince,44 where the court held
that a mistake of fact (the age of the victim) would be no defense to the crime of taking an unmarried
girl less than sixteen years old out of the possession and against the will of her father.45 Baron
Bramwell argued that the defense of mistake of fact should not be permitted because what the
defendant believed he was doing was "wrong in itself"46 (Criminal Intent Requires Liability (C.I. -
47Id.
48Id.
49 Thus, people who believe that rights only exist because they maximize the happiness of society may
argue nonetheless that plaintiff or defendant has a right, and in the next breath add a social policy argument in
support, as if these were two different things. I take no position on the "real" source of justification of rights; my
concern here is with how arguments about rights are used.
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L.)), and because "[t]he legislature has enacted that if anyone does this wrong act, he does it at the
risk of her turning out to be under sixteen."47 (Act At Your Peril (AAYP)). Brett, J., dissented on the
grounds that "if the facts had been as the prisoner . . . believed them to be . . . he would have done
no act which has ever been a criminal offense in England."48
Brett's argument might be classified as either a No Liability Without Fair Warning
(NLWFW) or a No Liability Without Criminal Intent (NLWCI) argument; hence the following
diagram:
Although the specific arguments change, individualist arguments of Moral Responsibility and
Desert will always be met with communalist arguments of Moral Responsibility and Desert,
regardless of the nature of the issues involved.
B. Arguments of Moral, Political, and Legal Right
Rights arguments form a class of moral and legal rhetoric distinct from arguments of Moral
Responsibility and Desert on the one hand ("defendant ought to do this"; "plaintiff deserves that"),
and arguments of Social Policy and Social Utility on the other ("the best consequences would flow
from this rule"). Rights arguments usually take the form: "the rule should be X because the party has
a right, which a contrary rule would abridge." This is a distinct form of argument even though people
differ about (1) the source of rights (political, legal, or moral) and (2) the philosophical justification
of rights (deontological or utilitarian ).49
The individualist conception of rights is based upon freedom from responsibility for the
consequences that one's acts have upon other members of the community and freedom to exercise
personal autonomy without community interference. Hence the standard individualist rights
arguments are that the defendant-actor has a right to act as she pleases without incurring liability to
50 Note that in the criminal cases, the rights argument for the defendant is usually not that she had the right
to act as she did but that her prosecution violates some other right that she is guaranteed (for example. due process,
or the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures). The argument that the criminal defendant had a right
to do what she did normally arises only (1) when the issue is whether certain conduct (e.g., so-called "victimless"
crimes like gambling) should be made (or can constitutionally be made) a crime, (2) when the issue is one of
construction of a criminal statute, or (3) "when the defendant is in effect making a jus tertii (or overbreadth)
argument--that the statute is invalid because it applies to the conduct of others which should not (or cannot) be made
criminal.
51This is related to the Formal Realizability argument. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
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the plaintiff (Rights as Freedom of Action-R.F.A.), or that the defendant-actor has a right to engage
in activity free from governmental regulation (Rights of Individuals-R.I.).
The communalist vision of rights is grounded upon a wholly different premise. People have
rights not in order to enjoy freedom of action, but to demarcate spheres of security. Moreover, the
community itself has the "right" to safeguard its members through regulation of their activities. Thus
the communalist rejoinders to the Rights as Freedom of Action and Rights of Individuals arguments
take the form, "Plaintiff has a right to be secure from invasions of her interests by the defendant"
(Rights as Security-R.S.), and "The State has the right to regulate the defendant's activities in order
to protect the welfare of its citizens (Rights of the Community-R.C.)." In criminal law, the argument
is most often seen as the rights of criminal defendants (individualist rights) versus the rights of
victims, their families, law enforcement officials, and the community as a whole (communalist
rights).50
Whenever an individualist rights argument is made, it is always possible to make an
communalist rights argument in response. This response simply asserts that there are important rights
on the other side. In addition, one can make arguments which are the denials of the R.F.A., R.I., R.S.
and R.C. arguments; for brevity's sake, I shall demarcate as them as NoR.F.A., NoR.I., NoR.S., and
NoR.C. The first two arguments are communalist, the second two are individualist. The Appendix
describes the various forms of rights arguments in more detail, but I will point out the most common
forms here:
(1) Trivialization---making the exercise of the right appear unimportant or otherwise
unworthy of protection.
(2) Slippery Slope---the right once recognized would have no logical or principled stopping
point.51
(3) No Violation or Adequate Alternatives Exist---even if the right exists, it is not abridged
because there are other ways for the complaining party to achieve her goals.
One can respond to these arguments with more sophisticated forms of rights arguments:
(1) Detrivialization---recharacterizing the right to make it look important and worthy of
protection.
52This argument is related to the Substantive Realizability argument. See infra text accompanying notes 73-
74.
53The claim that a pro-choice position is relatively more individualist is supported by the fact that recent
defenses of the right to abortion have been made by analogy to the common law tort rule of no duty to rescue, also a
relatively individualist position. See Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979); Thompson, A
Defense of Abortion, I PHIL & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971). Similarly, a pro-life position is relatively communalist, since it
argues that the mother is obligated to share her body with the fetus for the term of pregnancy.
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(2) Anti-Slippery Slope---the existence of difficult cases does not negate the importance of
protecting the right; reasonable boundaries can be drawn to demarcate its scope.52
(3) Alternative Remedies do not Exist---the abridgment of the right is substantial and the
right cannot be meaningfully exercised in other ways.
We can summarize the various forms of rights arguments in the following diagram:
To see how these arguments interact in a specific doctrinal setting, consider a debate about
abortion rights in the context of a state statute that makes abortion a crime. The relatively
individualist position would oppose the statute because the statute would create an additional duty
owed to others. The relatively communalist position would favor the statute because the statute
increases the responsibilities or duties persons owe to each other.53 Using the various forms of rights
arguments described so far, a hypothetical debate might go as follows:
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(1) A woman has no right to an abortion on
demand (NoR.F.A., NoR.I.).
(a) A woman has no right to murder
an innocent human life for her own
convenience. (Trivialization)
(b) If this right is recognized,
women will be able to abort
fetuses up to the time of birth.
It is impossible to draw
rational lines between the
moment of conception and
birth. The "viability" concept
is too vague, artificial and
imprecise. (Slippery Slope)
(c) If a woman does not wish
to be saddled with an extra
child, she can put up with the
inconvenience of carrying it to
term and put it up for
adoption. Or she can decide to
use birth control next time or
abstain from sexual activity.
(No Violation, Alternative Remedies
Exist)
(2) The fetus has a right to life (R.S.).
(a) The fetus is a person and like
anyone else has a right not to be
(1) A woman has a right to abort a fetus if she
chooses (R.F.A., R.I.)
(a) A woman has the right to
be able to control her body
without interference from the
government. (Detrivialization)
(b) The fact that no hard and
fast lines can be drawn does
not mean that some abortions,
relatively early in the term of
pregnancy, should not be
permitted. Reasonable lines
can be drawn based upon
concepts like viability. (Anti-
Slippery Slope)
(c) The issue is not only rais-
ing the child but being forced
to carry it in the mother's body
for nine months. This is hardly
an "inconvenience" and may
pose serious health hazards to
the mother. Adoption is not an
effective solution to the issue
of the right of bodily control.
The use of birth control
is not an effective alternative
because no birth control
method is 100% effective and
many may pose health hazards
to the woman. The choice to
abstain from sexual relations
altogether is an unreasonable
one to expect from people and
is itself an abridgement of
rights of personal autonomy.
(Real Violation of Rights; Adequate
Alternative Remedies do not exist)
(2) The fetus has no rights to survive when
placed in comparison with the woman's right.
(NoR.S.)
(a) The fetus is not a person
but only a clump of cells
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 murdered. (Detrivialization)
(3) The State has the right to protect the life
of the fetus (R.C.).
(a) The State has a right to protect
innocent life from
destruction.(Detrivialization)
(b) Reasonable regulations can
be drawn to permit abortions
in narrowly selected cir-
cumstances, for example,
where another innocent human
life is endangered.
(Anti-Slippery Slope)
which relies on the mother's body for
its existence and will only become a
human being if it is carried to term.
(Trivialization)
(3) The State has no right to interfere with the
mother's free choice (NoR.C.).
(a) The State has no right to
force the woman to become an
incubator against her will.
(Trivialization)
(b) This principle would forbid
abortions even in cases of
rape, incest, or where the
mother's life or health was
endangered.
(Slippery Slope)
The reader will recognize many familiar arguments in this hypothetical debate; some may
seem convincing and others less so. The substantive worth of the arguments, however, is irrelevant
here. The point of the example is that the structure of the rights debate about abortion is the same
as that below:
Whenever a dyadic rule choice divides along individualist-communalist lines, rights
arguments will line up according to this structure: individualist arguments will be chosen from the
group on the right, and the communalist responses from the group on the left. This is exactly the
same structure we observed in arguments of Moral Responsibility and Desert, and which we will
observe again in arguments of Social Policy and Social Utility.
C. Arguments of Social Policy and Social Utility
Arguments of Social Policy and Social Utility concern the practical consequences of a
particular rule choice---that rule X would have better consequences than rule Y. These arguments
54Related to this is the "competitive pathology" argument. See Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power,
41 MD. L, REV. 563, 601-02 (1982). Unless there is some regulation of activities, the "bad will drive out the good"
and freedom of choice will be restricted by the resulting impoverishment of social goods. These arguments are one
form of the "Regulation" arguments discussed infra at text accompanying notes 225-35 in the Appendix. Examples:
(1) Strict liability for consumer products is necessary to ensure that manufacturers continually improve the
safety of their products; otherwise unscrupulous manufacturers who do not test their products will be able to
underprice conscientious businessmen and drive them out of business or else force them to cut corners to stay in the
market; in either case, the ultimate loser will be the public. See id.
(2) Unless libel laws are enforced the level of public debate will be reduced to the gutter, and decent
persons who are interested in serving the public will refrain from entering public life, leaving the country to the
demagogues.
(3) Unless the government regulates the airwaves and allows only licensees to broadcast, everyone will
drown everyone else out in competition for scarce airspace and only the people with the "loudest voices," i.e., the
most powerful transmitters (and the most money) will be able to speak.
(4) Similarly, unless there is regulation of the type of programs shown on television the only shows which
will survive the struggle for ratings will be those which appeal to the lowest common denominator of public taste.
55The classic statement of this position is Justice Brandeis'defense of free speech in Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to
develop their faculties . . . . They believed that freedom to think as you will and speak as you think are means
indispensible to the discovery and spread of political truth~ that without free speech and assembly discussion
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of
noxious doctrine . . . that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds
repression: that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy of evil
counsels is good ones.
When economic rights are involved, this form of argument becomes a justification for laissez-faire: "No external
force, no coercion, no violation of freedom is necessary to produce cooperation among individuals all of whom can
benefit." M. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 2 (1980). "We are again recognizing the dangers of an over governed
society . . . that reliance on the freedom of people to control their own lives in accordance with their own values is
the surest way to achieve the full potential of a great society." Id. at 309-10.
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are often expressed in terms of broad social policies that their advocates believe the law should
foster.
The communalist version of the Social Utility argument is that increasing duties and
responsibilities that individuals owe to others will make everyone better off because people will feel
more secure and protected. This, in turn, will lead to a more stable, productive, and happy society.
On the other hand, the more license people are given to selfishly pursue their own narrow ends,
heedless of the consequences of their acts, the more others will fear engaging in socially beneficial
activities. Paradoxically, more freedom of action in the short run will lead to less freedom of action
in the long run.54
The individualist version of the Social Utility argument is that by limiting duties and
responsibilities owed to others in society and thereby increasing the scope of freedom of action,
everyone will benefit. People will feel free to act without having to consider every possible effect
that their actions may have on others. This will stimulate activity, self-reliance and competition; it
will produce a wider range of alternatives for people, and everyone will benefit in the long run.55 The
more restrictions and regulations are placed upon people's activities, the less incentives they will
have to produce, achieve, and accomplish things that are in the best interests of society as a whole.
56 The antinomy between rights of security and rights for freedom of action is recapitulated in Social
Utility arguments as competing claims that society is better off if security or freedom of action is increased. A
special case of the individualist social utility argument is a call for free economic competition, while a special case
of the communalist argument is a call for protection of property rights. The antinomy between property and
competition is thus reflected in the antinomy between individualism and communalism.
57 See Appendix text accompanying notes 194-244.
58 See Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
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Restrictions on freedom of action discourage productive activity because the actors fear that they will
be penalized for their actions or that they will be unable to enjoy the fruits of their labor.
Paradoxically, then, the more security is protected in the short run, the less secure people will feel
in the long run.56
There are many different versions of the Social Utility argument, ranging from deterrence
arguments in criminal law to economic arguments in tort law. These are explained in more detail in
the Appendix.57 What is important for our purposes is that the structure of the Social Utility
arguments in doctrinal rule choices is always the same:
For an example of these arguments in a particular doctrinal context, consider a debate over
whether landlords may be sued for negligence if they fail to exercise due care in inspecting and
maintaining leased premises.58 The individualist position will be against implying a duty of due care
in the lease absent an express agreement to that effect, while the communalist position will favor the
implication of such a duty regardless of whether it is explicitly assumed in the lease.
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Communalist:
(1) The court should imply this duty in
order to ensure that rental property is safely
maintained. Unless the landlord is held
responsible, tenants may suffer serious
physical injuries.
(2) The landlord is a cheaper cost
avoider because he is in a better position to
repair and maintain the premises due to the
nature of his business.
(3) Without this duty, landlords will
have insufficient incentives to repair and
maintain the premises. Tenants lack the
resources to perform such repairs themselves,
and lack the incentives because they are
renters and not owners.
(4) The landlord is better able to
afford the extra costs the duty imposes and he
can purchase insurance to spread the risk.
(5) Even if parties do not include this
duty in their rental agreements the courts need
to impose this duty in order to assist the
tenants. The tenants may not have the duty
included in their leases (even though it is
socially desirable and in their best interests to
do so) because
(a) the landlords have superior
bargaining power.
(b) Tenants underestimate the dangers
involved in not bargaining for this extra duty.
Individualist:
(1) If we want to ensure that rental
property is safely maintained, the best way to
do so is to have less liability, because this will
encourage tenants to locate problems and
correct them if it is cheaper for them to do so.
(2) In fact the tenant, who lives in the
building, is more likely to know what needs
to be fixed; the landlord often lacks easy
access to apartments that are currently being
rented to tenants.
(3) If we imply this duty, tenants will
have insufficient incentives to take care of
their premises and prevent injuries from
occurring.
(4) The tenant is free to purchase
insurance to spread the risk himself. If the
tenant wants the extra protection from the
landlord, he is free to pay a higher rent to the
landlord in exchange for a duty of care. The
fact that most leases do not contain such
provisions indicates that it is not worth it to
the tenant (or to society).
(5) Imposing a duty will not help the
tenants, because
(a) The landlord will raise the rent,
consuming more of the tenants' disposable
income or forcing tenants who cannot afford
the increased rent to move into even worse
housing. Some tenants will be forced to
purchase extra protections they don't want or
need.
(b) Some landlords will go out of
business because of the extra expenses of
maintaining their property, thus reducing the
supply of housing and making housing even
more expensive for tenants.
59The following abbreviations are used for argument forms: 
ASB21 = As Between Two innocents, Let the Person Who Caused the Damage Pay
NLWF = No Liability Without Fault
Soc. Util. (C) Communalist Social Utility Argument
Soc. Util. (I) Individualist Social Utility Argument
R.S. = Rights as Security
R.F.A. = Rights as Freedom of Action
No R.F.A. = Denial of Rights as Freedom of Action
No R.S. = Denial of Rights as Security
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Now that we have discussed the three basic forms of individualist and communalist
arguments, we can summarize the results. Whenever a dyadic rule choice is presented along the
individualist-communalist axis, the debate between the opposing rules will look like this:
IV. THE CRYSTALLINE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ARGUMENT
The thesis of this Article is that debates over the content of legal rules have a similar
structure, regardless of the area of law or the level of doctrinal complexity. What follows now are
demonstrations and examples of the crystalline structure of legal argument.
A. A Simple Example of Crystalline Structure
Let us again take up our example from Holmes's The Common Law. In his chapters on the
foundations of tort law, Holmes argues both for a negligence standard over strict liability and an
objective over a subjective standard of negligence. We may translate this discussion into dyads as
before:59
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Consider the following arguments for a negligence standard over that of strict liability:
(1) Losses should not be shifted onto parties unless they are morally blameworthy. It is unfair to make
a defendant pay for creating an injury that she could not have foreseen; it makes no more sense to
make a defendant act at her peril than it would to make her indemnify the plaintiff if the injury was
the result of an epileptic seizure. The defendant should not be made an insurer of the plaintiff's losses.
(NLWF)
(2) The defendant has the right to act in anyway she wishes without interference by the state as long
as she does not perform a morally blameworthy act. It is an abridgment of her rights to allow the state
to redistribute income from the defendant to the plaintiff simply because the plaintiff has been
injured. Social life would lose much of its value if defendants were liable for every accidental injury
they caused, no matter how unforeseeable. We must each give up something to live in society
together, and it is impossible to provide everyone with an absolute guarantee of security. (R.F.A., No
R.S.)
(3) A rule of strict liability will not result in greater safety and fewer accidents, since under a
negligence standard companies will already be making a socially desirable investment in safety.
Instead of improving accident safety, strict liability will drive companies out of business due to the
extra costs of compensation, and will make people too afraid to engage in socially desirable activities
out of the fear that they will be held liable for the most unforeseeable accidents and even if they take
all reasonable precautions. It is better to let people buy their own insurance against unforeseeable
accidents than to force innocent defendants to shoulder the burden. (Soc. Util. (1))
The communalist responses are:
(1) Regardless of the fault of the defendant, her actions have caused injury to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff is no less injured because the defendant's act was not blameworthy, and the plaintiff deserves
compensation. Since the defendant caused the damage, she should pay. When a defendant acts in a
way to cause damage to an innocent person, she acts at her own peril. (ASB21)
60 (1) Losses should not be shifted unless the defendant is at fault. If the defendant exercised all
precautions to the best of her ability, an objective standard of negligence would hold her liable for dangers that she
could not have foreseen. The particular level of understanding and ability Nature has given her is not her fault and
she should not be punished for it. (NLWF)
(2) The state has no right to punish a person unless she acted in amorally blameworthy fashion. If a
defendant acted to the best of his ability given her knowledge and understanding, it is unfair and an abridgment of
her rights to take property from her simply because another person might have seen the danger. Plaintiffs do not
have the right to expect that everyone in society will have the same level of understanding and ability. (R.F.A., No
R.S.)
(3) An objective standard of negligence will not result in greater safety and fewer accidents. It will simply
act as a trap for unwary defendants who cannot meet an artificial standard postulated after the fact by juries and
lawyers. The objective standard of negligence either will have no effect on the level of investment in safety, since
everyone thinks that they act reasonably, or else will cause people to overinvest in safety since they will have no
way of knowing how much safety is considered "reasonable." They can only define reasonableness by their own
standards, which is by definition insufficient. It is easier and more efficient for victims to self insure against the cost
of accidents, than to shift losses in an arbitrary fashion based upon some ad hoc standard of reasonableness. (Soc.
Util. (I))
61 (1) If a person is born hasty or awkward, she may be blameless for the accidents she unwittingly causes,
but the injuries she accidentally causes her neighbors are no less real than if they were caused by a blameworthy
neglect. They deserve compensation, and as between the innocent parties, the person who is causally responsible
should compensate the other. (ASB21)
(2) People have a right to walk about in society without fear of injury from stupid and incautious people,
no matter how well-intentioned. People have to give up something to live in society, and imprudent people must
recognize that they act at their own peril when they act rashly. (R.S., No R.F.A.)
(3) An objective standard of negligence will act as an incentive for people to live up to reasonable
standards of caution and to make socially desirable investments in safety. (Soc. Util. (C))
34
(2) The plaintiff has a right to be free from injuries inflicted on her. Social life would lose much of
its meaning if people could injure each other with impunity. We must give up something to live in
society together, and society cannot allow defendants who cause damage to others absolute immunity
from the consequences of their acts, no matter how well motivated. (R.S., No R.F.A.)
(3) Strict liability will ensure that people take precautions before they act in a way that might cause
danger to others. Companies will be more likely to invest in an appropriate amount of safety since
they know that it will be more difficult for them to escape liability. Companies will not go out of
business or overinvest in safety since they will invest in safety to the extent that it is profitable and
pay money damages for all non-negligently caused accidents; they will continue to produce as long
as they can make some profit, and they will simply pass the extra costs of non-negligent accidents
along to their customers. Strict liability will spread the costs of accidents rather than having all of the
costs fall freakishly on a few unfortunate victims. (Soc. Util. (Q)
However, after arguing in favor of a negligence standard, Holmes argues against the
relatively individualist position of a subjective standard of negligence. Yet the arguments for a
subjective standard will be of the same type (individualist) as those in favor of negligence as opposed
to strict liability.60 Similarly, the arguments in favor of an objective standard of negligence (which
Holmes supports) are communalist arguments of the same type as those in favor of the strict liability
standard that Holmes rejected.61
Going down a level of doctrinal complexity, the next dyadic rule choice concerns whether
there should be a special standard for children. Again, the arguments for the relatively individualist
62 (1) Children are incapable of the same degree of caution and foresight as adults. To hold them to a
reasonable person standard is to hold them liable when they are without fault. (NLWF)
(2) Children have a right to grow and develop, and their parents have a right to raise them in the manner
that they see fit. The state has no right to punish either the parent or the child for failing to conform to adult
standards. Plaintiffs cannot rightfully expect that children will behave like adults. (R.F.A., No R.S.)
(3) If a reasonable person standard is applied to children, parenting will be inhibited because parents will
be discouraged from allowing their children to experiment and learn about the world. Children cannot conform to
adult standards so the rule will not have the effect of making them more careful. (Soc. Util. (I))
63 (1) A person injured by a child is no less hurt because the person injuring is a child. (ASB21)
(2) People have a right to go about in the world without fear of being injured by children whose parents do
not adequately supervise them. Children and their parents cannot expect to injure innocent persons with impunity
and they have no right to jeopardize other lives so that children may "spread their wings." (R.S., No R.F.A.)
(3) An objective standard will encourage children to grow up with proper standards of behavior and will
encourage parents both to supervise their children more effectively and to inculcate their children with proper
respect for the rights of others. (Soc. Util. (C))
64 (1) A child who drives a car to the best of her skill and ability should not be punished. Holding a child to
an adult standard when driving an automobile will impose liability when the child was not at fault. (NLWF)
(2) If a child can pass a driver's exam she is as entitled to drive a car as an adult, and should not be held to
an artificial standard of behavior. Motorists should not expect that children will behave exactly like adults. (R.F.A.,
No R.S.)
(3) Holding children to an adult standard will not increase traffic safety since children cannot be expected
to conform to adult standards. Instead, it will simply make it more difficult for people to learn how to drive
effectively by discouraging children from practicing their driving skills. (Soc. Util. (I))
65 (1) A motorist is no less harmed because the car which crashes into him was driven by a child. When a
child engages in an adult activity (or her parents permit her to engage in such an activity), she does so at her own
peril and should be judged by adult standards. (ASB21)
(2) An innocent motorist has a right to expect that the persons who are driving on the same streets will
conform to and be held to reasonable standards of safety. This is especially so since a motorist has no way of
knowing the age of the drivers in other automobiles. A license to drive is not a license to engage in reckless
behavior, and a licensing scheme is in fact evidence that the state regards the activity as potentially dangerous.
(R.S., No R.F.A.)
(3) The adult activity rule will reduce traffic accidents and ensure that parents will teach their children how
to drive properly and that parents will not let their children drive unless the children are responsible. (Sec. Util. (C))
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position resemble the arguments in favor of negligence and a subjective standard,62 while the
arguments for the relatively communalist position resemble the arguments for strict liability and an
objective standard .63
The similarity continues at the next level of doctrinal complexity. The issue is whether there
should be an exception to the exception (that is, whether to apply the reasonable person standard)
when the child is engaged in an adult activity, such as driving an automobile. The individualist
position is that no subexception should be made,64 while the communalist position supports the use
of the reasonable person standard.65
66 In fact, even at the level of application of law to fact there should, in theory, be communalist and
individualist forms of argument. Because lawyers are able to disagree about how facts are to be characterized, or
how facts are to be applied to preexisting legal standards, the same oppositions which are present concerning the
choice of rules will reappear (albeit in disguise) in legal arguments about facts. This is especially true in the case of
ultimate facts like the presence or absence of causation, intent, or negligence. The communalist arguments will be
used to characterize factual situations so as to increase defendant's responsibility; the individualist arguments will be
used to characterize factual situations so as to minimize defendant's responsibility.
67 Consider a debate over whether there should be a complete or an incomplete defense of necessity in
intentional tort. Under a complete privilege, an intentional tort committed against a chattel in order to preserve a
valuable legally protected interest (a person's life or a more valuable chattel, for example), does not give rise to
liability, while under an incomplete privilege, compensation must be made, although the tortfeasor may not legally
be interfered with. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 262, 263 (1965).
The relatively individualist position is for an expanded principle of justification or excuse, and hence for
the absolute privilege, while the relatively communalist position is for an incomplete privilege.
In favor of a complete privilege:
(1) I There should be no duty to pay when it is necessary for the defendant to destroy property in order to
save something more valuable. The defendant is doing the socially desirable thing and cannot be considered morally
blameworthy for so acting. Therefore it is unjust to punish her. (NLWF)
(2) A person has a right to save her own life or a very valuable piece of property ifthe only way to do it is
to destroy less valuable property. The owner of the property cannot expect the plaintiff to surrender her interests to
save a less valuable one. This is especially the case where the defendant's life is at stake. (R.F.A., No R.S.)
(3) Unless an absolute privilege is given, people will be less willing to do the more socially desirable act,
that is save the more valuable interest, because of fear that they will have to pay for the damage. Even ifit is clear
that the defendant's interest is more valuable, defendants may hesitate in emergency situations because they are
unsure that an emergency exists that will justify their actions, with the result that more valuable interests will be
destroyed. (Soc. Util. (I))
In favor of an incomplete privilege:
(1) Although defendant may have acted in the face of a real emergency, she has still destroyed the
plaintiff's property and it would be unjust not to require her to make compensation. (ASB21)
(2) The plaintiff has a right to the security of her possessions and to compensation if they arc destroyed,
even in the interest of a socially desirable result. The defendant has no right to unjust enrichment by using the
plaintiffs property to save her own without compensating the plaintiff. (R.S., No R.F.A.)
(3) Even with an incomplete privilege, people will still protect more valuable interests, simply because they
are more valuable. No one who finds herself in an emergency will allow herself to perish for fear that she will have
to pay damages later. In any case, an incomplete privilege will actually save more lives and property because
plaintiffs will be less likely to interfere with defendants if they know that they will be compensated no matter
whether the emergency is real or not. (Soc. Util. (C))
68Consider, for example, the dyadic rule choices listed in Figures 2a-d, supra. The reader may protest that
legal rules in highly technical areas like taxation cannot display a crystalline structure. This might appear to be the
case because the opinions of courts in tax cases normally make arguments concerning congressional intent. They do
not appear as concerned with public policy as opinions concerning questions of common law. In reality, these
arguments are highly complex combinations of structures created by several different axes of opposition, including
axes of opposition which produce various forms of institutional argumentation.
At the level of tax policy, however, where Congress decides what and how much to tax, individualist and
communalist positions are readily identifiable. For example, a classic individualist Social Utility argument is that
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This crystalline structure will be found at each succeeding level of doctrinal complexity.66
Equally important, the same structure will appear if we shift our focus to other areas of doctrine.67
Although the examples just considered have come exclusively from tort law, the same
principles apply in other areas of the law as well.68
higher taxes will discourage the formation of capital and stifle desirable economic initiative; the communalist
rejoinder is the Social Utility argument that taxes are needed to fund social programs and achieve redistributional
goals. For a recent example consider the individualist argument for a value added (consumption) tax as opposed to
an income tax: "[T]he value-added tax does not discourage saving the way an income tax does. Assuming any
increased saving is absorbed by higher real investment spending, a value-added tax may be superior to an income
tax in fostering capital formation and economic growth." Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic
Growth- Value-Added Tax 19 (Report of the Treasury Department to the President, 1984).
Traditional justifications of the power of governments to tax their citizens involve the antinomy between
the individualist and communalist orientations. A relatively individualist position would deny the individual's
responsibility for inequitable income distribution and would oppose surrendering the fruits of individual activity for
an alleged "common good." A preference for progressive tax rates would normally be a relatively communalist
position, since it would stress the social creation of property and the obligations that all members of society have to
each other to share wealth:
Progressivity is criticized . . . by those who view a taxpayer's income as essentially the fruit of his or her own
labor and resources. Under this view, the government should have very little role in equalizing the amounts
with which individuals are left after taxes, since individuals arc entitled to whatever income arises from their
own labor or property. This view is, in turn, contested by those who contend that labor and property have
value only because society establishes laws and regulations which allow each individual to engage in
economic activity with relatively little interference from others . . . . Thus, because society establishes the
framework which allows labor and property to be valuable resources, it can also establish a progressive
income tax system and other mechanisms to achieve a more equitable distribution of income.
Analysis of Proposals Relating to Comprehensive Tax Reform (prepared by the staff of the Congressional Joint
Committee on Taxation, Sept. 21, 1984).
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B. Complicating the Model-Other Axes of Opposition
Not every choice of legal rules can be aligned along the individualist-communalist axis. Here
is an example:
Try as one might, it is impossible to position all of the arguments regarding judicial review
along the individualist-communalist continuum. Instead, the dyad represented in figure 20 involves
a different axis of opposition. The arguments associated with each side of the opposition concern
who is the proper or competent group in society to create, implement, or interpret legal rules. I shall
refer to these types of arguments as Arguments of Institutional Competence and Authority. In the
above dyad, for example, we have an opposition between the concepts of Judicial Power and
69 Although a more complete discussion of these arguments is beyond the scope of the present article, I will
briefly outline a few common types of argument forms produced by the opposition of Judicial Power and
Legislative Power. The following forms of argument can be made on behalf of Judicial Power:
(1) Judicial Authority: The judiciary has appropriate (or greater) authority to decide this type of issue.
(2) Judicial Competence: The judiciary has sufficient (or greater) competence to decide this type of issue.
(3) No Legislative Authority: The legislature lacks appropriate (or possesses less) authority to decide this
type of issue.
(4) No Legislative Competence: The legislature lacks appropriate (or possesses less) competence to decide
this type of issue.
The arguments made in favor of letting the legislature decide the issue (Legislative Authority, Legislative
Competence, No Judicial Authority, No Judicial Competence) are mirror images of the above.
In addition, there are similar sets of Arguments of Institutional Competence and Authority if the opposition
is between Judicial Power and Executive Power, between Federal Power and State Power, and so on.
70 For examples of debates concerning proportionality using the argument forms listed in Figure 21, see
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977).
The following abbreviations of argument forms are used:
C.I. × L = Criminal intent Requires Liability
NLWCI = No Liability Without Criminal Intent
R.C. = Rights of the Community
R.I. = Rights of the Individual
Deterrence = Communalist Social Utility (Deterrence) Argument
No Deterrence = Individualist Social Utility (No Deterrence) Argument
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Legislative Power which, in turn, produces its own standard forms of argument,69 and its own distinct
crystalline structure.
On the other hand, a subdoctrinal rule choice of the above dyad does present opposed
individualist and communalist positions:
70
Although only the institutional axis of opposition is represented in Figure 20, the dyad in
Figure 21 presents both axes of opposition. This means that not only do individualist and
communalist arguments appear on opposite sides of the second dyad, but so do the Institutional
arguments found on either side of the first dyad.
71 See Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 4, at 1687. The phrase is borrowed from 3 R. VON
IHERING, DERGEIST DES ROMISCHEN RECHT (THE SPIRIT OF ROMAN LAW) §4, at 50-55(1883) (available.- in French
translation as R. VON IHERING, L’ESPRIT DU DROIT ROMAIN (Meulenaere trans. 1877)).
72 See Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 4, at 1688; R.VON IHERING, supra note 71.
73 E.g., R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 203-16 (1976): Kennedy, Form andSubstance, supra note 4,
at 1687-89.
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Thus, instead of saying that there is a single crystalline structure to legal thought, it is more
correct to say that legal thought has a group of crystalline structures, created by different axes of
opposition. The interplay of the various axes of opposition gives legal argument great depth and
richness. The next section describes one of the most important axes of opposition in legal thought
after the opposition between individualism and communalism.
C. The Opposition of Formal and Substantive Realizability
One of the most common forms of argument that lawyers make in favor of choosing a
doctrine is unrelated to the substantive fairness of the doctrinal choice but concerns instead whether
a rule is a better choice because it is easier to administer.
These arguments are called "Formal Realizability" arguments.71 The arguments made in
response to these arguments I call "Substantive Realizability" arguments.72 Formal and Substantive
Realizability arguments cannot be classified as exclusively individualist or communalist because
they lie upon a different axis of opposition. That separate axis concerns the opposition between a
desire for certainty, predictability and easy application of legal doctrines on the one hand, with a
desire for substantively just results on the other.73 The result is that although individualist versions
of Rights, Social Utility, and Moral Responsibility arguments always line up together on the same
side of the dyad, Formal Realizability arguments sometimes support the individualist position and
sometimes the communalist.
The Formal Realizability argument is that a rule should be adopted because it is easier to
administer and apply and presents fewer problems of proof. This is usually joined with claims that
the opposite rule would lead to fraudulent or frivolous claims or defenses, an undesirably large
amount of litigation, or arbitrary and inconsistent verdicts in successive lawsuits. The familiar
"slippery slope" argument is also a type of Formal Realizability argument: a particular rule should
be rejected because the principle it stands for has no logical stopping point, and will lead to
disastrous results in future cases.
The Substantive Realizability argument takes the position that a rule should be adopted
because it will be fairer on an individual or case-by-case basis. The seemingly more "bright line" rule
will either lead to sub rosa manipulation by judges and juries to achieve substantively just results,
or a confusing complex of rules, exceptions, and counterexceptions. A simple standard worked out
through case-by-case adjudication will be more predictable and less arbitrary in the long run.
The Substantive Realizability argument normally includes a rejoinder to the Formal
Realizability argument that the less rigid rule cannot be applied in a consistent or predictable fashion:
74 Examples of these arguments are given in the Appendix at text accompanying notes 245-53. 
75 Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 4, at 1685.
76 Id. According to Kennedy: "There is a connection, in the rhetoric of private law, between individualism
and a preference for rules, and between altruism [communalism] and a preference for standards. The substantive
and formal dimensions are related because the same moral, economic and political arguments appear in each." Id. at
1776 (emphasis in original). That is to say, the two ideas (individualism and Formal Realizability) spring from
similar sources of moral and legal consciousness which produce similar forms of argument.
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(1) Judges and juries will be able to decide the proper scope of the rule's application through case-by-
case adjudication and the normal common law development of doctrine. (This form of response may
be called an "Anti-Slippery Slope" argument.) (2) The fact that some claims before courts are not
meritorious does mean that courts will not be able to separate the wheat from the chaff.74
D. The Relation Between Form and Substance
Professor Kennedy argued in Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication that there was
a correlation between Formal and Substantive Realizability arguments and the individualist-
communalist division of arguments. In particular, he argued that Formal Realizability arguments
(and a preference for rules in legal doctrine) were usually allied with an individualist position, and
Substantive Realizability arguments (and a preference for standards or case by case adjudication)
were usually allied with a communalist (or in Kennedy's terms, an altruistic) position.75 Kennedy's
point was that arguments about form are related to and can in effect disguise disputes about
substantive visions of justice.76
The problem with Kennedy's identification of arguments about form and those about
substance is that the alliance that he describes-Formal Realizability arguments and individualism---is
not consistently found in the law. The alliance frequently appears in contract law, the area on which
Kennedy focused in his famous article. However, Formal Realizability arguments are allied more
often with communalist arguments in tort and criminal law. Consider, for example, the following
dyad and its associated argument forms:
77 The following abbreviations are used for argument forms:
F.R. = Formal Realizability
S.R. = Substantive Realizability
ASB21 = As Between Two Innocents, Let the Person Who Caused the Damage Pay
NLWF  = No Liability Without Fault
Soc. Util. (C) = Communalist Social Utility Argument 
Soc. Util. (I) = Individualist Social Utility Argument
R.S. = Rights as Security
R.F.A. = Rights as Freedom of Action
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In this instance, strict liability is a more Formally Realizable rule than the reasonable person
standard, and thus the Formal Realizability arguments are aligned with the communalist arguments.
This alliance continues down through the next two levels of subdoctrine:
Yet if we go "up" to a supradoctrinal choice, for instance, the issue of whether there is any duty to
rescue absent a special relationship, this curious result appears:
78 In one sense, the Adult Activity Rule is m ore Formally Realizable because it increases the number of
cases in which the more Formally Realizable objective standard of negligence will be applied. On the other hand, it
maybe less Formally Realizable because it requires the courts to decide what are or are not "adult activities." See
Purtle v. Shelton, 251 Ark. 519, 522, 474 S.W.2d 123, 126 (1971) ("If we should declare that . . . hunting deer with
a high-powered rifle [is an adult activity] . . . we must be prepared to explain why the same rule should not apply to
a minor hunting deer with a shotgun, to a minor hunting rabbits with a high-powered rifle, to a twelve-year-old
shooting at crows with a .22, and so on down to the six-year-old shooting at tin cans with an air rifle.").
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Similarly, the reader will note that while in the following dyads, the Formal Realizability
arguments are allied with the relatively individualist position:
in others the Formal Realizability arguments are allied with the communalist position:
Finally, there are some individualist-communalist dyads where it is not clear on which side
the Formal Realizability argument belongs, or where it is possible to make such arguments on both
sides:
78
Thus the Formal Realizability and Substantive Realizability arguments seem to float between
the individualist and communalist positions, switching their alliances depending upon the particular
rule choice involved.
79 Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 4, at 1687-1701.
80 For a discussion of the phenomenon of argument forms "coloring" each other, see infra text
accompanying notes 85-87.
81 Examples of rule choices with this alignment (the communalist position is given first):
(1) Duty to rescue a stranger vs. No duty to rescue. Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959).
(2) Duty of landlord to keep premises in safe condition vs. No duty in absence of contractual promise.
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cit. 1970).
(3) Cause of action for commercial appropriation of likeness vs. No cause of action. Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
82 Examples of rule choices with this alignment:
(1) No defense of insanity vs. Defense of insanity. McGuire v. Almy, 297 Mass. 323, 8 N.E.2d 760 (1937).
(2) No state-of-the-art defense in products liability vs. State-of-the-art defense. Beshada v. Johns-Manville
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The reason this occurs is that these arguments are not, as Professor Kennedy thought, deeply
connected to the antinomy between individualism and communalism. They represent instead another
axis of opposition in our moral and legal thought, one of rules or mechanical classification versus
standards or case-by-case adjudication.79 This opposition does not concern the extent of the duties
owed to others (the individualist-communalist opposition), but rather the form of the duties already
postulated. Because these arguments spring from a different axis of opposition in our thought, there
is no a priori reason to expect that individualist arguments will always be accompanied by
arguments of Formal Realizability, or vice versa.
E. The Alignment of Axes
There are a few general rules that will describe the alignment of the individualist-
communalist axis with the Formal Realizability-Substantive Realizability axis. Generally speaking,
the most Formally Realizable rule is "The defendant always wins." This is Formally Realizable
because it is very easy to apply---the court simply refuses to recognize any causes of action, and
losses always lie where they fall. This position is equivalent to a complete absence of legally
cognizable duties owed by individuals to each other in society, and thus is an extremely
individualistic position. In fact, it is anarchy.
Similarly, it is usually more Formally Realizable for a court not to recognize or create a
particular cause of action. This position relieves the courts of any need to find facts or apply rules
or standards to particular disputes. It is also a relatively individualist position because it relieves the
defendant of a duty she might otherwise owe to others. Thus, whenever a dyadic rule choice is posed
between the recognition or denial of a particular duty, the individualist arguments will always line
up with and color80 the Formal Realizability arguments.81
However, whenever the issue involved is whether or not to permit a complete defense,
justification, or excuse which would relieve the defendant of responsibility, the relatively
individualist position is to create or recognize the defense, justification, or excuse. Of course, this
choice is not more Formally Realizable, because it is usually easier to apply a rule of liability without
any defenses, justifications, or excuses. In these cases, the Formal Realizability arguments will line
up with and be colored by the communalist arguments which accompany them.82
Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
(3) No defense of mistake of law vs. Defense of mistake of law. United States v. International Minerals &
Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
83 Examples of rule choices with this alignment:
(1) Comparative negligence defense vs. Contributory negligence defense. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
(2) Good faith exception to the exclusionary rule vs. No good faith exception. United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984).
(3) Spouse's sexual attack may constitute rape vs. Spousal rape exception. State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 426
A.2d 38 (1981).
84 Examples of rule choices with this alignment:
(1 ) "Eggshell skull" rule vs. Only foreseeable damages recoverable. Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d
1169 (2d Cir. 1970).
(2) No imperfect self-defense doctrine vs. Imperfect self-defense doctrine (i.e., subjective but unreasonable
belief that life is threatened reduces homicide from murder to manslaughter). Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa.
343, 80 A. 571 (1911).
(3) No defense of intoxication vs. Defense of intoxication only to specific intent crimes. State v. Stasio, 78
N.J. 467, 396 A.2d 1129 (1979).
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When the issue involves a choice between a partial defense, justification, or excuse, or a
complete defense, justification, or excuse, the individualist position will be aligned with the more
Formally Realizable position, since this is analogous to a choice between some duty and no duty
at all.83
When the issue involves a choice between a partial defense, justification, or excuse, or no
defense, justification, or excuse, the communalist position will be aligned with the more Formally
Realizable position, since this is analogous to a choice between duty and a lesser standard of duty.84
To sum up, if the rule choice is between some duty and no duty, the individualist position
will be the more Formally Realizable position. If the rule choice is between some duty and a higher
standard of duty, however, the communalist position will normally be the more Formally Realizable
position.
With this in mind, we can understand Kennedy's conclusion that Formal Realizability
arguments and a preference for rules over standards will be allied with the philosophy of
individualism in contract law. Most doctrinal issues in the law of contracts involve a choice between
some duty and no duty, that is, between contractual obligation or no obligation. This follows from
the fact that in the law of contracts, no duties are imposed upon the parties unless they have assumed
them through contractual agreement. For this reason debates about contractual liability usually focus
on whether a change in the status quo has been effected, or an enforceable promise has been formed;
that is, whether the defendant owes the plaintiff any duty. Consider the following dyads, each of
which displays an alliance between individualist and Formal Realizability arguments:
85 Examples:
86 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 119, 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (1896).
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This is not to say that there are not some dyadic rule choices in the law of contracts where
the alignment is reversed;85 the point is that the idea of contractual obligation (as opposed to
obligation in tort) starts from a highly individualist position where no duty is owed to others. This
is also a more Formally Realizable position; hence the natural alliance which Kennedy identified.
There is a still further explanation of Kennedy's result: this has to do with the effects that
different axes of opposition have upon each other when they are in a particular alignment.
F. The Coloring Phenomenon
Consider the following two opposed sets of arguments concerning whether the law should
recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the absence of physical
contact with the plaintiff. Because the question involves one of duty or no duty, the individualist
position (no cause of action) is also the more Formally Realizable position.
(1) If the right of recovery in this class of cases should be once established, it would
naturally result in a flood of litigation in cases where the injury complained of may be easily feigned
without detection, and where the damages must rest upon mere conjecture or speculation . . . a wide
field would be opened for fictitious or speculative claims.86 (FR.)
87 Dulieu v. White & Sons [1901] 2 K.B. 669, 681.
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(2) I should be sorry to adopt a rule which would bar all such claims on grounds of policy
alone, and in order to prevent the possible success of unrighteous or groundless actions. Such a course
involves the denial of redress in meritorious cases, and it necessarily implies a certain degree of
distrust, which I do not share, in the capacity of legal tribunals to get at the truth in this class of claim.
My experience gives me no reason to suppose that a jury would really have more difficulty in
weighing the medical evidence as to the effects of nervous shock through fright, than on weighing
the like evidence as to the effects of nervous shock through a railway collision or a carriage accident,
where, as often happens, no palpable injury, or very slight palpable injury, has been occasioned at the
time.87 (S.R.)
The above examples share an interesting feature. In each case, the arguments are a mixture
of the argument forms produced by the Formal-Substantive Realizability axis and the individualist-
communalist axis. The Formal Realizability argument has a distinctly individualist tinge to it: we
are concerned that spurious claims might be filed because we are afraid that liability will be extended
too far and that defendants will have to pay compensation when they are not at fault (No Liability
Without Fault (N LW F)) or when the plaintiffs have not really been harmed (No Liability Without
Harm (NLWH)).
Similarly, the Substantive Realizability arguments take on the flavor of the communalist
arguments with which they are aligned. Judicial administrability alone does not justify either denying
compensation to victims who have really suffered harm or allowing defendants to escape
responsibility (Plaintiffs Harm Requires Liability (H   L), Defendant's Fault Requires Liability
(F L)). The judicial system will be able to assign responsibility effectively.
This phenomenon I call the "coloring" of argument forms by each other. To see how the
Formal Realizability and Substantive Realizability arguments may be "colored" differently when
their alignments are reversed, consider the following debate about the defense of diminished capacity
in the criminal law. In this dyad the Formal Realizability arguments are aligned with the relatively
communalist position that there should be no defense, while the Substantive Realizability arguments
are aligned with the relatively individualist position in favor of the defense:
Communalist: The courts should not create a diminished capacity defense because it can too easily
be used by defendants to escape responsibility by feigning psychological disorders. If the defense is
allowed, it will be routinely offered by criminal defense attorneys and it will inject psychological
expert testimony into virtually every criminal trial. The result will be additional burdens on an already
overburdened criminal justice system and an increased number of guilty criminals escaping just
punishment. (F.R., Criminal Intent Requires Liability (C.I. L), Soc. Util. (C))
Individualist: The fear that some guilty criminals may go unpunished should not excuse the court's
duty to ensure that only those found to possess criminal intent are punished. The jury system is
designed to determine the extent of the defendant's criminal responsibility for his acts. The fact that
testimony as to the existence or absence of mens rea may be in conflict is no justification for refusing
to consider the issue. If the defense is not allowed, defendants who were not responsible for their
actions will be subject to undeserved criminal penalties, or juries will engage in nullification; either
result will be detrimental to the judicial process. (S.R., No Liability Without Criminal Intent
(NLWCI), Soc. Util. (I)).
Just as the colors a crystal displays when sunlight hits it may vary, so the "coloring" of an
axis of opposition (whether the arguments on one side seem individualist or communalist in nature)
88 Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 4, at 1737-45.
89 The reader should not confuse the arbitrary representation of doctrine as a series of dyadic rule choices
with the doctrine's historical development. In the case of this particular tort doctrine, the two simply happen to
coincide.
90 PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
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depends on the position of  the observer. The alignment (and coloring) of the arguments depends on
what type of dyadic rule choice is presented to the decisionmaker.
This insight gives us further understanding into Kennedy's identification of individualism and
Formal Realizability in the law of contracts. Dyadic rule choices in contract law generally present
an alliance between Formal Realizability and individualist arguments. Because of the alignment of
axes, Formal Realizability arguments in contract law have an individualist flavor, and individualist
arguments have a Formal Realizability flavor.88" However, the above examples demonstrate that this
alliance is not a necessary one, as Kennedy assumed, but may change from rule choice to rule choice,
or among different bodies of legal doctrine.
G. Combination of Crystalline Structures
The previous examples might suggest that the presence of different axes of opposition in
successive rule choices and their alignment is purely random. In fact, this is not so. We have already
noted that in contract law there seems to be a natural alliance between individualist and Formal
Realizability arguments. Very often, within a particular area of legal doctrine, the alignment of
different axes will remain constant as one moves from supradoctrinal to subdoctrinal choices.
We can see an invariant combination of structures at work in the historical development of
the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. The tort developed as a series of successive rule
choices presented to common law courts.89
The most fundamental doctrinal choice for this cause of action was whether or not to allow
recovery for emotional distress in a negligence action at all. Common law courts decided very early
on that plaintiffs could recover such damages if they simultaneously sustained physical injury.90 A
schematic representation of the debate appears below. Note the alignment of the Formal Realizability
argument with the individualist position:
91 The following abbreviations of argument forms are used:
S.R. = Substantive Realizability
F.R. = Formal Realizability
ASB2I = As Between Two Innocents, Let the Person Who Caused the Damage Pay
NLWF = No Liability Without Fault
H L = Plaintiffs Harm Requires Liability 
NLWH = No Liability Without Harm
F L = Defendant's Fault Requires Liability
NLWC = No Liability Without Causation
92 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
93 Id. at 108-09, 45 N.E. at 354.
94 [1901) 2 K.B. 669.
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The next step in the development of the doctrine was whether a plaintiff could recover
damages for mental suffering if there had been no actual physical injury caused by an impact with
the plaintiff; that is, where the physical injury was caused only by the mental anguish that resulted
from the act of negligence.
The older position was taken in Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co.,92 which followed the
"impact rule"; i.e., that no action for negligent injury would lie without some physical impact to the
plaintiff which caused injury.
Mitchell involved a pregnant woman who was waiting at a crosswalk to board one of the
defendant's cars when a team of defendant's horses "came so close to the plaintiff that she stood
between the horses' heads when they were stopped." She claimed that as a result of this shock she
lost consciousness, became ill, and suffered a miscarriage.93
The impact rule was rejected in Dulieu v. White & Sons,94 which instead required that the
plaintiff have been in the "zone of danger" of physical impact caused by the defendant's negligence.
Dulieu involved a woman who gave premature birth to an infant after a two-horse van crashed into
her husband's public house as she worked behind the bar.
95 Id. at 681.
96 Id. at 675.
97Mitchell, 151 N.Y. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354-55.
98 Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 355.
99 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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In the debate between the Mitchell and Dulieu courts over the impact rule, Dulieu takes the
relatively communalist position and Mitchell takes the relatively individualist position, which is also
the more Formally Realizable position. The court in Dulieu justified the abandonment of the impact
rules on the following grounds:
(1) I should be sorry to adopt a rule which would bar all such claims on grounds of policy
alone, and in order to prevent the possible success of unrighteous or groundless actions. Such a course
involves the denial of redress in meritorious cases, and it necessarily implies a certain degree of
distrust, which I do not share, in the capacity of legal tribunals to get at the truth in this class of claim.
My experience gives me no reason to suppose that a jury would really have more difficulty in
weighing the medical evidence as to the effects of nervous shock fright, than in weighing the like
evidence as to the effects of nervous shock through a railway collision or a carriage accident, where,
as often happens, no palpable injury, or very slight palpable injury, has been occasioned at the time.95
(S. R., H  L)
(2) If. . . the fear is proved to have naturally and directly produced physical effects, so that
the ill results of the negligence in damages which caused the fear are as measurable as the same
results would be if they arose from an actual impact, why should not an action for those damages lie
just as well as it lies where there has been an actual impact?96 (ASB21)
The Mitchell court defended the impact rule by noting:
(1) If the right of recovery in this class of cases should be once established, it would
naturally result in a flood of litigation in cases where the injury complained of may be easily feigned
without detection, and where the damages must rest upon mere conjecture or speculation . . . a wide
field would be opened for fictitious or speculative claims.97 (F.R., NLWH)
(2) [I]t cannot properly be said that the plaintiffs miscarriage was the proximate result of the
defendant's negligence . . . . The injuries to plaintiff were plainly the result of an accidental or unusual
combination of circumstances, which could not have been reasonably anticipated, and over which the
defendant had no control . . . . 98 (NLWF)
The limitation of recovery in Dulieu, the "zone of danger" rule, was abandoned in Dillon v.
Legg.99 Dillon involved a suit by a mother who witnessed her child being struck and killed by a
negligently driven automobile. The mother was not in the zone of danger of physical injury from the
accident, although the child's sister was. Nevertheless, the court permitted both the mother and the
sister to recover on a theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress on the grounds that it was
foreseeable that the mother would be in close proximity to the child when the accident occurred:
(1) The mere assertion that fraud is possible, "a possibility [that] exists to some degree in all
cases". . does not prove a present necessity to abandon the neutral principles of foreseeability,
proximate cause and consequential injury that generally govern tort law. . . . [W]e cannot let the
100Id. at 737, 441 P.2d at 918-19, 69 Cal. Rpm at 78-79 (quoting Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 695, 376
P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962)).
101101. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The court also quoted the language of the court in
Dulieu v. White, listed above as argument (I ). Not only do the same types of arguments resurface in later debates,
but often the same words as well. In fact, Justice Tobriner, who wrote the majority opinion in Dillon, clearly
recognized that the same tensions were present in both cases, and indeed in all of the cases which concerned limits
on the scope of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. See infra text accompanying note 110,
102 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.Ud 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
103 Id. at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
104 Id. at 617. 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
105 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
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difficulties of adjudication frustrate the principle that there be a remedy for every substantial wrong.100
(H  L, S.R.)
(2) Because it is inherently intertwined with foreseeability [the existence of the defendant's]
duty or obligation must necessarily be adjudicated only upon a case-by-case basis. . . . We can,
however, define guidelines which will aid in the resolution of such an issue as the instant one.101
(S.R.)
However, several states have considered the question since the decision in Dillon, and, like
the New York Court of Appeals in Tobin v. Grossman,102 have retained the zone of danger rule. The
Tobin court reasoned that:
(1) [ F]oreseeability [of injury], once recognized, is not so easily limited. Relatives, other
than the mother, such as fathers and grandparents, or even other caretakers, equally sensitive and as
easily harmed, may be just as foreseeably affected. Hence, foreseeability would, in short order, extend
logically to caretakers other than the mother, and ultimately to affected bystanders.103 (F.R., NLWF)
(2) The . . . most difficult factor is any reasonable circumscription, within tolerable limits
required by public policy, of a rule creating liability, Every parent who loses a child or whose child
of any age suffers an injury is likely to sustain grievous psychological trauma, with the added risk of
consequential physical harm. Any rule based solely on eyewitnessing the accident could stand only
until the first case comes along in which the parent is in the immediate vicinity but did not see the
accident. Moreover, the instant advice that one's child has been killed or injured, by telephone, word
of mouth, or by whatever means, even if delayed, will have in most cases the same impact.104 (F.R.)
The most recent step in the development of the tort was the holding by the California courts
that in certain cases, no physical injury at all was required to recover for mental suffering. The
leading case is Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,105 in which a plaintiff husband sued doctors
who negligently performed medical tests on his wife and erroneously informed her that she had
contracted venereal disease. Ultimately as a result of the wife's suspicions of the plaintiffs infidelity,
their marriage fell apart.
The majority opinion gave the following justifications for the extension of liability:
106 Id. at 928,616 P.2d at 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837 (quoting Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 172, 472
P.2d 509, 519 (1970)).
107 Id. at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
108 Id. at 933, 616 P.2d at 823, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 841 (Clark, J., dissenting). This is an example of an
Institutional Competence and Authority argument.
109 Id. at 934-35, 616 P.2d at 823, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 842 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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(1) Courts which have administered claims of mental distress incident to an independent
cause of action are just as competent to administer such claims when they are raised as an independent
ground for damages.106 (S.R.)
(2) In our view . . . the attempted distinction between physical and psychological injury
merely clouds the issue. The essential question is one of proof, whether the plaintiff has suffered a
serious and compensable injury should not turn upon this artificial and often arbitrary classification
scheme.107 (H  L)
The dissent argued that such an expansion of liability was a proper subject for the legislature
and not the courts,108 and that in any case the extension was undesirable from a policy standpoint:
(1) The requirement of a concurrence of physical injury with claimed emotional distress is
a safeguard eliminating spurious claims for negligently inflicted mental distress. That safeguard is
now abandoned in favor of newly declared standards designed by the majority opinion to limit
recoveries under their new, independent tort. A plaintiff claiming his or her mental tranquility has
been disturbed can now recover " 'where proof of mental distress is of a medically significant nature,'
" or the claim of mental distress is supported by “‘some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances
of the case.'". . . Such standards are nonstandards, opening wide the door to abuse.109 (F.R., NLWH)
Putting the three debates together, we can see that the development of the doctrine shows a
crystalline structure with respect to both the individualist-communalist and the Formal-Substantive
Realizability axis. Moreover, because the alignment of the two axes remains invariant, the two
crystaline structures are identical:
110 68 Cal. 2d at 746-47, 441 P.2d at 924-25, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84-85 (1968).
111 The debate over the extension of this tort continues, as courts grapple with the question of how closely
related the plaintiff must be to the defendant in order to recover for emotional distress under the theory of Dillon v.
Legg. In Ledger v. Tippitt, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), the court extended the Dillon theory to a
plaintiff who witnessed the man she was living with stabbed to death by the defendant. Only four days after the
decision in Ledger, another California appeals court affirmed a dismissal of a cause of action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress when the plaintiff witnessed her ]over killed in a car accident. Recovery was denied because
the plaintiff and her ]over had only lived together and had not married. Elden v. Sheldon, 210 Cal. Rptr. 755 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1985). The debate in these two decisions raised what should be by now familiar issues of Formal
Realizability in opposition to the need for compensation of tort victims. Compare Elden, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 760 with
Ledger, 2 10 Cal. Rptr. at 826. The argumentary structure of this debate is the same as that in Dillon and its
forebears; only the battleground of contention has changed.
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Justice Tobriner actually noted this phenomenon in his opinion in Dillon v. Legg:
[T]he history of the cases does not show the development of a logical rule but rather a series
of changes and abandonments.. . . [T]he argument [is made] in each situation that the courts draw a
Maginot Line to withstand an onslaught of false claims . . . .
The successive abandonment of these positions exposes the weakness of artificial
abstractions which bar recovery contrary to the general rules [of tort liability].110
It is important to understand, however, that what makes the argumentary structures crystalline
is not, as Justice Tobriner suggests, that the doctrine has been steadily headed in one direction. After
all, the court in Tobin v. Grossman declined to extend the tort cause of action in New York. The
point is rather that as each new debate arises about whether or not to extend the doctrine, the same
types of arguments arise anew.111
112 This is another manifestation of the fact that individualism and communalism are orientations along a
continuum of increasing societal duty to others.
The same analysis does not operate with respect to the Formal /Substantive Realizability axis because the
rule choices do not lineup in increasing order of Formal Realizability. The most Formally Realizable rule is No
Duty; the next most Formally Realizable rule is Strict Liability. This is a reason why separate and distinct axes of
opposition might not align with each other in the same fashion throughout a body of doctrine.
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H. The Contextual Nature of Legal Argument
One of the consequences of the crystalline structure of legal thought is that the alignment of
arguments with the two sides of a given doctrinal choice is wholly contextual. That is to say, it is not
the rule itself but the rule which is placed in opposition to it which determines the arguments in its
favor. In the diagram below, note that the arguments in favor of an objective standard of negligence
in opposition to strict liability are the same as the arguments against an objective standard when the
alternative is a subjective standard.
To put the point in more general terms, consider the following diagram, which displays a
spectrum of increasing standards of care in tort:
If the reader picks any two of the four and considers a dyadic rule choice between them, the
communalist arguments will always line up with the relatively more communalist position, no matter
what combination of rules is chosen to form the dyad.112
One more point should be made about the "contextual" nature of doctrinal rule choices.
Whether individualist or communalist arguments are made for a particular position depends not only
113 E.g., Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the “Insanity Defense"---Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1953).
114 R. EPSTEIN,C. GREGORY& H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (4th ed. 1984).
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on the rule which is opposed to the position but how the opposition is itself perceived. As explained
earlier, principles ofjustification and excuse in criminal law are normally relatively individualist; the
insanity defense is a paradigmatic individualist rule choice (in opposition to the lack of the defense).
Yet if one considers that after acquittal by reason of insanity, the defendant can be held indefinitely
by the state in conditions which may be little better (or perhaps even worse) than penal confinement,
the position may no longer seem relatively individualist. Thus, some commentators on the insanity
defense have made individualist arguments against it.113 Consider the following diagram:
The position on the right is still the most individualist. Most of the rhetoric concerning the
insanity defense has assumed that the acquitted defendant is better off; this perception is what gives
rise to the individualist arguments in favor of the defense. Thus, it is important to remember that the
factual or institutional context in which the rule choice is made will often decide which side of the
dyad presents the relatively individualist or communalist position.
I. Arguments That Prove Too Much and Too Little
It follows from the above examples that an argument for a relatively communalist position
is also an argument for an even more communalist position, and an argument for a relatively
individualist position is also an argument for an even more individualist position. This result
explains the efficacy of two commonly used rhetorical devices in legal argument. The first device
is an argument that the justifications for a rule choice show that, although preferable to the
alternative, the rule choice does not go far enough. The second device has precisely the opposite
goal. It involves the assertion that arguments in favor of a given rule choice prove too much, and
therefore that these arguments are discredited by a sort of reductio ad absurdum. The two strategies
are mirror images: in the first case the advocate claims that the rule does not go far enough, and in
the second the advocate argues that it goes too far.
Two excellent examples of these tactics are given by Epstein, Gregory, and Kalven in their
casebook on the law of torts:114
(1) The rule choice does not go far enough. The authors consider the common law rule that
insanity is not a defense to the application of an objective standard in negligence. They quote the
justification offered by Thomas Cooley in his treatise on the Law of Tort (1879):
115 Id. at 135.
116 Id.
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[There is] no more propriety or justice in making others bear the losses resulting from his unreasoning
fury when it is spent upon them or their property, than there would be in calling upon them to pay the
expense of his confinement in an asylum when his own estate is ample for the purpose.115
The authors then ask: "Why is this not an argument for strict liability in tort?"116 Why not
indeed? Cooley's argument is a classic As Between Two Innocents argument for corrective justice.
If it is accepted, it is an equally good argument for holding an insane person's estate liable whenever
that person causes injury to another's person or property:
Cooley might respond that other principles make a negligence standard preferable; thus, it
is true that an insane person's lack of moral fault will not excuse him from liability, but that is only
because people have a right to expect reasonable behavior from others in society. They have no right,
however, to expect any more than the behavior that a reasonable person would engage in, and if the
injury is one that even a sane and reasonable person would have caused, it is unfair to hold the insane
person liable because she has done nothing wrong when judged by normal societal expectations.
These, of course, are individualist arguments (No Rights as Security (NoR.S.), No Liability Without
Fault (NLWF)), and they are now used in favor of an objective standard because it is opposed by the
choice of the relatively more communalist position of strict liability.
Of course, this ploy works both ways. The principles that one should not be held liable if he
is not at fault, and that people should not expect that they will be protected from injuries which are
no one's fault are equally as good arguments for a subjective standard of negligence in opposition
to strict liability as they are for an objective standard in opposition to strict liability.
(2) The argument proves too much. Epstein, Gregory, and Kalven consider and criticize the
standard justifications for strict liability in products liability cases, including loss spreading. They
ask: "On this rationale, why does it matter if the plaintiff was injured by a defective product, or
indeed the defendant's product at all? Does this rationale require strict liability in all occupiers
117 Id. at 644.
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liability, automobile accident and medical malpractice cases, at least where there are institutional
defendants?"117
The point is that the spreading argument for strict products liability proves too much, since
it is an equally good argument for the more relatively communalist position of general strict liability
and, indeed, for the even more communalist position of enterprise liability:
Of course, the argument only works as a reductio ad absurdum if it is assumed that general
strict liability or enterprise liability are undesirable alternatives. It is this assumption which
differentiates the first example from the second.
J. Extending and Cutting Back on Doctrinal Rules
Another interesting result of using dyads to represent the crystalline structure of doctrinal rule
choices is that one can see graphically what lawyers mean when they speak of judges "cutting back
on" or "extending" preexisting doctrine. In general, a doctrinal choice has been extended in a new
case when the subdoctrinal choice follows the same direction (individualist or communalist) as the
original choice and, conversely, the doctrine has been "cut back" when the subdoctrinal choice is in
the opposite direction from the original doctrinal choice:
118 See Dulieu v. White, [19011 2 K.B. 669; supra text accompanying notes 92-98.
119 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
120 See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); supra text accompanying
notes 99-104.
121 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
122 The following abbreviations of argument forms are used in the above dyad and in the discussion that
follows:
S. R. = Substantive Realizability
F. R. = Formal Realizability
ASB2I = As Between Two Innocents, Let the Person Who Caused the Damage Pay
NLWF = No Liability Without Fault
H  L = Plaintiffs Harm Requires Liability
NLWH = No Liability Without Harm
F  L = Defendant's Fault Requires Liability
NLWC = No Liability Without Causation
123 Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); supra text accompanying notes
92-99.
124 See supra text accompanying notes 92-104.
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In the first example, the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress has been
extended to plaintiffs who are outside the "zone of danger" created by the defendant's negligence.123
Graphically, this looks as if the direction of the first dyad was being extended in the communalist
direction by means of the second rule choice. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the
arguments for the original rule choice are of the same form as the arguments for its extension, and
the arguments against the extension are of the same form as the arguments against the original rule
choice.124
125384 U.S. 436 (1966).
126 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
127Compare the following:
Communalist Arguments Against the Miranda Rule:
The Fifth Amendment . . . has never been thought to forbid all pressure to incriminate one's self in
the situations covered by it. [No R.I.]
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 512 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
[The Court's] rules impair, if they will not eventually serve wholly to frustrate, an instrument of
law enforcement that has long and quite reasonably been thought worth the price paid for it.
 .  . . [T]he Court is taking a real risk with society's welfare in imposing its new regime on the
country. The social costs of crime are too great to call the new rules anything but a hazardous
experimentation. [Soc. Util. (C), R.C.]
Id. at 516-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
More than the human dignity of the accused is involved; the human personality of others in the
society must also be preserved. Thus the values reflected by the privilege are not the sole
desideraturn; society's interest in the general security is of equal weight.
Id. at 537 (White, J., dissenting).
In some unknown number of cases the Court's rule will return a killer, a rapist, or other criminal to
the streets . . . to repeat his crime whenever it pleases him. As a consequence, there will not be a
gain, but a loss, in human dignity. [R.C., No R.I.]
Id, at 542 (White, J., dissenting).
Even if one were to postulate that the Court's concern is not that all confessions induced by police
interrogation are coerced but rather that some such confessions are coerced and present judicial
procedures are believed to be inadequate to identify the confessions which are coerced and those
that are not, it would still not be essential to impose the rule that the Court has now fashioned,
Transcripts or observers could be required, specific time limits, tailored to fit the cause, could be
imposed, or other devices could be utilized to reduce the chances that otherwise indiscernable
coercion will produce an inadmissible confession.
 . . . .
I see no sound basis . . . for concluding that the present rule against receipt of coerced confessions
[requiring case-by-case inquiry into voluntariness under the specific circumstances] is inadequate
for the task of sorting out inadmissible evidence and must be replaced by the per se rule which is
now imposed. [S.R., No R.I.)
Id. at 535, 538-39 (White, J., dissenting).
Communalist Arguments in Favor of the Public Safety Exception:
[T]he need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs
the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination. [Soc. Util. (C), No R.I.]
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (Majority opinion of Rehnquist, J.).
We decline to place officers . . . in the untenable position of having to consider, often in a matter
of seconds, whether it best serves society for them to ask the necessary questions without the
Miranda warnings and render whatever probative evidence they recover inadmissible, or for them
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In the next example, the prophylactic rule of Miranda v. Arizona,125that particular warnings
be given to every accused criminal defendant before lawful interrogation can begin, is modified by
an exception in cases where expeditious pre-warning interrogation is necessary to protect public
safety.126 Graphically, the second rule choice indeed seems to "cut back" against the direction of the
first rule choice. Nor is it surprising that the reasons offered by the majority in New York v. Quarles
were the same forms of argument which had motivated the dissent in Miranda, 127 while the
to give the warnings in order to preserve the admissibility of evidence they might uncover but
possibly damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation
confronting them. [Soc. Util. (C), R.C.]
Id. (footnote omitted).
The exception will not be difficult for police officers to apply because in each case it will be
circumscribed by the exigency which justifies it. We think police officers can and will distinguish
almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the
public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect. [S.R.]
Id.
128Compare the following:
Individualist Arguments in Favor of the Miranda Rule:
Unless a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is achieved . . . there can be no assurance
that [coercive police] practices . . . will be eradicated in the foreseeable future.
. . . [W]ithout proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or
accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.
[Soc. Util. (I)]
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447, 467 (1966) (Majority opinion of Warren, C.J.). 
A recurrent argument made in these cases is that society's need for interrogation
outweighs the privilege . . . . [But] the Constitution has prescribed the rights of the individual
when confronted by the power of government when it provided in the Fifth Amendment that an
individual cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. That right cannot be abridged.
(R.I., No R.C.]
Id. at 479 (citation omitted).
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule
and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple,
we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights
without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on
information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be
more than speculation; a warning is the clearcut fact. [F.R., R.I.]
Id. at 468-69 (footnote omitted).
Individualist Arguments Against the Public Safety Exception:
Miranda was not a decision about public safety; it was a decision about coerced confessions. Without
establishing that interrogations concerning the public's safety are less likely to be coercive than other interrogations,
the majority cannot endorse the "public-safety exception" and remain faithful to the logic of Miranda v. Arizona.
. . . .
. . . [B]y deliberately withholding Miranda warnings, the police can get information out of suspects who
would refuse to respond to police questioning were they advised of their constitutional rights. The "public-safety"
exception is efficacious precisely because it permits police officers to coerce criminal defendants into making
involuntary statements. [Soc. Util. (I), R.I.]
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 685 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Though the majority's opinion is cloaked in the beguiling language of utilitarianism, the Court has
sanctioned sub silentio criminal prosecutions based upon compelled selfincriminating statements. I find this result in
direct conflict with the Fifth Amendment's dictate that "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself."
The irony of the majority's decision is that the public's safety can be perfectly well protected without
abridging the Fifth Amendment. If a bomb is about to explode or the public is otherwise imminently imperiled, the
police are free to interrogate suspects without advising them of their constitutional rights. [R.I., No R.C.]
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arguments used by the dissent in Quarles were of the same form which had motivated the creation
of the prophylactic Miranda rule in the first instance.128
Id. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[A] public safety exception destroys forever the clarity of Miranda for both law enforcement officers and
members of the judiciary . . . .
. . . .
. . . Not only will police officers have to decide whether the objective facts of an arrest justify an
unconsented custodial interrogation; they will also have to remember to interrupt the interrogation and read the
suspect his Miranda warnings once the focus of the inquiry shifts . . . to ascertaining the suspect's guilt.
Disagreements of the scope of the "public-safety" exception and mistakes in its application are inevitable. [F.R.]
Id. at 680 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
129 0. HOLMES, supra note 6, at 107.
130 0. HOLMES, supra note 6, at 108-11.
131 See supra note 127.
132 The precise alternation was merely fortuitous. Had the majority rule been that there was no adult
activity rule, as was previously the case in several jurisdictions, e.g., Lehmuth v. Long Beach Unified School Dist.,
53 Cal. 2d 544, 348 P.2d 887, 2 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1960); Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 A. 457 (1931 ),
there would have been no such illusion of symmetry. The point is that the acceptance of individualist or
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K. The Doctrinal Conundrum
Although individualist and communalist arguments reappear at every level of doctrinal
complexity, neither the relatively individualist nor relatively communalist position is chosen by
courts in every case; the arguments which are persuasive in some doctrinal choices fail to persuade
in others. In our previous discussion we noted that Holmes made a No Liability Without Fault
(NLWF) argument for Negligence over Strict Liability, and rejected an As Between Two Innocents
(ASB21) argument for compensation.129 Yet only a few pages later in The Common Law, Holmes
rejects a NLWF argument for a subjective standard and embraces an ASB2I argument for an
objective standard.130 Clearly Holmes did not believe that he was contradicting himself in making
these two arguments, and there is in fact no logical contradiction, since they are made in different
contexts. The tension between the two positions he takes, however, is undeniable. There is, if not
a logical contradiction, at least a rhetorical one.
We could go further and note that the general common law rule that a special standard of care
applies to children involves accepting the NLWF argument that was rejected at the previous level
of doctrinal choice between objective and subjective standards. Going down one level further, the
acceptance of the adult activity rule is an acceptance of an ASB21 argument which was rejected at
the previous level of doctrinal choice, i.e., between a special standard for children and no special
standard. Similarly, in creating a "public safety exception" in New York v. Quarles, the Supreme
Court's majority opinion accepted forms of argument which were rejected by the majority in
Miranda.131
This successive acceptance and rejection of identical forms of argument at different levels
of doctrine I call the "doctrinal conundrum." It is a conundrum, or puzzle, because there is no
predictable way of telling which way a rule choice will go (and which arguments will be accepted)
by examining the rule choices which preceded it. In the tort law examples just given, the successive
rule choices alternated between individualist and communalist positions.132
communalist styles of argument in one rule choice has no effect on how any other rule choice will be resolved.
133 This apparent inconsistency between the law of intentional and unintentional tort was pointed out in
Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property and Personality, 39 HARV. L.
REV. 307, 308 n.3 (1926); and Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401, 410-18
(1959).
134 Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (judicial intervention to protect liberty interest in
freedom of contract) with United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (judiciary will not intervene to
protect rights threatened by economic regulation but may intervene where liberties afforded by the Bill of Rights are
threatened).
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The doctrinal conundrum is also present across doctrinal areas, as seen in the following
dyads:
The law in general accepts the No Liability Without Fault argument when a person preserves
his life or property by creating a small risk of injury to the property of another (which is therefore
classified as an unintentional injury if it occurs), while rejecting the NLWF argument when the injury
is intentional.133
American political ideology manifests one of the most interesting large scale illustrations of
the doctrinal conundrum. As noted earlier, individualism and communalism cannot be identified with
American liberalism and conservatism because the relatively individualist position is sometimes the
liberal position and sometimes the conservative position. Another way of putting this is that
American liberalism and conservatism contain "doctrinal conundrums" within themselves.
I will try to give a large-scale picture of the conundrums without being too simplistic. In
general, American liberals take relatively individualist positions in areas of free speech, reproductive
freedom, and criminal law, while taking relatively communalist positions with respect to economic
regulation and accident compensation. The position of American conservatives tends to be exactly
the reverse: They tend to take relatively communalist positions on issues of free speech, reproductive
freedom, and criminal law, while taking relatively individualist positions on issues of economic
regulation and accident compensation.134
What is especially interesting about this symmetrical pattern is that neither liberals nor
conservatives seem to view their choice of positions on such diverse issues as involving
135The liberal-conservative split of individualist-communalist positions explains why campaign financing
laws pose such difficult theoretical problems for both liberals and conservatives. They present the intersection of
regulations of speech and economic power; they are thus on the "fault line" of the individualist-communalist split
for both ideologies.
It is beyond the scope of this article to investigate why American liberalism and conservatism have
embraced the particular combinations of relatively individualist and communalist positions that they have or why the
combinations chosen by the two sides are mirror images of the other. For further discussion, see Balkin, Federalism
and the Conservative Ideology, 19 URB. LAWYER 459 (1987).
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contradictions: Liberals who see market failure and externalities as justifications for economic
regulation dismiss the need to correct any failures or externalities in the "marketplace of ideas";
conservatives who decry regulation of economic freedoms by an overzealous and intrusive
government are complacent about government restrictions on private sexual conduct in the name of
preserving morality and family values. Liberals may be more willing to accept liability without fault
to achieve deterrence against unsafe manufacture of consumer products than to achieve deterrence
against criminal activity; conservatives who argue for the felony murder rule as a deterrent to crime
are unimpressed by calls for liability without fault in tort law.135
L. The Doctrinal Conundrum and the Struggle of Doctrinal Development
One consequence of the doctrinal conundrum is that the fleshing out or development of a
legal doctrine of law will usually repeat the same debate that initially led to its creation. We have
already seen that the debate over negligence and strict liability is recapitulated in the extension and
development of the negligence standard. This phenomenon is not confined to tort law. Each new
application of the exclusionary rule by the Supreme Court recapitulates the debate over the propriety
of the exclusionary rule, as each succeeding Supreme Court case concerning the right to an abortion
recapitulates the debate about the importance of that right.
These conclusions are no doubt intuitively obvious to people who have observed that judges
who dislike a prior precedent use every available means to cut back on its force, while those who
support it often try to extend it further. If Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Rehnquist are on
opposite sides of an issue in a constitutional case, it will come as no surprise that they continue to
be on opposite sides in the next case construing the scope of the first precedent.
That judges are so predictable, one might think, is merely due to human nature. But the
doctrinal conundrum is not merely a theory about the stubbornness of judges. The doctrinal
conundrum is evidence of the dialectical nature of human moral consciousness: the opposed social
and moral ideas that human beings share and the arguments that they use to defend them. The
doctrinal conundrum shows us that when a subdoctrinal issue is presented, the clash of opposed
social visions in previous debates will reemerge with renewed vigor and the arguments which
supported those visions will do battle once again, with no guarantee that the result will be the same.
The existence of the doctrinal conundrum is another way of stating that doctrinal battles are
neverending. The argument forms which were routed in the first level of struggle are rejuvenated and
136 Professor Kennedy has summed up the notion of the doctrinal conundrum nicely when he stated that
"there are no 'killer' arguments." That is, no argument is guaranteed to win every doctrinal battle.
137 Purely logical contradictions are only one small subset of things which "speak against" each other, to
use the etymology of the word. The opposition or contrariness of objects and ideas has since Aristotle's time been
recognized as distinct from purely logical contradiction. Aristotle, Categoriae, ch. 10, in 1 THE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE (W.D, Ross ed. 1966).
138 By "zigzagging," I mean simply the choice of the individualist position in the first rule choice, the
communalist in the next, and so forth. In a dyadic diagram such as Figure 9 supra, the path of doctrinal development
does indeed appear to zigzag.
139 Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 4, at 1723-24 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
Professor James Boyle takes an even less sanguine attitude towards the doctrinal conundrum. As he puts it:
"The policy arguments ... are merely formal symbols, like + or -. They alone cannot tell us what is the right decision
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reemployed as each new application of precedent arises; they may yet carry the day in another
battlefield.136
M. The Doctrinal Conundrum and the Rationality of Legal Thought
The existence of the doctrinal conundrum raises the question about whether legal thought is
in fact rational. Obviously, the fact that practicing attorneys and academics are able to manipulate
and categorize legal decisions and doctrines in the context of rule choices means that legal thought
must be a rational enterprise at some level. This "rationality" is a very weak form of the word and
might mean only that there are no overt logical contradictions between rule choices. The most
interesting contradictions, however, are rarely logical ones. They are contradictions of style, of
tendency, and of flavor.137
The real issue raised by the doctrinal conundrum is not whether legal thought is rational in
that it avoids logical contradiction. We may rest assured that it does. The real issue is whether there
is any coherent set of principles that explains the erratic "zigzagging" nature of rule choices within
and across bodies of legal doctrine.138 In other words, is there any principled metatheory which tells
us why the individualist arguments carry the day in some cases while the communalist arguments
prevail in others?
Kennedy describes the doctrinal conundrum in this fashion:
Given that individualism and [communalism) are sets of stereotyped pro and con arguments, it is hard
to see how either of them can ever be "responsible" for a decision. First, each argument is applied,
in almost identical form, to hundreds or thousands of fact situations. When the shoe fits, it is
obviously not because it was designed for the wearer. Second, for each pro argument there is a con
twin. Like Llewellyn's famous set of contradictory "canons on statutes," the opposing positions seem
to cancel each other out [citing K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 521-35
(1960)). Yet somehow this is not always the case in practice. Although each argument has an
absolutist, imperialist ring to it, we find that we are able to distinguish particular fact situations in
which one side is much more plausible than the other. The difficulty, or mystery, is that there are no
available metaprinciples to explain just what it is about these particular situations that make them ripe
for resolution. And there are many, many cases in which confidence in intuition turns out to be
misplaced.139
although they appear to if you are only given one side of the pairs." J. Boyle, supra note 4, at 7 (emphasis in
original).
Professor Boyle's imaginative comparison of individualist and communalist arguments to formal symbols
reveals an explicitly structuralist analysis of the problem. For the discussion of the structuralist interpretation of the
doctrinal conundrum, see infra text accompanying notes 142-48.
140 The metaphor is one of a pendulum or see-saw, which oscillates back and forth under the pull of
gravity.
141 Thus, the "pendulum" or "see-saw" analogy is flawed because the "zigzagging" of these mechanical
devices is predictable, uniform, and ordered. With a pendulum of given physical dimensions and degree of initial
displacement, it is possible to predict the timing, shift, and displacement of each succeeding swing. The point of the
doctrinal conundrum is that the shift from individualist justifications to communalist justifications follows no
perceivable pattern and may differ among different courts or legal thinkers.
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One possible explanation of the doctrinal conundrum would be a "center of gravity" theory.
As doctrinal choices move the courts farther and farther toward the extremes of either individualism
or communalism, a "gravitational pull" exercised in the opposite direction brings rule choices back
towards the center of the continuum. This gravitational pull exists because the conflicted nature of
our thought does not permit us to embrace either individualism or communalism completely. Thus
the "zigzagging" we see in successive rule choices is nothing more than our attempts at balancing
or mediating the contradictory moral impulses we find within us.
It is no doubt true that we find a need to mediate the contradictions in our moral
consciousness, but however tempting the center of gravity theory is at a metaphorical level,140 it does
not explain why the shifts occur when they do or how two different courts can come out differently
on the same issue. Moreover, there seems to be no predictable general pattern which explains the
erratic course that doctrinal rule choices take.141
Another possible answer comes from the fact that I have not attempted within the scope of
this article to cover all of the various types of argument which are used in legal discourse. There are
many other axes of opposition which inhabit our legal thought. Thus, although individualist and
communalist principles cannot by themselves explain the body of legal doctrines, other principles,
for example institutional considerations, when taken together, may achieve that goal. Thus, the
doctrinal conundrum may be a puzzle only because it is observed from too narrow a viewpoint.
Although this answer is plausible, it does not meet the deeper issue raised by the doctrinal
conundrum: the dialectical structure of legal thought in general. There are other principles at work
in the construction of legal thought, to be sure, but each of these has its own counterprinciple, and
each of the oppositions between them creates its own crystalline structures and its own doctrinal
conundrums. It would be marvelous indeed if the summing of all of these conundrums made them
vanish altogether.
Instead of searching aimlessly for an Archimedean point at which all doctrinal choices
become coherent, we should simply acknowledge the conflicting and conflicted nature of our moral
and legal consciousness. The tools of argument that we use are by their nature dialectical; it is not
surprising that what we construct with them retains much of their antinomal character. Thus, the
proper answer to the question "Is legal thought rational?" is "Yes, but it is also dialectical."
142 For an introduction to the problems that structuralism seeks to address, see generally H. GARDNER, THE
QUEST FOR MIND (2d ed. 1981); P. PETTIT, THE CONCEPT OF STRUCTURALISM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1975);
STRUCTURALISM AND SINCE, supra note 11.
143 C. LEVI-STRAUSS, 1 STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 31-36 (1963, 1976). This view of linguistic symbols
had been proposed by Ferdinand de Sassure. See generally F. DESASSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (1966).
Levi-Strauss also relied heavily on Roman Jakobson's theory that binary oppositions were the basis of the
organization of the distinctive features of phonetics. See generally R. JAKOBSON & M. HALLE, FUNDAMENTALS OF
LANGUAGE (1960). Jakobson's theory and Levi-Strauss's reliance upon it have been Criticized, E. LEACH, CLAUDE
LEVI-STRAUSS (1970), but the principles (1) that relational context (here opposition) creates meaning and (2) that
thought is dialectical (that is, structured in oppositions) do not cease to be valid simply because the linguistic
theories which suggested these principles to Levi-Strauss are now out of fashion.
144 C. LEVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 95 (1966); C. LEVI-STRAUSS, 1 STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 58-
59 (1963, 1976).
145 See supra note 136.
146 The word "arbitrary" is unfortunate but I can think of no better term. I do not mean to suggest that,
when we take moral or legal positions, what we say is meaningless or that moral and legal persuasion is fruitless.
Rather, I mean that the scope of the extension of our moral and legal principles is not determined by our expression
of them. Hence that scope---how far the principle is to extend, how much the argument proves---is what is
indeterminate and therefore "arbitrary."
147 C. LEVI-STRAUSS, TOTEMISM 77 (1963) (emphasis omitted).
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N. The Structuralist Interpretation of the Doctrinal Conundrum
It is possible to recast the discussion above in terms of an explicitly structuralist 142 analysis
of legal argument. Claude Levi-Strauss's great insight in the field of anthropology was the idea that
cultural phenomena could be compared to linguistic symbols, by themselves arbitrary and devoid
of meaning, yet made meaningful in the context of their relations to other symbols.143 By comparing
the relationships between cultural phenomena, Levi-Strauss was able to demonstrate what he
considered to be universal structures of mental operation.144
The analysis of this article is structuralist in the sense that it proposes that the relationships
between arguments for various rule choices share a common structure. The doctrinal conundrum and
the crystalline structure of thought suggest that the arguments people use to defend rule choices are
by themselves indeterminate in the scope of what they prove. Every argument proves too much and
no argument is a "killer" argument which promptly ends debate.145 In that special sense the
arguments we use are arbitrary as are Sassure's linguistic signs or Levi-Strauss's cultural
phenomena.146 They take their meaning (their persuasive impact in the social act of defending and
creating doctrinal rule choices), however, in the context of the rule choice in which they are
employed and the positions they oppose. The relationships between the arguments used to defend
opposing positions in some rule choices are identical to the relationships between the arguments used
to defend opposing positions in other rule choices. The "universal" or "deep" structure is formed by
the identity of the relationships of argumentary opposition. As Levi-Strauss expresses it in discussing
the cultural phenomenon of totemism, "it is not the resemblances, but the differences, which
resemble each other.”147
148See C. LEVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND (1966); C. LEVI-STRAUSS, TOTEMISM (1963); Kennedy, Form
and Substance, supra note 4, at 1712-13.
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Levi-Strauss's position is that human thought is structured in oppositions and that these
oppositions are the bedrock of the meaning and association of ideas.148 An explicitly structuralist
version of my thesis, then, is that the dialectical structure of moral consciousness is a precondition
to moral thought.
I do not claim that the particular forms of moral argument found in Western cultures are
universal. For example, other cultures may have no forms of moral argument equivalent to the rights
arguments discussed above because they have no conception of rights as Westerners understand
them. Moreover, since the forms of institutional argument discussed above are based upon particular
historically contingent institutions (for example, judicial power versus legislative power), there is
no reason to expect the oppositions they represent to be universal.
The hypothesis I propose is more modest; I assert that moral thought is structured in
oppositions, or antinomal ideas, and that antimonal ideas by their nature create crystalline structures
of moral argument, regardless of the forms the arguments take and the substantive content of the
opposed ideas which the arguments represent. The oppositions which create crystalline structures
of moral argument may vary from culture to culture. Thus the oppositions that we see in Liberal
thought reflect our Liberal consciousness. I do not attribute, however, the existence of oppositions
to the Liberal nature of our consciousness, but to the tendency of human beings to think in
antinomies.
On the other hand, I do think it reasonable to assume that in any society where there is more
than one individual the antinomy of self and other will appear in moral discourse. This antinomy,
however, may not be identical to the individualist-communalist dichotomy we see in Western
thought, and the tensions it produces may not be felt with the same sense of urgency that modern
westerners experience.
0. A Reply to Cynicism
Once a person recognizes the recurring forms of legal arguments, it is relatively easy to learn
how to generate standard individualist and communalist arguments on both sides of any dyadic rule
choice. There is a danger that this newfound power will lead both to a loss of legal innocence and
an unfortunate plunge into cynicism. The former is not so terrible a fate, but the latter deserves
refutation. The cynical position takes this form: if the same arguments appear over and over again,
and if for every argument there is a counter-argument, isn't the exercise of legal and moral persuasion
pointless? What is the persuasive force of legal and moral argument if one can mechanically generate
arguments in support of any position? More importantly, what is the value of legal and moral
argument if it is so easily manipulable?
What is intriguing about these questions is their unstated premise that we have always
believed that one could not argue for any legal position. After all, in a country in which people have,
149 E.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
150 E.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
151 E.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
152 E.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U-S. 20 (1922).
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at various times, defended racial segregation,149 involuntary sterilization on eugenic grounds,150 life
sentences for the theft of less than $200 of property,151 and child labor in sweatshops,152 it would
seem obvious that one can argue for just about anything. The fact that one can construct arguments
for any legal position, however, does not mean that all legal rules are equally good, just, or right. Just
because many different buildings could be constructed out of the same materials, one would not
expect that they would all be equally useful, stable, or desirable.
The fact that "one can argue for anything" is a justification for neither cynicism or nihilism.
It is rather the very reason why every human being, and especially every lawyer, bears a heavy
responsibility for the ways in which she employs moral argument. The moral and legal positions we
take are not merely meaningless moves in an adventitious game; they affect human lives and
fortunes. Thus, the existence of mechanically generable counter-arguments for every position does
not mean that arguments about values are pointless. Legal persuasion (and more generally, moral
persuasion) is neither futile nor pointless; it is essential to civilization and the only antidote to its
destruction. If we cannot persuade each other, we cannot live with each other.
V. CONCLUSION: THE DIALECTICAL NATURE OF LEGAL AND MORAL THOUGHT
Systems of law and standards of moral conduct are founded upon and defended by the tools
of moral and legal argument. These tools are imperfect, as is the language in which they are phrased.
Every moral or legal argument stands for a principle much broader than that which is necessary to
decide a particular case, and indeed each principle "proves too much" in that it also supports results
we find unpalatable. This fact is symptomatic of the dialectical structure of our moral consciousness;
it is a corollary of the doctrinal conundrum. Yet these tools of persuasion, imperfect as they are, are
the only tools we have.
If I try to persuade you that abortion or capital punishment is a bad thing, I will find myself
using arguments of the types that I have catalogued above. I will make those arguments knowing that
each has a rejoinder. Yet I must make them anyway, for they are the only way I can communicate
to you morally. The dialectical structure of legal and moral thought is a precondition to its exercise.
One might try to avoid this conclusion and explain the crystalline structure of legal
argumentation as a semantic phenomenon. Thus, our moral and legal arguments "prove too much"
not because the principles overextend themselves but because the words we use to express our
thoughts point only crudely at what we mean. If language could equal the precision of our moral and
legal thought, so this argument goes, the tensions and conflicts described in this article would
evaporate.
153 This hypothesis about the source of the contradictions in our moral consciousness may be disproved, if
we could discover non-liberal cultures whose moral and political discourse did not reflect antimonal types of
thought. The problem comes in establishing how a different culture's forms of moral argument could be compared to
our own. We cannot expect every culture to have those conceptions of the state or of the rule of law which are the
hallmark of Western legal systems. Testing this hypothesis would also require more than a superficial understanding
of the meaning of the self and the community in different cultures. Thus, the problems of translation are formidable,
even if we can identify notions of "right" and "wrong" in a given culture.
154 Cf. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 580 (1983) ("Legal doctrine
rightly understood and practiced is the conduct of internal development through legal materials."); J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-51 (1971) (sense of justice comes from matching initial convictions with proposed
preconceptions in an attempt to achieve reflective equilibrium).
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Language, however, does not after some imagined pure presence of thought. It forms the
structure of thought itself. We necessarily think in symbols. Thus, the dialectical structure of legal
argument is not a distortion of our thought by an imperfect medium, but reflects the structure of legal
and moral thought itself and the tendency of the human mind to think in oppositions. To paraphrase
the poet, the fault lies not in our words, but in ourselves.
Nor can we place the blame for the dialectical structure of our moral and legal thought on
antinomies peculiar to Liberal social thought and western legal systems. I do not believe that our
moral and legal consciousness is dialectically structured because it is Liberal consciousness, so that
if we could free ourselves from Liberal institutions our moral and legal debates would no longer
display a crystalline structure. Our legal institutions and our system of moral values are Liberal, but
the contradictions of our thought are not Liberal contradictions, but are only manifested in our
Liberalism. They appear to us in a "Liberal flavor" not because of their inherently Liberal character
but because of the Liberal character of our institutions.
We must not confuse the dancer with the dance. The oppositions within our thought may
have contributed to the character of our historically contingent institutions but they are not
themselves simply creations of them. Thus, a transformation of our social and political institutions
might lead us to different sorts of antinomies in our moral and legal thought, but if my hypothesis
is correct, we would not escape the human tendency to think in antinomies.153
The crystalline structure of our legal and moral thought is cause for neither resignation nor
rejoicing. It simply reflects the way that we are. Can this knowledge be useful to legal and moral
thinkers? I believe that it can. The doctrinal conundrum reveals hidden tensions in our moral
justifications. Becoming aware of these tensions or potential contradictions can liberate us because
it forces us to reevaluate our justifications. It shows us that what we thought were dissimilar moral
issues are really alike. It urges us to consider transferring our moral intuitions from one area of our
life to another, and seeing whether the results of that transfer comport any better with our developing
visions of justice.154
If, as a result of this challenge to our preconceived intuitions, we reevaluate our moral and
legal positions, we know that the doctrinal conundrum will not disappear. But that is not really the
point. Although the doctrinal conundrum tells us that some doctrinal choices will rest upon
justifications which are in tension with justifications supporting other doctrinal choices, it does not
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tell us where the tension must lie. The progressive refinement of our moral and legal intuitions
remains a viable goal, even though their dialectical nature cannot be transcended. In fact, the
presence of the doctrinal conundrum virtually begs us to engage in that process of refinement.
Thus we see at last the most important difference between moral and legal reasoning and the
purely logical reasoning of a formal system. In a formal system of logic, one contradiction, anywhere
in the system, is enough to make the entire system worthless, for in such a system any theorem is
provable. Thus, the location of the antinomy is irrelevant to the value of the system. Yet in a system
of moral and legal thought, contradiction is not only inevitable but essential, and I mean "essential"
in both senses of the word. Contradiction is essential because it reflects the essence of thought, and
essential because it is a necessary spur to the continuing development of our moral and legal
intuitions.
155 Examples:
The only rational basis for allowing recovery in tort seems to be blamableness . . . .
Granting that we cannot have a division of misfortune, it is useless simply to shift it unless for
good reason. It is better, then, where neither party is to blame, to let the loss lie where it happens
to fall.
Whittier, Mistake in the Law of Torts, 15 HARV. L. REV. 335, 335 (1902) (arguing for defense of mistake in
intentional torts).
The conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the
package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away . . . . Nothing in the
situation gave notice that the failing package had in it the potency of peril to persons thus
removed. Negligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected
interest, the violation of a right. "Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do."
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 341, 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928) (quoting POLLOCK, TORTS 455 (11th ed.))
(majority opinion of Cardozo, J.) (arguing for "foreseeable plaintiff" rule).
Absolute safety is unattainable, and employers are not insurers. They are liable for the
consequences not of danger but of negligence; and the unbending test of negligence in methods,
machinery, and appliances is the ordinary usage of the business.
Titus v. Bradford, B.& K.R.R., 136 Pa. 618, 626, 20 A. 517,518 (1890) (arguing that custom should be a defense to
defeat liability of an employer for unsafe working conditions).
156 Examples:
[T]he problem with the rule stated by the majority is that] a particular defendant maybe
held proportionately liable even though mathematically it is much more likely than not that it
played no role whatever in causing plaintiffs' injuries . . . . In adopting the foregoing rationale the
majority rejects over 100 years of tort law which required that before tort liability was imposed a
"matching" of defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury was absolutely essential.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 616, 607 P.2d 924, 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 147 ( 1980)
(Richardson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (arguing against the market share theory of liability advanced by
the majority).
[T]here is nothing whatever to show that the decedent was not drowned because he did
not know how to swim, nor anything to show that, if there had been a life buoy on board, the
decedent's wife would have got it in time, . . . or, if she had, that she would have thrown it so that
her husband could have seized it, or, if she did, that he would have seized it, or that, if lie did, it
would have prevented him from drowning.
New York Central R.R. v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334, 335 (2d Cir. 1920) (rejecting theory that defendant was liable for
negligence in failing to provide life buoys).
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APPENDIX
THE TYPOLOGY OF LEGAL ARGUMENT
I. INDIVIDUALIST AND COMMUNALIST ARGUMENTS
A. Arguments of Moral Responsibility and Desert
1. Individualist Arguments of Moral Responsibility and Desert
Tort Law Arguments
(1) No Liability Without Fault (including foreseeability) (NLWF)155
(2) No Liability Without Causation (NLWC)156 
157 Example:
The law does not punish men for their guilty intentions or resolutions in themselves. Nor does it
commonly punish them even for the expression, declaration, or confession of such intentions or
resolutions. That a man's unfulfilled criminal purposes should be punishable they must be
manifested not by his words merely, or by acts which are in themselves of innocent or ambiguous
significance, but by overt acts which are sufficient in themselves to declare and proclaim the
guilty purpose with which they are done.
The King v. Barker, 1924 N.Z.L.R. 865, 875 (opinion of Salmond, J.) (arguing for equivocality test of criminal
attempt).
158 Examples:
Slander consists in uttering words to the injury of a person's reputation. No such injury is
done when the words are uttered only to the person concerning whom they are spoken, no one else
being present or within hearing. It is damage done to character in the opinion of other men, and
not in a party's self estimation which constitutes the material element in an action for verbal
slander.
Sheffill v. Van Deusen, 79 Mass. 304, 305 (13 Gray) (1859).
Women have occasionally sought damages for mental distress and humiliation on
account of being addressed by a proposal of illicit intercourse. . . . If there has been no incidental
assault or battery, or perhaps trespass to land, recovery is generally denied, the view being,
apparently, that there is no harm in asking.
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1055 (1936).
159 Examples:
One who suffers from the terrible tendency to bleed on slight contact, which is denoted
by the term "a bleeder," cannot complain if he mixes with the crowd and suffers severely, perhaps
fatally, from being merely brushed against.
Bourhill v. Young, 1943 A.C. 92, 109 (opinion of Lord Wright).
A party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction which has been made by the fault of
another, and avail himself of it, if he does not himself use common and ordinary caution to be in
the right.
Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 61, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (1809) (opinion of Lord Ellenborough, C.J.)
(arguing for defense of contributory negligence).
160 Examples:
[W]e think a different situation is presented if the claimed excuse is based upon the incapacity of
men in general to resist the coercive pressures to which the individual succumbed. . . . [ L]aw is
ineffective in the deepest sense, indeed . . . it is hypocritical, if it imposes on the actor who has the
misfortune to confront a dilemmatic choice, a standard that his judges are not prepared to affirm
that they should and could comply with if their turn to face the problem should arise.
Condemnation in such case is bound to be an ineffective threat; what is, however, more significant
is that it is divorced from any moral base and is unjust.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09commentat7 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960) (arguing for defense of duress).
[A] drug addict, who, by reason of his use of drugs, lacks substantial capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law may not be held criminally responsible for mere possession
of drugs for his own use.
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(3) No Liability Without an Act (NLWA)157
(4) No Liability Without Harm (NLWH)158
(5) As Between Two Guilty Persons, Let the Loss Lie Where It Falls (ASB2G)159
Criminal Law Arguments
(6) No Liability Without Free Choice (NLWFC)160
United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1209- 10 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, J., dissenting).
161 Examples:
I must advert to the consequences of holding that this very general offence [conspiracy to corrupt
public morals] exists. It has always been thought to be primary importance that our law, and
particularly our criminal law, should be certain: that a man should be able to know what conduct
is and what is not criminal, particularly when heavy penalties are involved.
Shaw v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions [19621, A.C. 220, 281 (H.L. 1961) (opinion of Lord Reid) (arguing against
creation of common law crime of "conspiracy to corrupt public morals").
No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal
statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,453 (1939) (arguing that the Due Process Clause requires that penal statutes
not be vague).
162 Examples:
It has been argued . . . that absolute liability [in criminal law] is necessary for
enforcement in a number of areas where it obtains. But if practical enforcement cannot undertake
to litigate the culpability of alleged deviation from legal requirements, we do not see how the
enforcers rightly can demand the use of penal sanctions for the purpose. Crime does and should
mean condemnation and no court should have to pass that judgement unless it can declare that the
defendant's act was wrong.
MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.05 comment at 140 (Tent. Draft No. 4,1955) (arguing against prison terms in strict
liability offenses).
In every robbery there is a possibility that the victim will resist and kill. The robber has
little control over such a killing once the robbery is undertaken . . . . To impose an additional
penalty for the killing would discriminate between robbers, not on the basis of any difference in
their own conduct, but solely on the basis of the response by others that the robber's conduct
happened to induce.
People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781, 402 P.2d 130,133, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445 (1965) (arguing against
application of felony murder rule where accomplice is killed by robbery victim).
163 Examples:
The one shot that entered the plaintiff"s eye . . . could not have come from the gun of both
defendants. It was from one or the other only.
. . . .
. . . [A] requirement that the burden of proof on that subject be shifted to defendants
becomes manifest. They are both wrongdoers-both negligent toward plaintiff. They brought about
a situation where the negligence of one of them injured the plaintiff, hence it should rest with
them each to absolve himself if be can.
Summers v. Tice. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 84-87, 199 P.2d 1, 3-4 (1948) (arguing for theory of alternative liability).
The proposition is this: Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from
those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. Such an act occurs. Not only is he
wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected to result, but he also who is in fact injured,
even if he be outside what would generally be thought the danger zone.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 350, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) (arguing
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(7) No Liability Without Fair Warning (NLWFW)161
(8) No Liability Without Criminal Intent (NLWCI)162
2. Communalist Arguments of Moral Responsibility and Desert
Tort Law Arguments
(1) Defendant's Fault Requires Liability (F  L)163
against "unforeseeable plaintiff" rule of majority).
164 The ASB2I argument can be an argument for compensation or for corrective justice. Examples:
I may not do a trespasse to one for fear of threatenings of another, for by this means the party
injured shall have no satisfaction . . . .
Gilbert v. Stone, Style 72, 82 Eng. Rep. 539 (K.B, 1648) (arguing against defense of duress in intentional tort).
We need not recanvass the reasons for imposing strict liability on the manufacturer. The
purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are
borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377 P.2d 897,900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700-01
(1963).
In addition, the ASB21 argument may simply focus on the fact that the defendant has caused harm to the
plaintiff and therefore should be liable. In this case the argument might better be called Defendant's Causation
Requires Liability (C  L).
Examples:
[The rescuer's) right of action depends not upon the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct in its
tendency to imperil the person whose rescue is attempted, but upon its tendency to cause the
rescuer to take the risk involved in the attempted rescue."
F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 569 n.33 (1926) (explaining why a rescuer is permitted a cause of action
against a defendant whose negligence endangered a third party).
That the design defect does not cause the initial collision should make no difference if it is a cause
of the ultimate injury.
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 215, 321 A.2d 737, 744 (1974) (holding manufacturer has a
duty to design a crash-worthy vehicle).
165 Examples:
A person who inflicts a serious wound upon another, calculated to destroy or endanger
his life, will not be relieved of responsibility, even though unskilled or improper medical treatment
aggravates the wound and contributes to the death. Every person is held to contemplate and be
responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts, and the criminality of an act is not
altered or diminished by the fact that other causes co-operated in producing the fatal result.
Hall v. State, 199 Ind. 592, 608-09, 159 N.E. 420, 426 (1927).
As the purpose [of the criminal law] is to compel men to abstain from dangerous
conduct, and not merely to restrain them from evil inclinations, the law requires them at their peril
to know the teachings of common experience, just as it requires them to know the law.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 57 (1923) (arguing for objective standards in criminal law).
166 Example:
The damage done by negligent reporting . . . can be just as devastating to the individual as that
resulting from false reporting done maliciously or in reckless disregard of truth . . . .
Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 232-33, 531 P.2d 76, 83 (1975) (arguing for a negligence standard in
defamation actions brought by private parties against media defendants).
167 This argument is a response to the defendant's ASB2G argument that the plaintiff should be denied
liability because he is (to some degree) at fault. The argument is that the plaintiff should not forfeit recovery
because he is not at fault, has not caused his own injury, etc.
Example:
73
(2) As Between Two Innocents, Let the Person Who Caused the Harm Pay the Damage (ASB21)164
(3) Act At Your Peril (AAYP)165
(4) Plaintiffs Harm Requires Liability (H  L)166
(5) An Innocent Plaintiff Should Not Forfeit Recovery (NFWF (Plaintiff)).167
We believe the cases in those jurisdictions rejecting the "seat belt defense" [a defense of
contributory negligence barring recovery for increased damages caused by plaintiff's failure to
wear a seat belt] are the better reasoned cases. It seems extremely unfair to mitigate the damages
of one who sustains those damages in an accident for which he was in no way responsible,
particularly when, as in this jurisdiction, there is no statutory duty to wear seat belts.
Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 171, 492 P.2d 1030, 1036 (1972).
Rebuttals of this type are all communalist in nature, even though they are responsibility denying arguments.
What makes them communalist is that they emphasize the defendant's responsibility to pay by denying the plaintiff's
responsibility for his own predicament. The positions of the plaintiff and the defendant are thus symmetrical:
individualist arguments like ASB2G deemphasize the defendant's responsibility for plaintiffs injury by emphasizing
the plaintiffs responsibility for his own predicament. This symmetry continues throughout the other forms of
individualist-communalist arguments: Rights, and Social Utility. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53 and 54-
58, respectively; infra note 210.
168 Examples:
[W]e cannot accept a thesis that responsibility in law for a criminal act perpetrated by a legally
sane defendant, can be considered nonexistent . . . because his act was motivated by subconscious
influences of which he was not aware, and which stemmed inevitably from his individual
personality structure. A criminal act of that nature is nothing more than the consequence of an
impulse that was not resisted.
State v. Siokora, 44 N.J. 453, 472, 210 A.2d 193, 203 (1965) (citations omitted) (affirming trial court's refusal to
admit psychiatric testimony relating to defendant's capacity to premeditate murder).
There is no reason . . . always to make this protest [of no free choice] when someone who
"just didn't think" is punished for carelessness. For in some cases at least we may say "he could
have thought about what he was doing" with just as much rational confidence as one can say of
any intentional wrongdoing -he could have done otherwise" . . . .
H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 154 (1968) (rejecting argument that mere unawareness of nature of risk
should negate mens rea in negligent homicide cases (a pure subjective standard)).
169 Examples:
Defendant was aware of the penal statute enacted by the Legislature. He knew what he
wanted to do, and he did the thing he intended to do. He claims merely that he was given advice
[by the State Attorney General] regarding his legal rights. If there was any mistake, it was a
mistake of law and not of fact.
Hopkins v. State, 193 Md. 489, 499, 69 A.2d 456, 460 (1950) (arguing against defense of mistake of law).
[W]here, as here, . dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are
involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession
of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation.
United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971) (arguing that defendant's
knowledge that its action violates specific provision of regulations is not required for violation of 18 U.S.C. §
834(f), regulating transportation of corrosive liquids in interstate commerce).
170 Examples:
One of the purposes of the criminal law is to protect society from those who intend to injure it.
When it is established that the defendant intended to commit a specific crime and that in carrying
out this intention he committed an act that caused harm or sufficient danger of harm, it is
immaterial that for some collateral reason he could not complete the intended crime.
People v. Camodeca, 52 Cal. 2d 142, 147, 338 P.2d 903, 906 (1959) (arguing against defense of impossibility in
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Criminal Law Arguments
(1) Free Choice Existed (FCE)168
(2) Fair Warning Existed (FWE)169
(3) Criminal Intent Requires Liability (C.I.  L)170
attempt case).
If a defendant can be convicted as an accomplice for advising or counseling the perpetrator, it
likewise seems fair to impose vicarious liability upon one who, in alliance with others, has
declared his allegiance to a particular common object, has implicitly assented to the commission
of foreseeable crimes in furtherance of this object, and has himself collaborated or agreed to
collaborate with his associates, since these acts necessarily give support to the other members of
the conspiracy.
Developments in the Law---Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 999 (1959) (arguing for vicarious liability
of conspirator for overt acts done by co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy).
171 Examples:
There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where someone's feelings are
hurt. There must still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must
be left through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1966) (arguing that recovery for intentional infliction of
emotional distress must be predicated upon outrageous conduct by the defendant).
We had supposed that it was elementary law that a trader could buy from whom he pleased and
sell to whom he pleased, and that his selection of seller and buyer was wholly his own concern. "It
is a part of a man's civil rights that he be at liberty to refuse business relations with any person
whomsoever, whether the refusal rests upon reason, or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice, or
malice."
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 F. 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1915) (arguing for freedom of
contract) (quoting COOLEY ON TORTS 278).
172 Examples:
Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral, sensibilities.
Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit government to decide which types of otherwise
protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or
viewer, Rather, absent the narrow circumstances described above, the burden normally falls upon
the viewer to "avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes."
Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.& 15, 21
(1971)) (striking down a city ordinance which prohibited the showing of nudity in films by a drive-in movie theatre
when its screen could be seen from a public street or place).
There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free
contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker.
. . . .
. . . Statutes of the nature of that under review, limiting the hours in which grown and
intelligent men may labor to earn their living, are mere meddlesome interferences with the rights
of the individual.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57, 61 (1905) (striking down maximum hour law for bakers on grounds that law
violated freedom of contract).
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B. Arguments of Moral, Political, and Legal Right
Basic Rights Arguments
Individualist:
(1) Rights as Freedom of Action (R.F.A.): The defendant has a right to act as he pleases
without incurring liability to plaintiff.171




Security of person is as necessary as the security of property; and for that complete
personal security which will result in the peaceful and wholesome enjoyment of one's privileges as
a member of society there should be afforded protection, not only against the scandalous
portraiture and display of one's features and person, but against the display and use thereof for
another's commercial purposes or gain.
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N,Y. 538, 563, 64 N.E. 442, 450 (1902) (Gray, J., dissenting) (arguing
in favor of recognition of cause of action for commercial appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness).
[A] subjective standard of negligence] would leave the genera) security unprotected against that
vast amount of dangerous and harmful conduct which results not from inadvertence or
indifference but from deficiencies in knowledge, memory, observation, imagination, foresight,
intelligence, judgment, quickness of reaction, deliberation, cool ness, self-control, determination,
courage, or the like.
Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence, and Indifference: The Relation of Mental States to Negligence, 39 HARV. L.
REV. 849, 867 (1926).
174 Examples:
[U]tterances inciting to the overthrow of organized government], by their very nature, involve
danger to the public peace and to the security of the State . . . . And the immediate danger is none
the less real and substantial, because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen.
The State cannot reasonably be required to measure the danger from every such utterance in the
nice balance of a jeweler's scale . . . . [I]t may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the
threatened danger in its incipiency.
Gillow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,669 (1925) (upholding statute which criminalized advocating the overthrow of
organized government by violent means).
[T]he Eighth Amendment does not prevent the State from taking an individual's "well-
demonstrated propensity for life-endangering behavior" into account in devising punitive
measures which will prevent inflicting further harm upon innocent victims. . . . [D]eath finally
forecloses the possibility that a prisoner will commit further crimes, whereas life imprisonment
does not."
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 610 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing for constitutionality of the death
penalty in rape cases) (quoting Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 354 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)).
175 Examples:
The Court talks about a constitutional "right of privacy" as though there is some
constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge
the "privacy" of individuals. But there is not.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
No American decision has been cited, and independent research has revealed none, in
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(3) Rights as Security (R.S.): Plaintiff has a right to be secure from invasions of her interests
by the defendant.173
(4) Rights of the Community (R.C.): The State has the right to regulate the defendant's
activities in order to protect the security of its citizens.174
No Rights Arguments
Denials of Individualist arguments (NoR.F.A., NoR.I.) are communalist; denials of
communalist arguments (NoR.S., NoR.C.) are individualist.
Each NoR argument can take four basic forms: 
(1) Basic "No Rights" arguments: This form of argument is the denial that the right asserted in the
R.F.A., R.I., R.S., or R.C. argument exists. It can be either 
(a) a simple denial that the right asserted exists,175 or 
which it has been held that . . . a landowner has a legal right to the free flow of light and air across
the adjoining land of his neighbor.
Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
176 Examples:
Persons living in organized communities must suffer some damage, annoyance and inconvenience
from each other- For these they are compensated by all the advantages of civilized society. I f one
lives in the city he must expect to suffer the dirt, smoke, noisome odors, noise and confusion
incident to city life.
Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 577 (1876) (arguing for locality rule in nuisance cases).
The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic society, still do not
mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place
and at any time.
Cox v. Louisiana (Cox 1), 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) (arguing for constitutionality of time, place, and manner
regulations of speech).
177 Examples:
We disagree with both the District Court and the Court of Appeals that there is some sort
of "one man, one cell" principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979) (holding that "double-bunking" of pretrial detainees does not violate the
Due Process Clause).
The interest that the appellant may have in permanently sharing a single kitchen and a
suite of contiguous rooms with some of her relatives simply does not rise to [the] level [of an
interest implicit in the concept of ordered liberty]. To equate this interest with the fundamental
decisions to marry and to bear and raise children is to extend the limited substantive contours of
the Due Process Clause beyond recognition.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 537 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right
to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice.
Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
178 Examples of this type of argument are given in the section on Formal Realizability arguments, infra
notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
179 Examples:
[T]he regulation [prohibiting sleeping in national parks could not be] faulted . . . on the ground
that without overnight sleeping the plight of the homeless could not be communicated in other
ways. . . . Respondents do not suggest that there was, or is, any barrier to delivering to the media,
or to the public by other means, the intended message concerning the plight of the homeless.
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984) (upholding content neutral time, place,
and manner regulation of use of federal parks).
When the right asserted is that of the community, the argument that the state has no right because there are
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(b) a denial that the right exists to the degree asserted .176 Two common ways to do this are by
trivialization and slippery slope.
(i) Trivialization is the recharacterization of the right so that it seems unimportant, ludicrous
or otherwise unworthy of protection.177
(ii) Slippery Slope arguments assert that the right as announced would have no recognizable
limiting principle.178 
(2) "No Violation" arguments concede that a right exists but deny that there is any infringement of
the right. The most common versions of this line of reasoning are:
(a) The right is not abridged because it can be exercised in other ways.179
other ways of achieving its purposes becomes the familiar "less restrictive alternative" argument:
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (arguing against state's right to require public school teachers to list
every organization to which they had belonged in the last five years).
180 Examples:
The Hyde Amendment . . . places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who
chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by means of unequal subsidization of abortion and
other medical services, encourages alternative activity deemed in the public interest.
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980) (arguing for constitutionality of federal law which subsidized childbirth
but not medically necessary abortions).
To ask a man to agree, in advance, to refrain from affiliation with the union while
retaining a certain position of employment, is not to ask him to give up any part of his
constitutional freedom. He is free to decline the employment on those terms, just as the employer
may decline to offer employment on any other . . . .
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 21 (1915) (arguing that right of association of employee to join a labor union is not
abridged by "Yellow Dog" contract).
181 Examples:
The financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy the full range of
constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on
access to abortions, but rather of her indigency.
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (arguing that governmental decision to fund childbirth but not medically
necessary abortions did not violate constitutionally protected right of privacy).
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument to consist in the assumption
that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If
this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (upholding "separate but equal" doctrine).
182 Examples:
Although [plaintiffs] claim that the Constitution has been violated, they claim nothing else. They
fail to identify any personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional
error, other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct
with which one disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under Art. III . . . .
[S]tanding is not measured by the intensity of the litigant's interest or the fervor of his advocacy.
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 485-86
(1982) (arguing that plaintiffs did not suffer actual injury when the government donated property to a church related
group in an alleged violation of the Establishment Clause).
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract
need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have
a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.
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(b) The actor retains a free choice whether to exercise the right or to accept some other benefit (or
avoid a penalty).180
(c) To the extent that the actor has suffered a restriction of available opportunities, it has not
occurred because of a violation of the actor's rights by the defendant but because of other
circumstances for which the defendant is not responsible.181 
(d) The plaintiff has not suffered an "actual" (i.e., non- speculative) impairment of the asserted
right.182 
. . . .
. . . [T]he terms of the respondent's appointment secured absolutely no interest in re-
employment for the next year . . . . [T]he respondent surely had an abstract concern in being
rehired, but he did not have a property interest sufficient to require the University authorities to
give him a hearing when they declined to renew his contract of employment.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972) (arguing that a one year employment contract gave no
entitlement to a pretermination hearing under the Due Process Clause).
183 Example:
In view of the torpidity of [the] administrative review process . . . and the typically
modest resources of the family unit of the physically disabled worker, the hardship imposed upon
the erroneously terminated disability recipient may be significant. Still, the disabled worker's need
is likely to be less than that of a welfare recipient. . . . in view of [other] potential sources of
temporary income, there is less reason here than in [Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)] to
depart from the ordinary principle . . . that something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient
prior to adverse administrative action.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 3 19, 342-43 (1976) (arguing that prehearing termination of Social Security
Disability benefits did not violate right to procedural due process).
184 Examples:
[B]ankruptcy is not the only method available to a debtor for the adjustment of his legal
relationship with his creditors. . . . "[w]ithout a prior judicial imprimatur, individuals may freely
enter into and rescind commercial contracts . . . ."
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434,445 (1973) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971)) (arguing
that, in contrast to filing fees for divorce, filing fees for bankruptcy petitions do not unconstitutionally deny a right
of equal access to the courts).
The schoolchild has little need for the protection of the Eighth Amendment.. . . Even
while at school, the child brings with him the support of family and friends and is rarely apart
from teachers and other pupils who may witness and protest any instances of mistreatment.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,670 (1977) (arguing that corporal punishment does not constitute a violation of
the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments).
[C]orporal punishment in public schools implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest, but
we hold that the traditional common-law remedies are fully adequate to afford due process.
Id. at 672.
Note that the difference between the three examples is that the first and second examples argue that there is
no right because of the presence of an adequate alternative remedy, while the third example concedes that there is a
right, but argues that it has not been violated because of the presence of an adequate alternative remedy.
185 Example:
[T]hat the Constitution does not afford a judicial remedy does not, of course, completely disable
the citizen who is not satisfied with the "ground rules" established by the Congress for reporting
expenditures of the Executive Branch. Lack of standing within the narrow confines of Art. III
jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert his views in the political forum or at the polls.
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (arguing that fact that all citizens share an injury equally
indicates that no remedy for an alleged constitutional violation lies in the federal courts).
As the above example demonstrates, these arguments often concern the proper
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(e) The plaintiff has not suffered a sufficiently great impairment of the asserted right.183
(3) "Adequate Remedy Exists" arguments: Whether or not a right exists, and whether there has been
a violation of the right, no extra protection is needed because alternative means of redressing the
asserted infringement already exist .184
(4) "No Remedy" arguments: Whether or not there is a right, and whether or not there has been a
violation, there should be no remedy for relief, at least, of the sort the plaintiff or defendant seeks185.
institutions to give the complaining party his desired relief. They are related to the arguments of
institutional competence and authority mentioned earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 69-
70; supra note 69.
186Examples: (See supra note 177 for corresponding trivialization arguments.)
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of
the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a
household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of
constitutional recognition.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977).
The fact that the "offensive" speech here may not address "important" topics--ideas of
social and political significance," in the Court's terminology. . . —does not mean that it is less
worthy of constitutional protection.. . . [I]t is in those instances where protected speech grates
most unpleasantly against the sensibilities that judicial vigilance must beat its height.
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 87 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
187 Examples of this form of argument are given in the section on Substantive Realizability arguments,
infra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
188 Example:
Limiting the distribution of nonprescription contraceptives to licensed pharmacists
clearly imposes a significant burden on the right of the individuals to use contraceptives if they
choose to do so.. . . [T] he restriction of distribution channels to a small fraction of the total
number of possible retail outlets renders contraceptive devices considerably less accessible to the
public [and] reduces the opportunity for privacy of selection and purchase . . . .
Carey Y. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 689 (1977).
189 Example:
[W]hile the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful
than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric.
. . . .
. . . [W]e cannot overlook the fact . . . that much linguistic expression serves a dual
communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached
explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact. words are often chosen as much
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Responses to No Rights Arguments
When a NoR argument is made against an asserted right, and another contrary right asserted
to exist in its stead, the proponent of the first right can deny the existence of the second right (NoR);
however, she may also respond to her opponents' NoR arguments with more subtle varieties of rights
arguments:
(1) The existence and worth of the right may be reasserted through: 
(a) Detrivialization-recharacterizing the right or interest in a broad fashion so that it appears
important and worthy of protection.186
(b) Anti-Slippery Slope arguments. These arguments concede that no right can determine the scope
of its own extension but argue that the right exists nevertheless and merits protection in this case.
This is coupled with the assertion that reasonable boundaries can be drawn through the use of
standards or case-by-case adjudication.187 
(2) In response to the "No Violation" arguments, the reality of the abridgment may be reasserted by
the following arguments: 
(a) The abridgment of the right is substantial.188 
(b) Part of the right consists of the choice of the manner of its exercise. 189
for their emotive as their cognitive force.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971) (rebutting argument that defendant could have expressed opposition
to the draft in other ways than wearing obscene slogan on the back of his jacket).
190 Examples:
[T]he Hyde Amendment has effectively removed [the choice whether or not to have an abortion]
from the indigent woman's hands. By funding all of the expenses associated with childbirth and
none of the expenses incurred in terminating pregnancy, the Government literally makes an offer
that the indigent woman cannot afford to refuse. It matters not that in this instance the
Government has used the carrot rather than the stick.
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 333-34 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual
assertions—and to do so on pain of libe1judgments virtually unlimited in amount—leads to . . .
"self-censorship."
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (arguing against strict liability in libel cases).
191 Example:
In . . . First Amendment contexts, the courts are inclined to disregard the normal rule against
permitting one whose conduct may validly be prohibited to challenge the proscription as it applies
to others because of the possibility that protected speech or associative activities may be inhibited
by the overly broad reach of the statute.
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980).
192 Example:
[A subsequent] tort action [against a schoolteacher for wrongfully imposed corporal
punishment) is utterly inadequate to protect against erroneous infliction of punishment . . . . First,
under Florida Law, a student punished for an act he did not commit cannot recover damages from
a teacher "proceeding in utmost good faith . . . on the advice of others," supra, [430 U.S.] at 692 . .
. .
. . . .
Second, and more important, even if the student could sue for good faith error in the
infliction of punishment, the lawsuit occurs after the punishment has been finally imposed. The
infliction of physical pain is final and irreparable; it cannot be undone in a subsequent proceeding.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 693-95 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing for Due Process right of informal
hearing prior to infliction of corporal punishment).
193 Example:
The Court's decision removes an entire class of constitutional violations from the equitable powers
of a federal court. It immunizes from prospective equitable relief any policy that authorizes
persistent deprivations of constitutional rights as long as no individual can establish with
substantial certainty that he will be injured, or injured again, in the future.. . . The federal judicial
power is now limited to levying a toll for such a systematic constitutional violation.
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 137 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing against rule that plaintiff had no
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(c) "Chilling" arguments: Forcing the actor to choose between not exercising the right and exercising
it at the risk of losing a benefit or suffering a penalty will effectively discourage its exercise.190
(d) "Jus Tertii" (or "Overbreadth") arguments: Whether or not the actor's rights have been abridged,
the rights of third parties in different positions will be compromised.191
(3) One may reject the Alternative Remedies Exist argument by characterizing the remedies as
unavailable, inadequate, or otherwise futile.192
(4) In response to "No Remedy" arguments, one argues that the existence of the right necessitates
a remedy.193
standing to seek injunctive relief from chokeholds which may in the future be administered by police in violation of
his constitutional rights).
194 Examples:
The purpose of the felony murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or
accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit.
People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445 (1965).
It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects that are
a menace to the public.
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (arguing
for strict products liability).
195 Examples:
The effect of the [fellow servant rule] is to give employees a strong incentive to report careless
fellow workers to their supervisors.
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 44 (1972).
This form of argument is implicit in the position that minorities will be better off in the long run if they
attain economic and political equality without the benefit of civil rights or affirmative action legislation.
Individuals of any race or creed have but one road to social acceptance and economic abundance. .
. . That road is the narrow, rocky, trail of personal exertion, perseverance, study, work, savings,
and character building. . . . This road is the only one that leads to self-respect and the respect of
others.
110 CONG. REC. 1621 (1964) (statement of Rep. Abernathy) (arguing against passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
196 Examples:
Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife.
Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921 ) (opinion of Holmes, J.) (arguing against rule that defendant must
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C. Arguments of Social Policy and Social Utility
Four common forms of Social Utility arguments are: (1) Behavior Modification arguments;
(2) Spreading arguments; (3) Distributional arguments; and (4) Arguments of Social Choice. Each
of these has individualist and communalist versions which oppose one another.
1.  Behavior Modification arguments emphasize the changes in the behavior of the parties
that will result from the proposed rule. Some of the most common versions of this argument are the
following:
a. Deterrence and No Deterrence arguments. These arguments are seen most frequently in
criminal law. The activity meriting deterrence, however, can be any behavior deemed undesirable
by society. The communalist form of the Deterrence argument is that additional responsibilities and
duties will deter undesirable conduct on the part of defendants.194 The individualist version is that
reduced responsibilities and duties will reduce undesirable conduct by encouraging plaintiffs to take
action which eliminates the harmful conduct, protects them from it, or reduces their exposure to
risk.195
No Deterrence arguments respond to Deterrence arguments. The individualist No Deterrence
response to the communalist Deterrence argument is that the increased duty or responsibility will not
deter socially undesirable conduct but will instead punish the innocent, the disadvantaged, and the
unwary,196 or else will simply shift the problem to other areas where it cannot be dealt with as
consider retreat before killing in self-defense).
To punish as a murderer every man who, while committing a heinous offense, causes
death by pure misadventure, is a course which evidently adds nothing to the security of human
life. No man can so conduct himself as to make it absolutely certain that he shall not be so
unfortunate as to cause the death of a fellow creature. The utmost that he can do is to abstain from
every thing which is at all likely to cause death. No fear of punishment can make him do more
than this: and therefore to punish a man who has done this can add nothing to the security of
human life.
T.B. Maucalay, A Penal Code Prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners, Note M, 64-65 (1837) (arguing against
felony murder rule).
[T]he deterrent theory, which is normally accepted as a justification for criminal punishment,
finds itself in some difficulty when applied to negligence. . . . Hardly any motorist does not firmly
believe that if he is involved in an accident it will be the other fellow's fault. . . . [T]he threat of
punishment for negligence must pass him by, because he does not realise that it is addressed to
him.
G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 122-23 (2d ed. 1961).
197 Examples:
Our indiscriminate policy of using the criminal law against selling what people insist on
buying [gambling, drugs, prostitution] has spawned large-scale, organized systems . . . . Not only
are these organizations difficult for law enforcement to deal with; they have the unpleasant quality
of producing other crimes instead.
Kadish, The Crisis of 0vercriminalization, 374 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 157,16364 (1967).
Other classic arguments of this type are that outlawing abortions will only lead to unsafe abortions being
performed under unsafe conditions in back alleys, and that restricting access to contraception will not reduce
teenage promiscuity but will simply lead to an increased number of teenage pregnancies and an increased burden on
the state's welfare system:
Common sense indicates that many young people will engage in sexual activity
regardless of what the New York Legislature does; and further, that the incidence of venereal
disease and premarital pregnancy is affected by the availability Or unavailability of
contraceptives. Although young persons theoretically may avoid these harms by practicing total
abstention, inevitably many will not.
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 714 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (arguing against prohibition of distribution of contraceptives to minors under 16 years of age).
198 Examples of this argument include the claim that giving governmental officials immunity from civil
suits will permit them to perform their duties in the public interest without fear of later second guessing by judges
and juries:
Because of the singular importance of the President's duties, diversion of his energies by
concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government.
As is the case with prosecutors and judges . . . a President must concern himself with matters
likely to "arouse the most intense feelings" . . . . Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in
precisely such cases that there exists the greatest public interest in providing an official "the
maximum ability to deal fearlessly and importantly with" the duties of office.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 751-52 (1982) (announcing rule of absolute immunity for Presidents) (quoting
Ferri v. Ackermann, 444 U.S. 193, 203 (1979)).
This form of argument is also used to justify exclusion of evidence of subsequent improvements in
products liability cases:
[Exclusion of this evidence] encourages persons to improve their products, property, services and
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efficiently.197 Another common individualist response is that the best way to ensure that defendants
engage in socially desirable conduct is to reduce rather than to increase regulations or restraints on
their action.198 The communalist No Deterrence response to the individualist Deterrence argument
customs without risk of prejudicing any court proceeding and consequently delaying
implementation of improvements.
Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 405 Mich. 79, 92, 273 N.W.2d 476, 481 (1979).
199 Example:
Workmen such as the present plaintiff, who ply their livelihoods on ladders and scaffolds, are
scarcely in a position to protect themselves from accident. They usually have no choice but to
work with the equipment at hand, though danger looms large. The legislature recognized this, and
to guard against the known hazards of the occupation required the employer to safeguard the
workers from injury caused by faulty or inadequate equipment. If the employer could avoid this
duty by pointing to the concurrent negligence of the injured worker in using the equipment, the
beneficial purpose of the statute might well be frustrated and nullified.
Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 318-19, 83 N.E.2d 133, 135 (1948) (arguing that contributory
negligence should not be a defense where the defendant is in breach of safety regulations).
200 R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.11 (2d ed. 1977).
201 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring opinion) ("[T]he fitting
remedy for evil counsels is good ones.").
202 See also infra note 210.
203 In criminal law, this might be called the "ten and one" argument: It is better that ten guilty persons be
convicted along with one innocent person under a stricter rule than to let all of them go free under a less strict
alternative:
The point here is that the future harm that the ten guilty men who have been acquitted may do,
either by repeating their own offences or by encouraging others by showing how easy it is to avoid
conviction, far exceeds any injury that the innocent man can suffer by his conviction. The
question then becomes: Is it better that ten young persons should be tempted to become drug
addicts than that one innocent man should be convicted of being in possession of unauthorized
drugs?
Goodhart, Possession of Drugs and Absolute Liability, 84 LAW Q. 382, 385-86 (1968) (arguing for strict liability
for possession of illegal drugs).
An individualist version of the "ten and one" argument would be that it is better to let a few criminals
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is that reduction of duties and responsibilities will not lead to self-protection by plaintiffs but will
simply leave them at the mercy of stronger parties who will have no incentives to protect them.199
There is an interesting symmetry to each of the individualist and communalist versions of
behavior modification arguments: the communalist emphasizes the defendant's ability to correct the
undesirable situation or achieve the desired effect, while the individualist argument emphasizes the
plaintiff’s ability to achieve desirable results or to otherwise protect herself without recourse to
governmental intervention. Thus, a negligence standard with a defense of contributory negligence
is said to encourage plaintiffs to protect themselves from accidents 200 and broad first amendment
protection is said to encourage people who are offended by speakers' messages to offer their own
views so as to convince others.201 The individualist emphasis on forcing the plaintiff to deal with his
own problems is the essence of so-called "Rugged Individualism.202
Deterrence arguments (both individualist and communalist) can also be made in terms of a
specific cost benefit analysis: although the increased responsibility will have some undesirable
effects, they are outweighed by the worthwhile deterrent effects in protecting lives and property.203
escape through the use of the exclusionary rule when the arresting officer makes a good faith mistake than to have a
good faith exception and leave the door wide open to police abuse.
The inevitable result of the [exclusionary rule] is that police officers who obey its strictures will
catch fewer criminals. . . . [That] is the price the framers anticipated and were willing to pay to
ensure the sanctity of the person, the home, and property against unrestrained governmental
power.
Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in
Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1393 (1983).
204 This rejoinder might be called the "one and ten argument": an individualist version would be that it is
better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent person be sentenced to jail. An example of a
communalist version would be that it is better to risk a chance of police abuse under a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule than to let dangerous criminals loose on the streets because of technical errors in police practices.
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The communalist or individualist rejoinder to this form of argument is the denial that the benefits
outweigh the costs.204
Cost benefit arguments rely on assessments of the comparative desirability of certain conduct.
Because these judgments are frequently subjective, arguments are easy both to make and to rebut.
The disagreement about the cost benefit analysis can take place both at the level of facts and at the
level of values. For example, one can disagree over whether ten guilty men set free would cause
more harm than jailing one innocent person along with them because one disagrees about what will
actually happen in either case or because one disagrees about the comparative moral value of what
is agreed will happen. One may disagree about both.
In general, any Social Utility argument that is predicated upon a factual assessment can be
rebutted by denying the truth of the factual predicate. Thus, a claim that a given rule will deter is
rebutted by a claim that it will in fact not deter, and so on. In general, any Social Utility argument
which is predicated upon a normative assessment can be rebutted by denying the value system which
produces the normative judgment. Thus, a claim that the benefits to society in reduced crime
outweigh the dangers of police abuse resulting from abolishing the exclusionary rule may be rebutted
by claiming that personal liberty and freedom from arbitrary government coercion are more
important values than security of persons and property.
b. Regulation of relationships arguments. These arguments deal with the consequences of
regulating a preexisting relationship between the parties, for example, between family members,
doctor and patient, lawyer and client, priest and penitent. The individualist argument is against
additional legally created duties between the parties, on the grounds that the special nature of the
relationship will be harmed or destroyed by the intrusion of the legal process. The result will be that
the relationship will become either less stable, less intimate, or otherwise less rewarding, and society
205 Examples:
[B]oth legal and medical authorities have agreed that confidentiality is essential to effectively treat
the mentally ill, and that imposing a duty on doctors to disclose patient threats to potential victims
would greatly impair treatment . . . . [I]mposing the majority’s new duty is certain to result in a net
increase in violence.
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal.3d 425, 452, 551 P.2d 334, 354-55, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 34-35
(1976) (Clark, J., dissenting).
The proposition that the mutual promises made in the ordinary domestic relationship of husband
and wife of necessity give cause for action on a contract seems to me to go to the very root of the
relationship, and to be a possible fruitful source of dissension and quarrelling. I cannot see that
any benefit would result from it to either of the parties, but on the other hand it would lead to
unlimited litigation in a relationship which should be . . . protected from possibilities of that kind.
Balfour v. Balfour [1919] 2 K.B. 571, 577 (opinion of Lord Justice Duke).
206 Thus laws regulating sexual activity are criticized on the grounds that it will put the Government in our
bedrooms. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965) ("Would we allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?"). A standard argument for retaining
intra-family tort immunities has been that tortfeasors would otherwise be able to sue a parent for contribution or
indemnity as a joint tortfeasor on a theory of negligent supervision, thus lessening the amount of real recovery that a
minor child will receive in a tort suit against a third party. Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338,
364 N.Y.S.2d 859(1974).
207 Examples:
Critics have argued that [allowing prosecutions for spousal rape] would . . . lessen the likelihood
of reconciliation . . . . [R]econciliation hardly seems an expected or likely consequence of a
relationship that has deteriorated to the point of forcible sexual advances by a husband.
State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 225-26, 372 A.2d 386, 389 (Law Div. 1977).
If a state of peace and tranquility exists between the spouses, then the situation is such that either
no action will be commenced or that the spouses . . . will allow the action to continue only so long
as their personal harmony is not jeopardized. If peace and tranquility is nonexistent or tenuous to
begin with, then the law's imposition of a technical disability [a defense of interspousal immunity]
seems more likely to be a bone of contention than a harmonizing factor.
Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 187, 500 P.2d 771, 774 (1972) (abandoning rule of interspousal immunity).
One suggested interest [in requiring a minor's parental consent prior to obtaining an abortion) is
the safeguarding of the family unit and of parental authority. It is difficult, however, to conclude
that providing a parent with absolute power to overrule a determination, made by the physician
and his minor patient, to terminate the patient's pregnancy will serve to strengthen the family unit.
Neither is it likely that such veto power will enhance parental authority or control where . . . the
very existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family structure.
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
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will be worse off.205 An allied argument is that regulation of the relationship will allow third parties
to intrude on the relationship or else leave the parties with less protection from third parties.206
The communalist position is that regulation of the relationship is necessary to redress the
unequal bargaining position of the parties; regulation will make the relationship more secure and
rewarding for both parties. If the parties are sufficiently at odds that they believe it is necessary to
resort to legal proceedings, the intimacy of thl.- relationship will already have been destroyed .207
These arguments are related to the more general Regulation arguments discussed infra.
208 These arguments are really a special case of Behavior Modification Arguments which concern accident
prevention. For this reason they take on an economic flavor.
209 Examples:
By imposing on manufacturers the costs of failure to discover hazards, we create an incentive for
them to invest more actively in safety research.
Beshada v. Johns- Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 207, 447 A.2d 539, 548 (1982) (arguing for strict liability
for asbestos manufacturers).
[I]t is said that a rule imposing liability [for the intentional torts of an insane person) tends to
make more watchful those persons who have charge of the defendant and who maybe supposed to
have some interest in preserving his property. . . .
McGuire v. Almy, 297 Mass. 323, 327, 8 N.E.2d 760, 762 (1937).
210 Examples:
Against a large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident to
participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection
than the law could  ever  be.
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936).
[A] pure rule of strict liability would frequently result in inefficient solutions to conflicting
resource use problems because it would give the victim of the accident no incentive to take steps
to prevent it even if those steps cost less than prevention by the injurer.
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 139 (2d ed. 1977).
In general, the individualist theory asserts that society will be better off if defendants' responsibilities and
duties are reduced; therefore, members of the plaintiff class must develop their own means of protection, either by
investing in safety, by self-insuring, or by accepting certain injuries as inevitable (developing a "thicker skin"). It is
from this promise that the notion of “rugged individualism," that a normal person needs no help from others,
probably arose. This rhetorical mode is often used to argue for reduced responsibility to others. It is important to
note, however, that individualism does not necessarily imply that the defendant is responsible for her own behav-
ior—rather it asserts only that the defendant is not responsible for what happens to others. Thus although
individualist principles are often used to argue that others should care for themselves, the same arguments can be
used to deny an individual's responsibility for her own actions. In short, the defenses of both contrib u tory
negligence and insanity are highly individualist.
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c. Investment in Safety Arguments. These arguments concern whether the rule proposed will
cause one of the parties to make a proper investment in safety either by the purchase or use of
necessary precautions or by a reduction in that party's activities.208
The communalist form of this argument is that an increased duty or responsibility on the
defendant will lead to a proper cost benefit expenditure, and give the defendant sufficient incentives
to invest in safety or to restrict the scope or nature of his activities in order to achieve a socially
desirable level of activity.209
The individualist form of the Investment in Safety argument proposes, conversely, that a
decrease in responsibilities and duties owed by the defendant is necessary in order to ensure that the
plaintiff has incentives to make an optimal investment in safety, either through self-protection or by
restricting potentially harmful activities.210 This is often coupled with the following responses to the
communalist position:
211 Examples:
Everyone can foresee the commission of crime virtually anywhere and at any time. If
foreseeability itself gave rise to a duty to provide "police" protection for others, every residential
curtilage, every shop, every store, every manufacturing plant would have to be patrolled by the
private arms of the owner.
Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (1962) (arguing against landlord
liability for crimes against tenant).
Pressure to conform to the existing standard of care. induced by fear both of being sued
and of being held liable, has led physicians to practice "defensive medicine" in order to guard
against liability for "sins of omission." The practice of defensive medicine involves prescribing or
performing a test or procedure that is not medically justified but is nevertheless carried out
"primarily (if not solely) to prevent or defend against the threat of medical-legal liability."
Note, Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law in Light of Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1012
(1985) (quoting U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 14 (1973)).
212 Usually an argument of this form is explicitly or implicitly derived from the Coase Theorem; whatever
the choice of rules of liability, the amount of investment in safety will be the same, and will be efficient because the
parties can locate the cheapest cost avoider and bargain for the proper investment in safety. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 16
(1972). Given this fact, the law should opt for a lower standard of duty because it involves fewer administrative
costs or fewer lawsuits, see Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973), or because shifting
losses is government interference, which is thought to be an evil if not justified by some more pressing goal. See 0.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 96 (1923); see also infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text (arguments of Formal
Realizability). The Coase Theorem thus becomes a weapon in an individualist argument for laissez-faire in
questions of economic regulation. It is possible to respond, however, that strict liability might in fact be easier to
administer than negligence. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973). A more standard
communalist response is the claim that transactions costs prevent the Coase Theorem from having any validity.
Example:
If there were no transaction or information costs associated with paying people to alter their
behavior, it would not matter (in terms of market control of accidents) who bore the accident costs
initially. Regardless of who was initially liable, there would be bribes or transactions bringing
about any change in the behavior of any individual that would cause a greater reduction in
accident costs than in pleasure. Since in reality transactions are often terribly expensive, it is often
not worthwhile spending both the cost of the transaction and the amount needed to bribe someone
else to diminish the accident-causing behavior. As a result, the accident cost is not avoided by
society . . . .
G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 136 (1970).
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(i) The imposition of increased duty or responsibility will lead to an overinvestment in safety
precautions or a restriction in activities which will be socially undesirable.211
(ii) Even with a reduced standard of duty or responsibility, market forces will produce an
optimal level of activity and investment in safety in the absence of transactions costs.212
The communalist counter-responses to this argument are:
(i) The imposition of increased duty or responsibility will not lead to an overinvestment in
safety or a restriction in socially desirable activities because defendants will simply internalize the
cost of the activity (or spread part of the cost on to others) and continue to engage in the activity as
213 Examples:
Where a volunteer blood bank holds a monopoly, strict liability will not end its operations. The
blood bank will simply increase its charges, the way all monopolists do when faced with increased
costs. Where the volunteer blood bank is faced with competition, the court believes that the bank
would still pass on any cost increases resulting from the imposition of strict liability, because
volunteer blood banks have kept their fees lower than what the open market would bring. Should a
volunteer blood bank cease operations, this will further insure that less hepatitis-infected blood
will be delivered to hospitals and ultimately to patients.
Brody v. Overlook Hospital, 121 N.J. Super. 299, 311, 296 A.2d 668, 675 (Law Div. 1972) (arguing for strict
products liability in cases of hepatitis-infected blood transfusions).
The communications industry has increasingly become concentrated in a few powerful
hands operating very lucrative businesses reaching across the Nation and into almost every home.
Neither the industry as a whole nor its individual components are easily intimidated . . . .
Requiring them to pay for the occasional damage they do to private reputation will play no
substantial part in their future performance or their existence.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 390-91 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that media's liability for
libel will not inhibit exercise of First Amendment freedoms).
214 See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 212. This type of argument is a form of the Regulation
argument discussed in the section on Arguments of Social Choice. See infra text accompanying notes 225-35.
215 Examples: Why, then should the master be responsible [for the torts of his servant]?
. . . [I]t is socially more expedient to spread or distribute among a large group of the
community the losses which experience has taught are inevitable in the carrying on of industry,
than to cast the loss upon a few.
Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 456 (1923) (justifying doctrine of respondeat superior).
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The
cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person
injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and
distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing for strict products liability).
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long as it is worth it to them. To the extent that this results in a reduction in the level of activity, the
extra activity is judged to be socially undesirable.213
(ii) Market forces will not produce an optimal level of activity or investment in safety due
to the existence of transactions costs or other market imperfections. It is therefore necessary to place
an additional duty on the defendant because she is the best able to make a correct decision as to the
optimal level of activity or investment in safety.214
2. Spreading arguments. These arguments concern neither behavior modification nor
investment in safety but the allocation of burdens on actors in society. The communalist version of
this argument is that additional responsibilities and duties should be placed upon the defendant
because the defendant is best able to spread the costs of the additional burden by passing the cost
forwards or backwards to other persons. This result is more socially desirable than allowing the total
societal burden (for example, the cost of an accident) to fall randomly on particular individuals.215
The individualist version of this argument is an argument for self-insurance (analogous to
the individualist Investment in Safety argument for self-protection). The purchase of insurance by
each potential plaintiff is a cheaper and more efficient way of distributing the risk of loss. This is
normally joined with an Anti-Paternalism argument (discussed in the section on arguments of Social
216 Examples:
To hold that the owner must not only meet his own loss by fire, but that he must guaranty the
security of his neighbors on both sides . . . would be to create a liability which would be the
destruction of all civilized society . . . . In a commercial country, each man, to some extent, runs
the hazard of his neighbor's conduct, and each, by insurance against such hazards, is enabled to
obtain a reasonable security against loss.
Ryan v. New York Central R.R., 35 N.Y. 210, 216-17 (1866) (arguing for narrow rule of proximate cause).
But this argument [that strict liability permits the spreading of costs of unavoidable accidents
which under negligence would be concentrated on the victim] overlooks the fact that the
individual can also remove the concentrated loss from his shoulders-by insuring himself against
the accident and thereby spreading the loss to the other policyholders of the company he insures
with.
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.11, at 141 (2d ed. 1977).
217 See Kennedy, supra note 34, at 572 (issue in distributive arguments is the balance of power between
various groups in civil society).
218 Examples:
The purpose of [strict products] liability is not to regulate conduct with a view to
eliminating accidents, but rather to remove the economic consequences of accidents from the
victim who is unprepared to bear them and place the risk on the enterprise in the course of whose
business they arise.
Goldberg v. Kollsman instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 440, 191 N.E.2d 81, 85, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 598 (1963)
(Burke, J., dissenting).
In the great majority of cases the servant actually guilty of the negligence is poor, and unable to
make good the damage, especially if it is considerable, and the master is at least comparatively
rich, and consequently it is generally better to fix the master with liability . . . .
River Wear Comm'rs v. Adamson, 2 A.C. 743, 767 (H.L.(E.) 1877) (opinion of Lord Blackburn) (arguing for
respondeat superior doctrine).
219 This argument is related to the communalist Regulation argument discussed in the section on arguments
of Social and Individual Choice, see infra text accompanying notes 225-35, that an additional duty or responsibility
should be imposed because the parties would have agreed to it but for the inequality of bargaining power between
them. In that case, however, the reason for the concern is the limitation of free choice caused by the inequality, not
the desire for redistribution of wealth or power per se.
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and individual Choice infra) that it is better to place the responsibility for the choice of whether or
not to selfinsure on individuals than to force individuals to purchase insurance through higher prices
for goods and services that result from stricter rules of liability.216
3. Distributional arguments. These arguments concern neither efficiency nor risk spreading
but the distributional consequences of liability rules.217 The communalist version of this type of
argument is a Redistribution argument: additional responsibilities and duties should be placed upon
the defendant because either (1) the defendant is financially better able to afford the loss which
would otherwise be borne by the plaintiff class (also known as the Deep Pocket Argument), or (2)
these additional duties and responsibilities will achieve a socially desirable redistribution of income,
benefits, or power from one class of persons to another.218 A special version of this argument applies
when the plaintiff and the defendant stand in any contractual or bargaining relationship. This version
proposes that additional duties should be imposed on the party with disproportionate bargaining
power to equalize the relative bargaining positions of the parties.219
220 Example:
It may seem unfair on wealth-distribution grounds to force the victim, rather than the enterprise, to
pay the insurance premium; the victim has less money. But if the enterprise is forced to insure, the
cost will be borne, in major part anyway, by its customers, who are also "little people."
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.11, at 141 (2d ed. 1977).
221 Examples:
Housing code enforcement leads to a substantial reduction in the supply of housing . . . coupled
with a substantial rise in the price of the remaining supply.
Id. § 16.8, at 357.
[T]he effect of the Fuentes decision [invalidating replevy without notice or prior hearing of goods
purchased under an installment sales contract] is to increase the cost of the installment sales
contract: a dubious blessing to consumers, especially those who have no alternative to such
contracts if they wish to purchase consumer durables.
Id. § 25.3, at 507.
Consider another example of an allegedly unfair type of contract: the installment contract in which
a default entitles the seller to repossess the good no matter how small the remaining unpaid
balance of the buyer's note. . . . Were the right of repossession of late defaults to be limited, sellers
would have to require either a larger down payment or higher initial installment payments in order
to protect themselves against sustaining windfall losses from early defaults. Consumers unable to
pay large down payments or high initial installment payments would be harmed by such a change
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The individualist responses to Redistribution arguments are twofold. The first is a denial of
the legitimacy of the use of legal rules for the redistribution of power, income, or benefits. Strictly
speaking, this is not a true distributional argument. Since virtually all rules of legal liability have
some redistributive character, this argument usually boils down either to a NLWF argument (rules
of duty and responsibility should not be chosen solely for their redistributive effects but should be
based upon notions of the fault of one party or the moral desert of the other), or an Institutional
argument that such goals should be achieved only through the tax and welfare system.
The second individualist response is a true distributional argument; it concedes the propriety
of the distributional goal but argues that the goal will not be achieved. This No Distribution
argument runs as follows: increased duties placed upon the defendant class will simply be passed
along in the form of higher prices or reduced benefits to other persons. The defendant class will not
suffer a significant loss of income, benefits, or power foiling the redistributional goal. Worse yet,
the defendant class will probably pass a large portion of the extra costs along to the plaintiff class,
the intended beneficiaries of the increased duty.220
In the special context of bargaining or contractual relationships between plaintiffs and
defendants, the argument is that additional responsibilities placed upon the defendant will not correct
the inequality of bargaining power between the two. Rather, the defendant will raise the price of her
product or service, reduce other possible benefits provided to the plaintiff, simply refuse to deal with
the plaintiff, or go out of business. The result will be that (1) plaintiffs will get the benefits of the
extra duties and responsibilities only by absorbing most of the extra cost to the defendant; (2) other
plaintiffs will be forced to buy extra features or protections they do not want or need; and (3) other
plaintiffs will be priced out of the market for the defendant's goods or services, and will have to
content themselves with inferior or less desirable substitutes. In each case there will be no substantial
alteration in the relative bargaining power or the profit margin of the defendant.221 This version of
in the contractual form.
Id. § 4.8, at 86-87.
[I]f the holder in due course doctrine is abolished, the price of consumer credit will rise to
compensate installment sellers for the higher costs of operating without benefit of such a doctrine.
The price increase will probably make consumers worse off (rather than simply no better off) than
they were with a lower price plus the remedial disadvantages imposed by the doctrine.
Id. at 87.
222 E.g., Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L. REV. 879
(1975) (arguing that the ALI'S position would decrease the available stock of housing for low income persons and
raise rental costs); Moorehouse, Optimal Housing Maintenance Under Rent Control, 39 S. ECON. J. 93 (1972) (rent
control results in decrease in maintenance services and an increase in real rent); Note, The District of Columbia
Rental Housing Act of 1977: The Effect of Rent Control on the Rental Housing Market, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 607
(1978) (arguing that rent control causes lack of new investment in housing that poor persons can afford).
223 See generally Kennedy, supra note 34, at 625-49.
224 Examples:
[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its
measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices. It
never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is
required . . . .
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the argument is known as the "Landlord Will Raise the Rent" argument, because it was used by
persons opposed to judicial creation of an implied warranty of habitability in landlord-tenant
contracts.222
4. Arguments of Social and Individual Choice. These arguments concern to what extent the
community should disregard the decisions of private parties. The four basic kinds of arguments are
Paternalism arguments, Regulation arguments, Facilitation arguments, and AntiPaternalism
arguments. In the normal situation in which these arguments occur, the issue presented is whether
to foreclose choices made by the plaintiff class by imposing an additional duty on the defendant class
because it is in the best interest of the plaintiffs. In this situation, the Paternalism argument is
communalist, and the Anti-Paternalism argument is individualist. The Regulation argument is
communalist when it is opposed to either the Facilitation or Anti- Paternalism arguments, and the
Facilitation argument is individualist when it is opposed to either the Regulation or Paternalism
arguments.
a. Paternalism arguments. Paternalism arguments favor the imposition of duties or
responsibilities on parties because they are in the best interests of those parties or of the parties with
whom they deal.223 Thus, a Paternalism argument might be made for criminalizing heroin use
because it harms people, even though there are people who want to use the drug. A Paternalism
argument also might be made for preventing automobile dealers from disclaiming liability for
personal injury caused by defects in their product on the grounds that it is not in the best interests
of their customers, even though there are people willing to buy cars with a disclaimer if the price is
low enough. Paternalism arguments do not concern themselves with what the parties themselves
believe to be in their own best interests; they represent a societal imposition of values on the
individual because the societal values are deemed superior.224
The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cit. 1932) (rejecting industry custom as a defense to negligence).
The control of impulsive behavior, then, may provide a key to justifying [the nonwaivability of the
right of discharge in bankruptcy]. If unrestrained individuals would generally choose to consume
today rather than save for tomorrow . . . they may opt for a way of removing or at least restricting
that choice . . . .
. . . .
A nonwaivable right of discharge controls impulsive credit decisions by encouraging creditors to
monitor borrowing.
Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1409 (1985).
225 See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111-12 (1972) (limitations on alienability or freedom of contract justified
where a transaction creates significant externalities to third parties, or where external costs do not lend themselves
to objective and nonarbitrary collective measurement).
226 For example, where there is a common pool of resources, the argument is often made that restrictions
on use or increased responsibilities for use (through liability rules) will help preserve the resources and promote
their more efficient use:
The rational man finds that his share of the costs of the wastes he discharges into the commons is
less than the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for everyone. we
are locked into a system of "fouling our own nest," so long as we behave only as independent,
rational, free-enterprisers. . . . [T]he tragedy of the commons as a cesspool must be prevented by .
. . coercive laws or taxing devices that make it cheaper for the polluter to treat his pollutants than
to discharge them untreated. 
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1244-45 (1968).
227 Example:
The basis of voiding exculpatory clauses is that they are contrary to the public policy of
discouraging negligence and protecting those in need of goods or services from being overreached
by those with power to drive unconscionable bargains.. . . [I]t is evident that the subject matter of
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b. Regulation arguments. In contrast to Paternalism arguments, Regulation arguments
propose preemption of individual choices in favor of societal choices not because the individual
choices are deemed irrelevant but because conditions exist which prevent individuals either from
choosing or from making informed choices. These arguments enforce certain societal choices on the
parties because it is assumed that the parties would have made the choice in the absence of these
complicating conditions. In general, Regulation arguments are, like Paternalism arguments, relatively
communalist, because they are used to justify additional responsibilities and duties on a party which,
it is claimed, the party would not assume unless the party's choice were regulated by the legal system.
The conditions that are most often used to justify imposition of a societal choice on the
parties are (1) various forms of market failure and (2) the lack of information by or risk neutrality
of the plaintiff class.
(i) Market Failure arguments. Conditions of market failure that are used to justify regulation
of social choice include:
(a) Externalities, by which are meant costs of activity that are not adequately factored
into market pricing mechanisms and not borne by the persons creating them.225
(b) Public Goods or "Free Rider" Problems.226
(c) Inequality of Bargaining Power Between the Parties.227
the exculpatory clause herein—shelter—is indispensable for the physical well being of tenants;
that they have nothing even approaching equality of bargaining power with landlords and no free
choice whatever in agreeing to the exemption, since they will be confronted with the same clause
in other form leases if they seek shelter elsewhere.
O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 Ill. 2d 436, 446, 155 N.E.2d 545, 550 (1958) (Bristow, J.,
dissenting) (arguing against enforceability of clause which exculpates landlord from the consequences of his
negligence in operation of apartment building).
228 Example:
The gross inequality of bargaining position occupied by the consumer in the automobile industry
is thus apparent. There is no competition among the car makers in the area of the express
warranty. Where can the buyer go to negotiate for better protection? . . . Because there is no
competition among the motor vehicle manufacturers with respect to the scope of protection
guaranteed to the buyer, there is no incentive on their part to stimulate good will in that field of
public relations. Thus, there is lacking a factor existing in more competitive fields, one which
tends to guarantee the safe construction of the article sold. Since all competitors operate in the
same way, the urge to be careful is not so pressing.
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 391, 161 A.2d 69, 87 (1960) (arguing that a warranty
disclaimer limiting damages to cost of replacement parts in consumer automobile purchase contract is
unconscionable).
229 Example:
No individual tenant had it within his power to take measures to guard the garage entranceways, to
provide security at the main entrance of the building, to patrol the common hallways and
elevators, to set up any kind of a security alarm system in the building, to provide additional
locking devices on the main doors, to provide a system of announcement for authorized visitors
only, to close the garage doors at appropriate hours, and to see that the entrance was manned at all
times.
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 480 (D.C. Cit. 1970) (arguing for landlord liability for
crimes against tenants).
230 The risk neutrality argument is thus a special case of a market failure argument. The high information
costs that lead to the skewing of costs and benefits by a risk preferring class may in turn be attributed to one of the
other forms of market failure listed above.
An alternative claim might be that risk preference is an inherent characteristic of the plaintiff class that
would be manifested even in the presence of adequate information. An argument for foreclosing a choice by the
plaintiff class in that case would be a true Paternalism argument.
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(d) Monopolistic or Oligopolistic Power of One of the Parties.228
(e) High Transactions Costs229
(ii) High Information Cost/Lack of Risk Neutrality Arguments. A socially desirable result will
not be achieved from the interaction of market forces because one of the parties lacks access to
important information or is not risk neutral and therefore does not know what is in that party's best
interests. The usual claim is that the risk preference is due to the high cost of obtaining
information.230
Additional duties should therefore be imposed upon the defendant because plaintiffs are
unaware of disadvantages, extra costs, or dangers to them or to others which result from their
231 For example, plaintiffs maybe buying an unsafe product at a lower price when they could buy a safer
product at an increased cost, and a risk neutral person armed with information about the product or its dangers
would purchase the more expensive product. To give another example, the plaintiffs may not be bargaining for
certain job security clauses in employment contracts in exchange for a lower wage or reduced benefits because they
lack information concerning how important such a clause really is to them. See Note, Protecting At Will Employees
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1831-32 (1980).
232 Examples:
Manufacturing processes . . . are ordinarily either inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general
public. The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the
soundness ofa product, even when it is not contained in a sealed package . . . .
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (arguing
for strict liability for product defects).
233 See Kennedy, supra note 34, at 601 (referred to as the "simple cost information case").
234 Id. (referred to as the "simple freeloader case").
235 See, e.g., Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973). A producer who wishes to
advertise that his product is safer than others
may be reluctant to advertise a safety improvement, because the advertisement will contain an
implicit representation that the product is hazardous . . . . He must balance the additional sales that
he may gain from his rivals by convincing consumers that his product is safer than theirs against
the sales that he may lose by disclosing to consumers that the product contains hazards of which
they may not have been aware, or may have been only dimly aware. . . . But make the producer
liable for the consequences of a hazardous product, and no question of advertising safety
improvements to consumers will arise. He will adopt cost-justified precautions not to divert sales
from competitors but to minimize liability to injured consumers.
Id. at 211.
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choices.231 A communalist Regulation argument in favor of forcing plaintiffs to make different
choices by imposing greater responsibilities on the defendant might be based upon the fact that:
(a) The plaintiffs are not even aware of the dangers to them and are thus unaware that
there exists information that they need. The combined cost of recognizing the risks and evaluating
them is prohibitive.232
(b) The plaintiffs have a limited appreciation of the value of information, but they
regard the cost of education as too high, given the difficulty of acquiring and understanding -
complex information.
(c) The defendants or other actors in society recognize that they could educate the
plaintiffs to make different choices which would be both in the plaintiffs' best interests and their own
(for example, defendants might increase their profits by selling a higher priced but safer product or
by offering guarantees of job security to workers in exchange for lower wages), but they are unable
or unwilling to educate the plaintiff class because:
(1) The costs of educating the plaintiff class by themselves are prohibitive.233
(2) The benefit of educating the plaintiff class extends to all defendants similarly situated,
so that there is a "free rider" problem.234
(3) The education of the plaintiff class to understand that they have previously been receiving
inferior contractual terms or unsafe merchandise may have a "backlash" effect which will hurt the
defendants.235
236 Examples:
True consent to what happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an
opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon each.
The average patient has little or no understanding of the medical arts, and ordinarily has only his
physician to whom he can look for enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent decision.
From these almost axiomatic considerations springs the need, and in turn the requirement, of a
reasonable divulgence by physician to patient to make such a decision possible.
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
[A]s in the case of patent drugs sold over the counter without a prescription, the manufacturer of a
prescription drug who knows or has reason to know that it will not be dispensed as such a drug
must provide the consumer with adequate information so that he can balance the risks and
benefits of a given medication himself.
Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cit. 1974).
237 Example:
I do not know whether the ugly pictures in this record have any beneficial value. The fact
that there is a large demand for comparable materials indicates that they do provide amusement or
information, or at least satisfy the curiosity of interested persons. Moreover, there are serious
well-intentioned people who are persuaded that they serve a worthwhile purpose. Others believe
they arouse passions that lead to the commission of crimes . . . . In the end, I believe we must rely
on the capacity of the free marketplace of ideas to distinguish that which is useful or beautiful
from that which is ugly or worthless.
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 319-21 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing against obscenity
prosecutions).
238 Example:
It is just too much, absent a contractual agreement, to require or expect a combination office-
apartment building . . . to provide police patrol protection or its equivalent. . . . If tenants expect
such protection, they can move to apartments where it is available and presumably pay a higher
rental . . . .
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c. Facilitation arguments. Facilitation arguments claim that the best way to deal with market
imperfections is not to impose social choices on the parties but rather to rid the system of these
problems and allow the parties to choose for themselves. Thus a Facilitation argument against
nondisclaimable contract terms for the sale of consumer goods would be that a simple requirement
of full disclosure as to the consequences of various terms is all that should be required of the parties.
Once information costs are lowered, the parties can freely and fairly bargain and any decision they
reach should be respected. 236
d. Anti-Paternalism arguments. These arguments are the most individualist forms of Social
Choice arguments. They oppose attempts to impose increased responsibilities or duties on parties
that the parties have not freely chosen for themselves. They also oppose any attempt to control the
choices of parties through the use of rules of liability. AntiPaternalism arguments are often coupled
with Rights as Freedom of Action and Rights as Freedom of Contract arguments. They are strongly
identified both with "rugged individualism" and with libertarian social theory. Anti- Paternalism
arguments usually make one of three claims:
(i) Since no one can tell what is really in the best interest of the parties (or society as
a whole), individual choice should be respected.237
(ii) The parties are in the best position to determine their interests, and the legal
system should not interfere with their choice.238
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 492-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
239 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
240 R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALNSIS OF LAW §§ 13.1-13.7 (2d ed. 1977).
241 See Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 210-11 (1973).
242 Id.
243 See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
244 E.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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(iii) The best consequences to individuals (and to society as a whole) flow from
respecting individual choice.239 This is usually coupled with both a claim that individual choices
working together as market forces will produce a socially desirable outcome, and a series of
rejoinders to the claims of market failure made in the communalist Paternalism and Regulation
arguments.
The individualist response to the claims of market failure, high transaction costs, or high
information costs is normally that market failure does not exist or is minimal in the long run.240
Similarly, transaction and information costs do not exist or are minimal in the long run, since it is
in the interest of all parties to lower these costs through technological advances or other means of
cost reduction if by doing so the parties can increase profits or maximize utility.241 Thus, for
example, it may be argued that defendants have market incentives to advertise and educate plaintiffs
about the relative safety of product improvements even if plaintiffs have insufficient incentives to
educate themselves.242
The individualist response to the claim that regulation of choice is necessary to correct
inequalities of bargaining power or concentrations of market power is another version of the familiar
"Landlord Will Raise the Rent" argument. Although the individual choices of plaintiffs may be
"corrected" in one area, it will simply lead to a loss of benefits to the plaintiff class in other areas,
and no real change in the inequality of bargaining power will be achieved.243
Most situations involving Arguments of Social Choice arise where foreclosing plaintiffs'
choice would effectively impose additional duties on the defendant. This is the case in all of the
examples mentioned above. Hence Paternalism is normally associated with communalism and Anti-
Paternalism is associated with individualism. However, there is a class of situations where a
Paternalism argument can be relatively individualist, and an Anti-Paternalism argument can be
relatively communalist. This occurs when foreclosing a choice to the plaintiff class would involve
relieving defendants of duties they would otherwise have.
These types of situations may arise, for example, where the plaintiff is a patient and the
defendant is a doctor. Consider a situation in which the patient sues the doctor for malpractice on
the grounds that the doctor failed to inform the patient of the risks of a particular medical proce-
dure.244 A duty imposed on the doctor to disclose information concerning the risks of a medical
245 Examples:
What the majority envisions as a fair apportionment of liability to be undertaken by the jury will
constitute nothing more than an unfair reduction in the plaintiffs total damages suffered, resulting
from a jury process that necessarily is predicated on speculation, conjecture and guesswork.
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 751-52, 575 P.2d 1162, 1178, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,396 (1978)
(Jefferson, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing against recognition of comparative fault principles in strict
products liability cases) (emphasis in original).
The vast confusion that is virtually certain to arise from any attempt to deal in a trial setting with
the concept of scientific knowability constitutes a strong reason for avoiding the concept
altogether by striking the state-of-the-art defense [in products liability cases].
. . .
We doubt that juries will be capable of even understanding the concept of scientific knowability,
much less be able to resolve such a complex issue.
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 207-08, 447 A.2d 539, 548 (1982).
Where, as here, there are no standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted by
the [vagrancy) ordinance, the scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement of the law. It furnishes a convenient too] for "harsh and discriminatory enforcement
by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure."
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procedure to a patient would be relatively communalist (because it would increase the doctor's duties
and responsibilities to the patient). On the other hand, giving the doctor the right to withhold this
information from the patient if the doctor reasonably believed that it was in the patient's best interests
would be relatively individualist (because it would serve as a defense to a charge of malpractice for
failure to disclose).
In this case, the doctor will make an individualist Paternalism argument that she should not
be forced to disclose all possible dangers because patients may refuse to submit to medical
procedures which are best for them. Alternatively, the doctor will make an individualist Regulation
argument that the high cost of educating the patient (or the patient's risk aversion) will prevent the
patient from making the proper decision. The patient will respond with a communalist Anti-
Paternalism argument that the doctor should not have the authority to limit the patient's autonomy.
In addition, she will make a communalist Facilitation argument that if the doctor is concerned about
the patient's ability to make an informed decision, the doctor should be required to give the patient
enough information to decide, instead of foreclosing individual choice.
II. FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REALIZABILITY ARGUMENTS
These arguments are neither individualist nor communalist—they represent instead a separate
axis of opposition. As described above, however, they color and are colored by individualist and
communalist arguments.
A. Formal Realizability Arguments
1. The rule in question should be chosen because the alternative involves a standard that will
be difficult for juries and judges or law enforcement officials to apply in particular contexts and thus
will lead to inconsistent and arbitrary decisions.245
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 3 10 U.S. 88, 97-98
(1940)) (arguing against constitutionality of vagrancy ordinance).
246 Examples:
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger,
or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might
bring a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who
entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit,
would ensue.
Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M.& W. 109, 114, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842) (opinion of Lord Abinger, C.B.).
If [the right of privacy] be incorporated into the body of the law . . . the attempts to logically
apply the principle will necessarily result, not only in avast amount of litigation, but in litigation
bordering upon the absurd, for the right of privacy, once established as a legal doctrine, cannot be
confined to the restraint of the publication of a likeness but must necessarily embrace as well the
publication of a word-picture, a comment upon one's looks, conduct, domestic relations or habits.
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 544-45, 64 N.E. 442, 443 (1902).
247 Examples:
Those actions for interference with domestic relations which carry an accusation of sexual
misbehavior—that is to say, criminal conversation, seduction, and to some extent alienation of
affections—have been peculiarly susceptible to abuse. Together with the action for breach of
promise to marry, it is notorious that they have afforded a fertile field for blackmail and extortion
by means of manufactured suits in which the threat of publicity is used to force a settlement.
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at 929 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
[I]f ignorance of the law were admitted as a ground of exemption, the courts would be involved in
questions which it were scarcely possible to solve, and which would render the administration of
justice impracticable. If ignorance of law were admitted as a ground of exemption, ignorance of
law would always be alleged by the party, and the court, in every case, would be bound to decide
the point.
1 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 498 (3d ed. 1869); see also supra text accompanying notes 97, 103-04,
109 (Formal Realizability arguments made against the recognition and extension of the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress).
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2. The rule in question should be chosen because the alternative rests upon a principle which
has no logical stopping point and, if applied in its fullest extension, will lead to results which are
unfair, unjust, or contrary to public policy. (This form of the argument is the familiar "Slippery
Slope" argument.)246
3. The rule in question should be chosen over its alternative because it is easier to prove
whether or not the rule has been complied with; the alternative involves a standard which creates
serious proof problems leading to either:
(a) inconsistent and arbitrary verdicts by juries who differ on what constitutes adequate proof;
(b) awards or benefits to undeserving plaintiffs or exculpation for undeserving defendants
who are able to deceive decisionmakers through cunning or guile;
(c) inappropriately inflated awards or benefits to plaintiffs who have suffered only minimal
or moderate harm (or reduced verdicts or penalties against defendants incommensurate with their
real degree of responsibility); or
(d) strike suits or blackmail by disgruntled plaintiffs against innocent defendants.247
4. The rule in question should be chosen because the alternative will result in an avalanche
of frivolous legal claims or defenses. The task of separating the small number of meritorious suits,
claims, or defenses from the frivolous ones will overburden the court system and will leave less time
248 Examples:
[T]here can be no question but that a rash of new applications from state prisoners will pour into
the federal courts, and 98%of them will be frivolous, if history is any guide. This influx will
necessarily have an adverse effect upon the disposition of meritorious applications, for, . . . they
will "be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely
to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search.”
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 445-46 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) (arguing that a procedural default furnishing an
adequate and independent ground for a state conviction should bar habeas corpus relief) (quoting Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
Although cases may arise in which the emotional distress absent physical harm may not be
temporary or slight, nothing before us indicates that most such claims are not of that character. We
are unwilling, therefore, to impose upon the judicial system and potential defendants the burden of
dealing with claims of damages for emotional distress that are trivial, evanescent, temporary,
feigned, or imagined, in order to ensure that occasional claims of a more serious nature receive
judicial resolution.
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 555, 437 N.E.2d 171, 180 (1982).
249 Example:
[T]he drafters of Article 2 [of the Uniform Commercial Code] proceeded on the conviction that
general commercial law was prototypically adapted to standards. This choice was explicitly based
on the claim that ideas like "reasonableness" and "good faith" provide greater predictability in
practice than the intricate and technical rule system they have replaced.
Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 4, at 1704-05.
250 Example:
"Every trial lawyer is well aware that juries often do in fact allow recovery in cases of
contributory negligence, and that the compromise in the jury room does result in some diminution
of the damages because of the plaintiff’s fault. But the process is at best a haphazard and most
unsatisfactory one." (Prosser, Comparative Negligence [41 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1953)] p. 4; footnote
omitted ) . . . . It is manifest that this state of affairs, viewed from the standpoint of the health and
vitality of the legal process, can only detract from public confidence in the ability of law and legal
institutions to assign liability on a just and consistent basis.
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 811-12,532 P.2d 1226, 1231, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 863 (1975) (arguing for
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to consider meritorious actions fully and fairly, with the result that the courts will be less able to
administer justice efficiently.248
B. Substantive Realizability Arguments
1. The use of per se rules will not achieve the desired level of judicial administrability. Per
se rules can never anticipate the multitude of factual situations a court may confront, and will lead
to a confusing complex of rules, exceptions, and counterexceptions. In fact, directing the jury to use
their own common sense in the application of a simple standard, in the long run, will lead to fairer
and more predictable results.249
In contrast, adherence to draconian per se rules which prevent a substantively just result
(compensation to injured plaintiffs or exculpation to defendants) in the name of judicial
administrability will lead to sub rosa manipulation of existing doctrine by judges and juries in favor
of sympathetic litigants, or even jury nullification. Ultimately, this will lead to disrespect for the law
and inconsistent and arbitrary results.250
comparative negligence standard).
A further example of how rigid rules can be manipulated involves the now abandoned rule that to recover
for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff had to suffer physical damage from some direct impact to
the plaintiff’s body. The justification for this rule was, of course, that it would prevent false claims from being filed.
See supra text accompanying note 97. However, in order to get around the harshness of this rule, the courts began to
find that the slightest impact was adequate to serve as the basis for a cause of action for emotional distress. See. e.g.,
Porter v. Delaware, L.W.R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (dust got in plaintiff’s eye); Morton v. Stack, 122
Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 969 (1930) (plaintiff inhaled smoke); Kenny v. Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 A. 343 (1925)
(hair of mouse in spoonful of stew touched roof of plaintiffs mouth).
251 Examples:
When a legal principle is pushed to an absurdity, the principle is not abandoned, but the absurdity
avoided. The courts are competent, we think, to deal with difficulties of the sort suggested, and
case by case, through the traditional process of inclusion and exclusion, gradually to develop the
fullness of the principle and its limitations.
Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P.2d 438,447 (1941 ) (arguing in favor of recognizing right of
privacy and rejecting argument that the principle would have no stopping point).
The genius of the common law is that the case-by-case analysis permits opening and closing of the
door to the courtroom. . . . In my judgment, the assertion that appellant should be denied relief
because his case represents the opening wedge of a theory which might produce further litigation
is an inappropriate judicial consideration.
Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 188, 319 A.2d 174, 182 (1974) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
252 Examples:
[I]t is hardly uncommon for our criminal justice system to deal with false and fabricated criminal
charges. Indeed, our jurisprudence is designed to test the very truth or falsity of accusations in all
criminal proceedings. We see no basis for the supposition that it will completely and utterly fail to
operate in the circumstances here presented . . . .
State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 226, 372 A.2d 386, 389 (Law Div. 1977).
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2. The fact that no doctrinal principle determines the scope of its own extension is no
justification for refusing to recognize principles which are substantively correct in most ordinary
contexts. It is always possible to dream up ridiculous hypotheticals in which a principle, if carried
too far, would lead to an unjust result. However, the very purpose of the judicial system is to define
the limits of principles of law. Adoption of the alternative rule would simply countenance unjust
results in a large number of cases.
Judges and juries will be able to decide the proper scope of the rule's protection through case-
by-case adjudication and the normal common law development of doctrine. Over time, a consistent
and coherent doctrinal framework will emerge which is just, nonarbitrary, and predictable. (This
form of response is an Anti-Slippery Slope argument.)251
3. The fact that certain rules may involve difficult questions of proof and require juries to
make credibility judgments is not an argument against their adoption. The very purpose of a jury
system is to try difficult and contested questions of fact and ascertain the truth. Undeserving litigants
will always try to deceive juries, regardless of the cause of action, and the courts sit to sort out valid
claims from the invalid, and real damages from the feigned. The alternative rule would simply throw
the baby out with the bath water, by denying both deserving and undeserving litigants a chance to
prove the existence and amount of their injury (if they are plaintiffs) or a chance to demonstrate their
innocence (if they are defendants).252
We believe that it is unreasonable to eliminate causes of action of an entire class of persons
simply because some undefined portion of the designated class may file fraudulent lawsuits.. .
."Courts must depend upon the efficacy of the judicial processes to ferret out the meritorious from
the fraudulent in particular cases."
Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 761,518 P.2d 362, 370 (1974) (arguing against the constitutionality of guest
statutes) (quoting Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 431, 289 P.2d 218, 225 (1955)).
See also supra text accompanying notes 95, 100-01, 106 (substantive realizability arguments made in favor
of the extension of the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
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253 Example: 
That some claims maybe spurious should not compel those who administer justice to shut their
eyes to serious wrongs and let them go without being brought to account. It is the function of
courts and juries to determine whether claims are valid or false. This responsibility should not be
shunned merely because the task may be difficult to perform.
Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (1961).
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4. The purpose of the court system is to separate meritorious claims from nonmeritorious
claims. If all claims were meritorious there would be no need for a judicial system. The alternative
rule would deny relief to deserving plaintiffs or a valid defense to deserving defendants simply
because of a fear that many other litigants will come before the court who may not be so deserving253.
